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Motivation
The real euro area house price has increased steadily since 1997 reaching more than 6.5% in 
2004 and 2005. The rise on its own is not as striking as the long lasting effect of the phe-
nomenon. Indeed, it is the longest lasting house price increase ever experience in the euro area 
since data are available. Dramatic asset price volatility can harm real economic activity, as 
witnessed by manifold historical episodes like in Japan in the beginning of the 90s. Boom-
bust cycles in asset prices impinge on household’s wealth and so aggregated demand. Due to 
asymmetric information, a dramatic collapse can eventually cause a credit-crunch or even a 
disruption of the credit supply (systemic failure). 
ECB’s primary objective is to maintain price stability, which means broader spoken macro-
economic stability. As house price movements have significant effects on real economic activ-
ity, the ECB has to pay special attention on house market development. In ECB policy, the 
second pillar pertains to the money aggregate M3, while mortgage loan development is a 
counterpart of M3. In 2005, the ECB suspected mortgage loan development to fuel soaring 
house prices. Thus, this thesis aims at shedding more light on the factors driving house prices. 
Is there any fear of sharp decline? More precisely, the thesis addresses following questions: 
- In which framework can we explain house price movements? Can we explain house price 
movements in an asset pricing model underpinned by arbitrage mechanism or rather in a more 
general demand supply interaction framework? 
- Which factors drive house price movements? 
- What is the knock-on house prices, mortgage borrowing and stock of dwelling following a 
monetary policy shock qualitatively and quantitatively? 
- What belongs to short-term / and long-term? One task of the thesis is also to disentangle 
long-term from short-term dynamics. 
- Is current house price above its fundamental value? 
- If yes how would it converge back to its equilibrium level if the tide eventually started to 
turn? 
The  literature  partially  investigates  these  questions.  On  the  one  hand,  Tsatsaronis  &  Zhu 
(2004), IMF (2004) and Lecat & Mesonnier (2005) use a panel of OECD countries. However, 
they do not investigate either the interaction with the mortgage market, or the estimation of 
long-term house price, or the convergence to steady state. At least they come to general con-
clusions  on  house  market  and  price  determinants.  On  the  other  hand,  McArthy  &  Peach 
(2004) and Martinez & Angel (2003) focus on the USA and Spain respectively by using time 
series econometrics. Thus, their conclusions are country specific. No author investigates the 
situation in the euro area as a whole. To the best of my knowledge, no survey comes to euro 
area policy conclusions which could enlighten the ECB. Methodological development
The major problem with respect to the euro area is the lack of data. Indeed, the frequency of 
residential property price is as a rule yearly and for most countries only from the mid 70s to 
2005. The time dimension for time series econometrics is too low for reliable and stable esti-
mates. This raises the problem of stability and power of the estimates. As a result, in all my 
three working papers I implement the following strategy. I estimate the parameters in a panel 
econometric framework and thereafter use the estimated coefficients to simulate euro area 
fitted values. I do not derive country-specific conclusions but instead euro area conclusions. 
This assuages the criticism as regards the heterogeneity problem among cross-sections (coun-
tries). 
In my first working paper, I investigate the question whether one can explain past house price 
movements by the arbitrage theory. Since arbitrage is a static phenomenon, I use within FE 
and RE estimators. I tried many alternatives from the less to the most specified model. The 
residuals of all five models show a very strong autocorrelation. The pattern of the residuals 
proves that the theoretical framework is not suited to explain the history of house prices. Arbi-
trage is not the core mechanism in house price determination. As a result, conclusions based 
on house price over rents ratio are inconsistent. Why house price movements are not mainly 
driven by arbitrage in our empirical investigation? This may be due to large transaction costs, 
but  also  housing  is  un-tradable  by  nature,  and  finally  government  regulations.  There  are 
friendly tax schemes to promote home ownership against alternative assets, there are other 
government regulations like tenants rights and even massive public investment to build social 
houses for low-income households. 
Instead, in my second working paper, I suggest to analyze directly the interaction of supply 
and demand together with the mortgage market. I estimate together the reduced house market 
and the reduced mortgage market. I have three endogeneous variables: house prices, stock of 
dwelling and mortgage loan. To proxy ECT (error correction term), inspired by IMF (2004) 
and Lecat & Mesonnier (2005), I try three different affordability ratios. The two last ratios are 
interest rate adjusted. To the best of my knowledge, nobody has estimated a SEM (Simultane-
ous Equation Model): house market, mortgage market in a panel framework and that for the 
euro area. First, a FE term is the minimum heterogeneity to allow due to the strong heteroge-
neity among countries. As a result, RE and pooled OLS are biased. Second, the house price 
process exhibits strong persistence due to the household expectations on the demand side and 
the inertia of the supply. As house price is a persistent process, the autocorrelation term ren-
ders the within FE (LSDV) also biased. To estimate consistent estimates with endogeneous 
variables, IV methodology must be implemented, like Anderson & Hsiao (1981) or the well-
known GMM Arellano-Bond (1991) dynamic panel estimator (AB). However, in macro panel 
data, the time dimension is much larger than the cross-sectional dimension. As proved by 
Haque, Pesaran & Sharma (1999) but also Judson & Owen (1997) a trade off arises between 
efficiency and consistency. As a result, I check the results with other estimators which are 
biased but may be more efficient, e.g. the LSDV (within FE estimator). The LSDV estimates 
are close to the AB estimates, thus validating the choice of the AB estimator. 
In  the  third  working  paper,  a  general  equilibrium  model  underpins  the  choice  of  macro-
variables. Again, the small time dimension on a country level hinders robust estimates with 
classical time series via VECM methodology. Heterogeneous estimators are normally unstable 
(individual country estimates vary within wide ranges) and unreliable, although they have the 
desirable property of allowing for differences among countries. Panel econometrics allow a substantial gain in power. Thus, to disentangle long-term from short-term dynamics, the PMG 
(Pooled Mean Group) estimator developed by Pesaran, Shin & Smith (1997) is used. The 
PMG assumes homogeneity of long-run coefficients (or a sub-set) but without making im-
plausible assumption of common short-term coefficients. In the short-term coefficients are 
allowed to vary across countries. Indeed, mortgage and house market in the euro area are char-
acterized to be strongly heterogeneous (ECB, 2003 and section 2, third working paper). Once 
again, to the best of my knowledge as regards the housing market in the euro area or in a 
country, nobody has never used the PMG methodology to estimate a long-run house price 
equilibrium. 
Common conclusions
The conclusions derived from the second and third working papers are alike. First, the short-
term dynamics is essentially driven by disposable income per capita and the autoregressive 
term. Moreover, the demographic variables and rents do not account in the short-term house 
price dynamics. Second, the long-term house price phenomenon is better investigated in the 
third working paper than in the second. The empirical results of the PECM (third working 
paper) suggest a strong long-term empirical relationship between house price, disposable in-
come, interest rate, stock of dwelling, population, and mortgage loan. Moreover, long-term 
house price equilibrium is mainly driven by disposable incomes and interest rates. In the sec-
ond working paper, real house prices show mean reversion to affordability ratios, crude and 
interest rate adjusted. The model with the crude affordability ratio explains actual house price 
accurately except from 2002 to 2005. This is because it does not capture the interest rate 
moves in level and in variation. 
Two economic implications can be derived. First, in the wake of the EMU process, house-
holds in the euro area have experienced a positive shift in their borrowing capacity which have 
a positive impact on house price dynamics. Second, the business cycle since 1999 has been 
stabilized by means of an optimal "leaning against the wind policy" which has no pedigree in 
the  euro  area.  Since  2001,  the  economic  slowdown  should  have  dampened  house  price 
growth. However, the weak economic activity has been offset by an accommodative policy. 
Indeed, monetary policy stance indicators like interest rate and mortgage loan development 
prove a loose policy which sustained strong housing demand. Low short-term interest rates 
and expectations of future price increase allowed households to capture housing credits with 
apparent strong collateral. The staggered housing supply has provoked an excess of demand 
which has fueled soaring house prices. At the time this thesis is written, this demand is still 
overshooting supply and the disequilibrium has not started to revert yet.  
Current house price cycle is largely above 2% since 1998, i.e. already 8 years, the longest last-
ing cycle ever experienced. Two effects mentioned above explain this, i.e. low interest rate in 
level due to the ECB credibility (in addition, international low inflation environment) and 
variation in interest rate (optimal monetary policy). In contrast, the duration of the previous 
cycle was much shorter. As inflation was already rising in the end of the 80s, the Bundesbank 
raised its discount rate in 1988, and kept tightening it until 1992 due to the German monetary 
reunification. The one to one exchange with the OST mark obliged the Bundesbank to lead an 
even harsher policy. This provoked a German specific shock. The other member countries of 
the ERM (European Exchange Rate Mechanism) had to follow at odds with an optimal mone-
tary policy. Consequently, the “euro area” interest rates increased dramatically. Beyond the 
cyclical component, the overall interest rate level was excessively high, well above the opti-mal interest rate which would have been necessary to stabilize the “euro area” business cycle 
and to maintain price stability. The financial liberalization in the mid-80s caused sharp real 
estate increases. Thereafter, high interest rates coupled with a weak business cycle and a credit 
crunch due to bank distress dampened relatively quickly soaring house prices. 
In the third working paper, the PMGE (Pooled Mean Group Estimator) which estimates the 
euro area house price equilibrium depicts three positive misalignments with respect to actual 
house prices. The first started during the second oil price shock until the mid 80’s. The second 
began in the late 80’s and ended in the mid 90’s. Finally, current house prices have overshot 
equilibrium price since 2001 and have not shown mean reversion yet. This history is in line 
with the literature on housing. However, the gap between house price equilibrium and current 
price cannot be assimilated to a bubble as defined by Stiglitz (1990). Instead, the misalign-
ment of current prices to long-term equilibrium price characterizes a natural feature of the 
functioning of the house market. 
As regards the mortgage market, collateral (house price) is the only core factor. Consequently, 
house market and mortgage market strongly interact via the collateral. Banks relax their lend-
ing standards by favorable house price prospects due to asymmetric information. Households 
can capture more mortgage loans which fuels demand. Higher house price impinges positively 
on household’s wealth. This self-perpetuating process is then reversed by a trigger event like 
monetary policy tightening. An interest rate increase of 1% causes a 1% house price inflation 
drop and a 0.4% decline in mortgage loan growth rate in the long-term. The interest rate shock 
has only a temporary effect on the mortgage market on its own but the collateral (house price) 
drop leads to a long lasting fall in mortgage loan volume. To conclude, interest rate increase 
impinges negatively on real house price growth, proving that demand outweighs supply. As a 
result, monetary can influence house price growth. 
Supposing the tide starts to turn in 2006, current house prices would smoothly catch-up equi-
librium price in 5 to 6 years according to the PECM. In the simulation of current house prices 
adjustment to equilibrium level, I suppose that all explanatory variables equal simultaneously 
their steady value in 2006 and onwards. The adjustment depicts a 4% growth rate in 2006 de-
caying steadily and slowly over time. This is a smooth and soft landing in opposite to the 
“biggest bubble in history” documented by the Economist for instance. This empirical study 
might prove that no recession will occur and even less a deflation. First, most of the huge 
house price increase in the euro area is explained by the fundamentals and second, the bank 
risk exposure is relatively moderate, they have mostly already implemented Basel II. Bank risk 
management includes real estate stress test scenarios where expected stress losses are thor-
oughly estimated. The conclusion of the thesis concerns the euro area. Thus, sub-level or local 
crises are not excluded. 
Reading
All three working papers are self-contained and can be read independently. Nevertheless, there 
is clearly a progression over the three working papers. The first paper tries to explain house 
price movements by means of the arbitrage theory. The pattern of the residuals proves that the 
theoretical framework is not suited to explain the history of house prices. Arbitrage is not the 
core mechanism in house price determination. As a result, the second paper analyzes directly 
the interaction of supply and demand together with the mortgage market. A SEM is estimated 
by means of the well-known GMM Arellano-Bond (1991) dynamic panel estimator. The em-pirical estimates render satisfactory results of the short-term dynamics. However, the long-
term specification is less well specified. Consequently, the third paper disentangles long-term 
from short-term dynamics by means of a PMG estimator developed by Pesaran, Shin & Smith 
(1997). The long-term equation estimates allow simulating a long-term euro area house price. 
Furthermore, the PMG assumes homogeneity of long-run coefficients (or a sub-set) but with-
out  making  implausible  assumption of common short-term coefficients. This assuages the 
criticism regarding the inherent homogeneity assumption in the panel framework. In conclu-
sion, the three papers highlight the main determinants driving the house price dynamics and 
the possible misalignment with respect to the long-run house price equilibrium. CONTENTS
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Abstract
Real house prices have risen to historical levels in the last eight years in numerous euro
area countries like Ireland, Spain and the Netherlands and to a lesser extent in France and
Belgium. Since 1997, euro area house prices have grown positively and have increased steadily
reaching almost 7% in 2004 and 2005 despite the falling real house price in Germany which
accounts for roughly one third of the euro area house prices. As a result, the European
central bank (ECB) has shown concern about this dramatic appreciation. Indeed, large real
house price movements might cause adverse shocks on the economy via the wealth eﬀect and
the bank lending channel, which in turn impinge on the HICP (Harmonized Index Consumer
Price). Consequently, this paper aims at answering the question whether the current residen-
tial property price is in line with the fundamental price. Arbitrage equations underpinned
by the asset pricing theory are estimated to ﬁnd out what is explained by fundamentals
and what may be due to speculative behavior. The robustness of the estimation is highly
improved by the use of panel econometrics. The empirical results show an overvaluing of
approximately 12% in the euro area. However, the pattern of the residuals casts some doubts
on the validity of the arbitrage theory and thus on the empirical results. Indeed, housing as-
sets are non-tradable by nature and house prices might not be essentially driven by arbitrage
behavior.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C13, C23, G12
Key words: panel econometrics, asset pricing, house price
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11 Introduction
The unprecedented dramatic real house price increase for the last 8 years in numerous
European countries and elsewhere in the world raised a question: can the booming house
price be explained by fundamentals, or is it rather due to speculative behavior with the
threat to burst? Dramatic asset price volatility can have signiﬁcant eﬀect on real eco-
nomic activity, as witnessed by numerous historical episodes ranging from the 1929 Wall
Street crash to the more recent Tokyo housing and equity bubble. Boom-bust cycles in
asset prices can eventually cause either a period of credit crunch (due to asymmetric in-
formation) as highlighted by Bernanke (1983), Bernanke et al. (1995), or even a collapse
of the entire ﬁnancial system - systematic failure - via bank bankruptcy. Besides, strong
asset price volatility can harm the real economy essentially through housing wealth eﬀect,
which in turn impinges on private consumption and aggregate demand (OECD, 2002 ;
IMF, 2001). As the primary objective of the ECB is to maintain price stability, the ECB
pays attention to asset price movements without targeting it directly.
This paper aims at tackling the question whether current euro area house price increase
is sustainable, i.e. in line with the fundamentals. To investigate this question, this study
uses the theory of asset pricing valuation. Asset pricing theory in turn is based on the
concept of present value and arbitrage opportunity. The fundamental value of a house
can be considered as the present value of the real (expected) housing services over time.
House ownership (like any other asset) gives a ﬂow of house services proxied by rent
payments during time of possession. In other words, the fundamental house price results
from households arbitrage opportunity between housing assets and alternative assets like
bonds for instance. Thus, the purchase of a house gives a ﬂow of its future rents during
time of possession, and ﬁnally a gain/loss when selling the house (Ayuso & Restoy, 2003;
Bessone, Heitz, & Boissinot, 2005).
The choice of the econometric methodology is based on two considerations. The ﬁrst
involves the time dimension of the available data. Indeed, on a country level the time
dimension is too short for robust estimates. The annual data available ranges from 1975
to 2005 (31 observations) for house prices. Panel econometrics allows a substantial gain in
power. Moreover, panel estimators are proven to deal better with the problem of measure-
ment bias (see Baltagi, 1995). Second, one major criticism against panel econometrics due
to the parameter homogeneity hypothesis, does not really hold in this paper. Indeed, the
coeﬃcients estimated are used on a euro area level. As arbitrage equations are considered
static, panel estimator like ﬁxed eﬀects and random eﬀects are considered.
An outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 highlights euro area house market
stylized facts. Section 3 reviews the basic theory which underpins the equation estimated
under the hypothesis of either time-varying risk premium or constant risk premium. Sec-
tion 4 investigates the stationary and cointegration pattern of the panel series and reviews
the main testing strategy used. Section 5 shows the empirical results concerning not only
the elasticities but also the statistical tests. Finally, Section 6 concludes by comparing
fundamental price and current house price in the euro area as a whole.
22 Some stylized facts in the euro area house market
The euro area real house price growth rate has risen steadily from year to year since 1997,
reaching almost 7% in 2005 (see Figure 1). From 1975 to 2005, such a large growth rate
was only attained once, the peak year of the well-known 90’s bubble which occurred in
the majority of euro area countries (see Annex 3).1 The average real euro area annual
growth rate for the period 1997 to 2005 is more than twice as large as the growth rate of
the whole sample (see Table 1, last line EA8). All euro area countries have experienced
the same pattern, except Germany (see Table 1). Indeed, the German real house price
has exhibited negative growth rates for the last 8 years while Germany accounts for more
than one third of the euro area house price (see Annex 2 where aggregation methodology
is discussed). Despite this fact, euro area house prices have experienced a strong increase.
As can be remarkably seen in Figure 1, house price motion exhibits a strong cycle, one of
its key feature. Consequently, house price movements in the last eight years correspond
to a booming phase, which is nothing exceptional. However, never before 1975 had such a
house price increase lasted so long, i.e. more than 8 years and that in so many countries.
Countries which have experienced outstanding real house price increase in the last eight
years are: Ireland, Spain, France and the Netherlands with respectively: 11.27, 8.76, 6.43
and 6.22 on average (see Table 1 and Annex 3). The other euro area countries have also
experienced a strong house price increase2 but to a lesser extent.
Table 1: univariate analysis housing prices and rents growth rate (Real)
Country Residential Property Price Housing rents
1976-2005 1997-2005 1976-2005 1997-2005
Aver. St. Dev Aver. St. Dev Aver. St. Dev Aver. St. De.
DE -0.44 2.64 -2.20 1.18 0.69 1.28 -0.10 0.70
FR 2.57 4.97 6.43 4.40 0.74 1.37 0.35 1.18
IT 2.26 7.53 3.94 4.23 0.84 3.69 1.05 1.76
ES 4.27 9.62 8.76 4.68 -0.56 3.81 1.56 1.36
NL 2.90 9.26 6.22 5.20 1.40 1.69 0.60 1.44
BE 2.44 6.02 3.91 1.69 0.71 1.53 0.04 0.67
FI 1.39 9.97 5.79 4.78 0.41 2.54 1.28 0.69
IE 4.58 7.72 11.27 6.17 -0.77 5.81 1.55 4.54
EA8 1.83 3.63 4.39 2.17 0.74 1.02 0.58 0.85
This study aims at understanding the underlying factors explaining the booming house
price. In an asset pricing approach, the most straightforward idea is to investigate whether
price movements are commensurate with yields for a given asset, the so-called price-earning
ratio. Figure 1 shows that it is not the ﬁrst time that the euro area price rent ratio
(house prices over rents) deviates from its historical mean. However, the sharp increase
of the house price rent ratio is exceptional, reaching unprecedented levels in countries like
Ireland, Spain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands (see Annex 3). The average growth
1The house price bubble at the beginning of the 90’s has been particularly signiﬁcant in Spain, Finland
and Italy, and to a lesser extent in Ireland, France and Germany.
2As regards the outlier Germany, I suggest the following explanation. The reuniﬁcation provoked
massive investment in the housing sector, which in turn increased housing supply. Thereafter, housing
demand did not follow the supply as German households purchasing power ﬂattened. The staggered
housing supply could not adjust quickly enough to match demand. Excess housing supply may explain the
subdued house price.
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Figure 1:
rate of house price is systematically larger than housing rents for both periods and for
every country (except Germany). In four euro area countries (accounting for more than
ﬁfty percent of euro area house price) housing rents growth slowed down in the last eight
years (Table 1). A huge house price growth increase coupled with a moderate rent growth
explain the strong house price rent ratio increase in the euro area.
The volatility of both house prices and rents have fallen in the last nine years for all
countries. As a sheer matter of period division, the last nine years pertain to a booming
phase exclusively, whereas the entire time sample encompasses more than two cycles. As
can be seen in Table 1, the standard deviation of the last 9 years is smaller than the
one over the entire sample. On the other hand, the volatility of the real house prices are
systematically larger for all countries than the housing rents volatility for any period. As a
result, the house price cycle drives the house price rent ratio with a forward of a couple of
years. This is the consequence of a well known pattern observed on house market. House
prices exhibit stronger volatility than housing rents which is much more stable over time.
Legislative schemes protecting tenants rights dampen housing rents increase and volatility.
As a rule, housing rents track the consumer price index. Indeed, government measures try
to keep the lid on housing rents, at least state regulations try to maintain housing rents
in line with the cost of living for low income households.3 As a result, price ratio peaks
may not be due to a bubble caused by speculative behavior (Stiglitz, 1990)4 but rather to
3In France for instance, half of the dwelling rental park is owned by a public body which rents below
market price, the so-called "HLM". This public body is directly subsided by the Ministry of Social Aﬀairs.
4In Stiglitz’s deﬁnition, the non fundamental part of a price increase is a bubble. The level of price
which has been raised beyond what is consistent with the underlying fundamentals of the asset pricing
evaluation is considered a bubble. This phenomenon is based on expectations: buyers of the asset do so
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the consequence of government regulations. I will come back to this fact in the conclusion
of the paper.
Table 1 highlights the strong heterogeneity existing in residential property price volatil-
ity across euro area countries. Despite the convergence of macro-aggregates in the EMU,
the functioning of the housing market depends essentially on country and local structural
factors. The mortgage market system, local planing and urbanization schemes, taxes and
land availability for instance remain country and even local speciﬁc. Mortgage market fea-
tures aﬀect strongly house price volatility as stressed in ECB (2003) and by Tsatsaronis
& Zhu (2004). In countries where longer-term, ﬁxed rate mortgages with no prepayments
have been more important, house prices tend to be less sensitive to interest rates and
other macro-aggregates. This leads to less volatile house prices. The scatter diagram
above (Figure 2) corroborates this statement. Indeed, a robust negative correlation be-
tween house price volatility and the percentage of outstanding mortgage loans with ﬁxed
interest rate contracts is established. The Netherlands is the only outlier as house price
volatility is strong, despite a mortgage ﬁnance system predominantly based on ﬁxed mort-
gage rate payments. There are other features on the house market like Loan To Value
(LTV) and Mortgage Equity Withdrawal (MEW). Among countries with predominantly
ﬁxed mortgage interest rates, the Dutch mortgage market is the only one characterized
by a high LTV and where MEW is current practice (see Table 2). This might explain the
Dutch idiosyncrasy.
with the expectation of future price increase.
5Table 2. Heterogeneity among EMU countries in the mortgage market
Main Mortgage loan features Countries Sample Variables
Fixed rate contracts DE, FR, IT, NL, BE Group 1 Int. rate 1 i1, r1
Variable rate contract ES, FI, IE Group 2 Int. rate 2 i2, r2
Low LTV, restrictive MEW DE, FR, IT, ES, BE Sub-s1 dummy du1
High LTV, developed MEW NL, FI, IE Sub-s2
A thorough review of national features within the euro area mortgage market is given in
ECB (2003) and by Tsatsaronis & Zhu (2004). Based on these two surveys, Table 2 depicts
the salient features among the eight countries of the euro area (EA8) between ﬂoating and
ﬁxed mortgage rate tradition, but also between more or less conservative bank practices in
providing mortgage credit loans. MEW and high LTV characterize less conservative bank
lending behavior. As a result, slope heterogeneity between ﬁxed and variables mortgage
interest rate country groups might be necessary to ﬁnd consistent results. For country
group 2, the sensitivity of house prices with respect to short term interest rates should be
much larger, according to Meen’s (2002) empirical ﬁndings, for instance. Moreover, the
arbitrage mechanism between housing and an alternative asset might also work diﬀerently
in a country where MEW is current practice relative to a more conservative mortgage
market country. To conclude, the mortgage market features among euro area countries
schematized very crudely in Table 2, must be investigated during the estimation in section
5.
3 Asset pricing valuation
3.1 Basic model
In this section, I brieﬂy discuss basic theoretical aspects which underpin the empirical
estimation. The user cost of housing is commonly deﬁned as:
uct = Pt
 






see for instance Muellbauer & Murphy (1997) and McCarthy & Peach (2002); and r is
the real interest rate, δ is the depreciation rate, or the rate of maintenance costs including
property taxation, ﬁnally, the ratio expected house price (Pe) over house price is the
expected appreciation of house price. The representative household purchasing a house in
period t will bear the cost related to home ownership, i.e. the user cost uct described in
equation (1) and the price (value) of house purchased: Pt. The whole ﬁnancial expenses
in period t are then: uct + Pt. On the other hand, housing might yield rents from tenant
or housing services (equivalent to rents) if the owner keeps the house for its own needs.
Like stocks or currency, house property does not guarantee payment of certain income.
The uncertainty concerning the rent payment (Rt) as well as the capital gain in terms of
future price is based on expectations. Under the hypothesis of risk-averse households, a
risk premium is introduced: ξt. As a result, housing revenue is characterized by housing
rents diminished by the risk premium : Rt −Ptξt. As household maximizes its utility in a
free market, the costs of house ownership equals housing yields, which gives equation:
uct + Pt = Rt − Ptξt, (2)
6and substituting equation (1) into (2) yields:
Pt(1 + rt) = Rt + Pe
t − Ptδt − Ptξt. (3)
Bessone & Boissinot (2005) derive the same arbitrage equation (3). The household
investing the amount Pt in an alternative asset (risk free bond) yields a return given in
the L.H.S. of equation (3). On the other hand, if the household invests in housing, it









− δt − rt. (4)
The risk premium equals the real housing rent, the expected house price inﬂation
subtracted from depreciation rate and the interest rate of a risk free asset.
3.2 Time-varying risk premium
The risk premium indicates the degree of risk households take. A higher risk premium
means more risk-averse households, i.e. they value a given risk higher. Figure 3 depicts the
euro area5 time-varying risk premium generated from equation (4) according to two diﬀer-
ent house price expectations. Under the hypothesis of naïve expectations,6 it is assumed
that the expected house price growth is the average of last two years (moving average).
Since 2000, the risk premium has exceeded the 90’s house price bubble. Unfortunately,
the cycle of the risk premium is shaped by the house price cycle itself as can be observed
in Figure 3. The conclusion should thus be taken with caution. Consequently, a second
risk premium was calculated by assuming zero expectation (expected house price equals
current house price). This impedes the house price cycle to shape the time-varying risk
premium. The zero expectation risk premium is substantially less volatile than the former
premium. However, this latter risk premium has been increasing since 1997. Housing
depreciation does not account for much and rents slightly increased in the euro area. Al-
together, the increase of the zero house price growth expectation risk premium is due to a
falling interest rate. The U-shaped zero house price growth expectation risk premium re-
counts the history of the real interest rate and monetary policy the last 30 years. Overall,
the level of time-varying risk premium might be misleading in evaluating possible house
price bubbles and speculative behavior.
However, the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the naïve expectation risk premium shows interesting
properties as leading indicator of euro area house price growth rate, see Figure 4 (and
Annex 5). The ﬁrst diﬀerence of the euro area risk premium has exhibited downward
trends since 2001 but is still positive. If we believe in this empirical regularity, it may
indicate that real house price growth rates will slow down as the indicator is downward-
trended.
5Annex 4 shows country-speciﬁc risk premiums.
6The view of naïve forecast expectation can be challenged, so can rational expectations. Semi-rational
expectations seem a realistic assumption with regard to earlier empirical ﬁnding (Muellbauer & Mur-
phy, 1997). A model must be estimated, however, to extract semi-rational expectations from the data.
Consequently, I keep on the naïve expectation hypothesis.
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House price growth expectation risk neutral households
Figure 5:
3.3 Constant risk premium
The hypothesis of time-varying risk premium is relaxed in this subsection. I suppose in-
stead risk-neutral households, i.e. with zero risk premium. An inﬂation house price (πh)
expectation (operator Et) can be derived from equation (3). This house price expectation
does not contain speculative elements as deﬁned by Stiglitz (1990) or self-fulﬁlling expec-
tations aspects. Instead the expectation in equation (5) is based on fundamental elements
like housing rents and interest rates.
Et(πh




Figure 57 depicts the euro area expected inﬂation with the actual real house price
growth. The huge real house price increase since 1997 cannot be explained by the "fun-
damentals". This "fundamental" expected house price does not help us any further as it
is the opposite of the "zero house price expectation risk premium" shown in Figure 3.
More promising is to suppose a non-zero time constant risk premium diﬀerent from
zero. As a rule, a myriad of theoretical and empirical studies use this hypothesis (Baker,
2002; Ayuso & Restoy 2003; McCarthy & Peach, 2004). Thus, solving equation (3) with









Pt + δt + ξ
. (6)
7Annex 6 depicts the "fundamental" house price expectations in euro area countries.
9Another alternative to derive almost the same equation (albeit less speciﬁed) is to con-
sider the fundamental house price as the present value of all future housing services which
is proxied by market housing rents. For instance Weeken (2004) derives such fundamental
house price. The theoretical underpinning is given in Aoki, Proudman & Vlieghe (2002)
and Piazzesi, Schneider & Tuzel (2003). These models consider the house price as the








r + ξ − g
. (7)
However equation (7) includes fewer variables than equation (6). Indeed, the depreci-
ation and expected capital gain are missing due to more restrictive hypotheses.
4 Data properties and panel econometrics
4.1 Unit root tests
Time series unit root tests (e.g. ADF or KPSS tests) applied individually to each section
(country) lack power. There are too few observations (T=31) for robust time series tests,
nevertheless the time span is long enough to be concerned by the stationary proprieties of
the series. As a consequence, to gain power, panel unit root tests are performed. Levin,
Lin & Chu (1993) and Im, Pesaran & Shin (1997) tests for instance do not take into
account possible cross-sectional correlations. Instead, a new generation of panel unit root
tests9 have been developed dealing with cross-sectional correlations: Bai & Ng (2001),
Moon & Perron (2003), Choi (2002). Monetary union and the convergence process
imply a very strong cross-sectional correlation among the series of the data set. This is
particularly true for the interest rates. All four tests perform a unit root test only on the
idiosyncratic component. The Bai & Ng test supposes to know the number of common
factors (total factor model) ; consequently this test is not performed. Moon & Perron,
but also Choi, on the other hand, eliminate the common components of the series, and so
perform a unit root test on the transformed series. Moon & Perron and Choi panel unit
root test are the most relevant in this study in view of their asymptotic properties.
Thus, Moon & Perron and Choi tests have been performed. The null hypothesis for
both tests is unit root. The number of lags were chosen automatically section by section
based on the SIC (Schwartz Information Criteria) with maximum lag order of 4. Annex
8 gives the main results. Consumer price inﬂation rate (π), depreciation rate (δ), the log
of the real house price (lnP) , the log of the real housing rents (lnR) but also nominal
interest rates (short-term: i1) and (long-term: i2) are I(1). The denomination 1 and 2
refers to country groups deﬁned in Table 2. House prices and housing rents are in log
level. On the other hand, the null hypothesis of unit root is rejected for the series: house
price rent ratio (P
R) and real interest rates (long: r1 and short: r2), they are considered
stationary. The house price ratio is the ratio of an I(1) over and I(1), which is, as a rule,
expected to be I(0). As regards the interest rates, the results are in line with the Fisher
equation. The nominal interest rates (long and short) and inﬂation are cointegrated with a
8A more detailed computation is given in Appendix 7. It is important to emphasize that in order to
solve equation 6, I am obliged to assume a constant (time-invariant) housing rent growth rate: g.
9The new generation of unit root tests have been performed thanks to the matlab codes developed by
Christophe Hurlin.
10cointegration coeﬃcient which equals one. Consequently, the residuals of nominal interest
rates (long and short) minus inﬂation rates are stationary and so are the real interest
rates.
4.2 Cointegration tests
The use of cointegration techniques to test the presence of long-run relationships among
integrated variables has enjoyed growing popularity in the empirical literature. Once again,
the inherently low power of these tests when applied to time series leads me to use panel
cointegration tests.10 Pedroni (1999) proposes 7 statistics to test the null hypothesis of
no-cointegration with multiple regressors (heterogenous slopes among cross sections). As
highlighted by Pedroni (2004), the panel-t and the group-t statistics oﬀer good asymptotic
properties in view of the panel dimension (time dimension and number of cross-sections).
As a result, the investigation on long-run cointegration among series will be based on these
two statistics only. It is also more relevant to use the parametric statistics, since the sample
accounts to only 248 observations. Under the Ho hypothesis of no-cointegration, the
statistics have to be compared with the critical values of the standard normal distribution
N(0,1).
Annex 9 reports the results of Pedroni’s cointegration tests. The null hypothesis is
clearly rejected at 5% for the two series house prices and rents. When nominal interest
rate is added (long or short), the null hypothesis of no-cointegration cannot be rejected at
any common level. However, according to Pedroni’s test, the four series house price, rents,
nominal short and long interest rate cointegrate. Inﬂation rate too cointegrate with the
former last series. However, the addition of depreciation rate weakens the result. Indeed,
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at 5% but almost at 10% for the panel ADF statistic.
To investigate the cointegration properties of the panel series, an alternative option will
also be used. The residuals of the diﬀerent speciﬁcations will be tested for unit roots.
4.3 Estimation strategy
Panel econometrics is chosen in this paper for manifold reasons. First, the time dimension
of the available data on a country level is too short for robust estimates. Indeed, the
annual data available ranges from 1975 to 2005 (31 observations). Panel econometrics
allows a substantial gain of power. Second, panel estimators are proven to deal better with
the problem of measurement bias (Baltagi, 1995). Third, one major critic against panel
econometrics lies in the strong hypothesis of parameter homogeneity. Hereinafter, the
panel coeﬃcients estimates are used to simulate euro area ﬁtted housing price. Conclusions
are not driven on a national level, but on a euro area level instead. This assuages the
scepticism as regards the homogeneity assumption pertaining to panel econometrics.
Estimating an arbitrage equation requires static estimators. Arbitrage is rather viewed
as an instantaneous phenomenon, i.e. static by nature where dynamism is absent. I trust
the arbitrage theory in this study.11 Currently, there are two extremes to estimate static
10The cointegration tests have been performed thanks to the Rats program provided by Pedroni (1999).
11The static view based on the arbitrage theory is followed slavishly. Consequently, static estimators like
FE and RE are used. However, the residuals shown in section 5 cast serious doubts on the relevance of this
hypothesis. It appears on the contrary that house price is an autoregressive process (strong persistence),
which ﬁnally questions the validity of the arbitrage theory in valuing house prices.
11phenomenon in panel econometrics. The ﬁrst supposes to estimate N separate regression
(for each country) and to calculate the coeﬃcient means. This estimator is consistent but
mostly ineﬃcient. At the other extreme are the traditional pooled estimators, such as
Fixed Eﬀects (FE), Random Eﬀects (RE) and pooled OLS which assume that the slope
coeﬃcients and error variance are identical. The asymptotic properties in case of large
T and small N with traditional panel econometric procedures have proven to produce
inconsistent estimates in panel data unless the slope coeﬃcients are in fact identical.
Thus, country speciﬁc conclusions based on panel econometrics are avoided. As already
stressed, panel estimated coeﬃcients are used to derive euro area conclusions. Although
this assuages the problem of coeﬃcient homogeneity, slope heterogeneity is tested to eschew
possible inconsistent estimates. This choice is grounded on the fact that ﬂoating versus
ﬁxed mortgage rate practice is the salient feature characterizing the diﬀerent European
mortgage market as explained in section 2. Furthermore, a breakdown into two subgroups
based on other mortgage market features as reported in Table 2, like LTV or MEW gives
almost the same subdivision, except the Netherlands. First, I will try both alternatives,
by including and then excluding the Netherlands from sub-group 2. Second, a Wald
test will be performed to determine whether coeﬃcients between group1 and group2 are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
In addition to slope heterogeneity, the classical heterogeneity tests to detect the pres-
ence of an unobserved time invariant eﬀect are also performed. The testing strategy
proposed by Greene (2003) is followed but adapted to the purpose of this study (see An-
nex 10). Accordingly, OLS estimates are compared to RE or FE estimates to determine
whether heterogeneity across sections (countries) is present. If the most restrictive form
was eventually chosen, i.e. pooled OLS, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity tests would
be performed.
Suppose a RE model estimate, i.e. heteroscedasticity is allowed among sections (coun-
tries): Yi,t = xi,tβ + ui + ei,t and ui is the unobserved time-invariant eﬀect. The error
composite term is ηi,s , and ηi,s = ui + ei,s . The Breush & Pagan (1979) test is per-
fectly suited to test the presence of an unobserved eﬀect. If the model does not contain
an unobserved eﬀect, pooled OLS is eﬃcient and all associated pooled OLS statistics are
asymptotically valid. The absence of an unobserved eﬀect is statistically equivalent to test
Ho: σu = 0 (null hypothesis) which is equivalent to test that the error composite term
ηi,s is not serial correlated corr(ηi,s,ηi,t) = 0 (Greene, 2003). Breush & Pagan (1979)
derive a statistic using the Lagrange multiplier principle in a likelihood setting. If the null
hypothesis is rejected, it proves that there is heteroscedasticity among sections, and so the
RE is signiﬁcant. However this does not mean yet that a RE is the most suited model, this
only proves that there is heterogeneity across sections. Indeed, there is another competing
speciﬁcation that might induce the same results, the FE.
Zama (1995) shows the inconsistency of the Breush & Pagan (1979) test under certain
circumstances. After estimation of a RE model, an alternative heteroscedasticity test has
been developed by Baltagi & Li.12 They consider a spatial panel regression model with
12Stata software performs a joint test for serial correlation and random eﬀects and calls it the Baltagi-Li
(1991-1995) test. However, to the best of my knowledge, the ﬁrst piece of literature explaining this test is
Baltagi, Song, Jung & Koh (2003) while Baltagi & Li (2000) deal with joint test of spatial correlation and
functional form, see under References.
12serial correlation over time for each spatial section and spatial dependence across these
sections on a particular point in time. In addition, they allow for heterogeneity across the
spatial sections through random eﬀects. Testing for any one of these symptoms ignoring
the other two leads to misleading results. They argue that ignoring serial correlations in
the error term results in consistent, but ineﬃcient estimates of the regression coeﬃcients
and biased standards errors. They derive a joint and conditional LM test. Under Ho, no
spatial or serial error correlation and no random country eﬀects is assumed. For the sake
of clarity, suppose serial correlation wants to be tested, the error composite term can be
rewritten: ηi,t = ui + νi,t as in the Baltagi & Li test, under Ho not only σu = 0 but also
νi,t is serially uncorrelated. More precisely, under Ho, the joint hypothesis is: σu = 0 and
ρ = 0 ; and νi,t = ρνi,t−1 + ζi,t with ζi,t being white noise.
To decide between a RE estimator or a within FE estimator, the Hausman (1979) test
is performed. Under the null of the Hausman test, both FE and RE are consistent and the
coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. The RE model assumes corr(ui,ei,t) = 0 and
if it does not hold, the RE is inconsistent, so the FE is the only alternative. The result
of the test is a vector of dimension k , the number of parameter estimated, i.e. dim(β)
which will be distributed as a χ2(k). If the null hypothesis is rejected, FE estimator is
consistent. For further explanations, see Greene (2003) and Annex 10.
In the same stance, heterogeneity tests can be performed following a FE estimation.
Indeed, the same type of heteroscedasticity test has been developed following a FE estimate
which, under the null hypothesis, assumes independence of the errors. A deviation from
independent errors in the context of panel series is likely to be due to contemporaneous
correlations across cross-sectional units. Thus, Breush & Pagan proposes to test cross-
sectional independence of residuals. Under the null hypothesis, uncorrelated residuals
among cross sections is assumed. The test is a χ2 test. The rejection of the null hypothesis
might indicate heteroscedasticity among cross sections and so justify the use of a FE or
RE estimator. Furthermore, a modiﬁed Wald test was performed to test for groupwise
heteroscedasticity. Under Ho, it is assumed that the variance of every single cross-section
equals the variance of the whole (hypothesis assumed in a pooled OLS). Finally a Fisher
test was performed on the signiﬁcance of the ﬁxed eﬀect constant, as explained in Annex
10.
If the conclusion of no heterogeneity came out, then the more restrictive pooled OLS
would be considered. The pooled OLS estimator is the most eﬃcient estimator among
all others, it is said to be BLUE.13 The key condition for pooled OLS to consistently
estimate the parameters is that the errors (ei,t) have mean zero and are uncorrelated
with each of the regressors (E(e)=0, Cov(xi,t,e)=0). The underlying theoretical model
tested is: Yi,t = xi,tβ+u+ei,t and ei,t is white noise. This pooled OLS does not allow any
heterogeneity among sections (countries). Consequently, it is assumed that all explanatory
variables are exogenous. An explanatory variable is said to be endogenous if it is correlated
with e. The endogeneity leads to inconsistent and biased estimations in an OLS framework.
Numerous reasons can cause endogeneity. The most current one is due to omitted variables.
Indeed, in a panel data set, it is very usual to have heterogeneity across section (countries)
without having a variable explaining it. Fixed eﬀects and random eﬀects take into account
13Best Linear Unbiased Estimator
13the unobserved eﬀects to a certain extent. Thus, FE and RE avert correlation between
regressors and the error terms.
The residuals of the pooled OLS need to be checked for autocorrelation and het-
eroscedasticity. The former is tested by means of Wooldridge’s (2003) autocorrelation test
in ﬁrst diﬀerence. The heteroscedasticity test is based on a likelihood ratio test, which
compares the variance corrected for heteroscedasticity by a FGLS estimator with respect
to the uncorrected variance. Strong autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity might indi-
cate the presence of unobserved heterogeneity through individual eﬀects. In that case,
the estimated parameters are inconsistent. In conclusion, these results suggest that the
OLS estimates suﬀer from a misspeciﬁcation due, for example, to unobserved countries
heterogeneity (omitted variable bias). This problem can be addressed by either adding
more explanatory variables or by allowing for additional individual eﬀects (FE or RE).
5 Empirical results
5.1 Model speciﬁcations
In section 3, two equations were derived, i.e. (6) and (7); and in section 4.1 and 4.2 unit
root tests and cointegration tests concluded on series characteristics. Thus, theoretical
consideration but also cointegration and stationary properties give ﬁve possible speciﬁca-
tions which will be investigated:
Pt
Rt
= α1rt + α0. (S1)
lnPt = α2 lnRt + α3it + α0. (S2)
lnPt = α2 lnRt + α3it + α4πt + α0. (S3)
lnPt = α2 lnRt + α3it + α4πt + α5δt + α0. (S4)





The forms of the speciﬁcations have been chosen to eschew spurious estimation. In
speciﬁcation (S1), all variables are stationary. In speciﬁcation (S2), the real house price
(in log) is I(1) and thus introducing nominal interest is the only alternative. Arbitrage
equations are generally expressed in real terms, consequently including inﬂation might be
justiﬁed.14 In speciﬁcation (S2) and (S3), all variable series contain a unit root. According
to Pedroni’s cointegration test, the variable series in speciﬁcation (S2) and (S3) cointegrate,
under the condition that both, long and short nominal interest rates are included (see
Annex 9). Speciﬁcations (S4) and (S5) only include variable series integrated of order one.
However, the cointegration weakens when the depreciation rate is added. In speciﬁcation
(S5) the naïve house price expectation growth is I(0). Even though speciﬁcation (S5)
14The coeﬃcient in front of the inﬂation variable (α4) should be 1 to match precisely arbitrage theory.
Indeed, nominal interest rate minus inﬂation yields real interest rate, which is the determinant variable for
arbitrage decisions with respect to real house prices.
14comprises this I(0) variable, I refrain from excluding it on the grounds of economic theory.
Furthermore, it is worth undertaking the empirical estimation of all ﬁve speciﬁcations and
to compare them. The validity of each speciﬁcation and the best among the speciﬁcations
will be evaluated in the light of the empirical results.
5.2 Coeﬃcient estimates
To be on the safe side, I will ﬁrst estimate the most heterogeneous form discussed in
section 4.3, i.e. the FE model with slope heterogeneity between country group 1 and 2.15
Table 3 reports the empirical results. Variables r1 and r2 stand for real interest rate
in country group 1, respectively country group 2. By the same token, i1 and i2 denote
nominal interest rate in country group 1 respectively country group 2. All estimated
semi-elasticities have the right sign. Moreover, the t-test (student test) indicates that all
coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant except inﬂation in speciﬁcation (S3) and (S4), and depreciation.
The Fisher tests (Table 3) corroborate the overall signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients. As
expected, the explanatory power of the model increases as the speciﬁcation includes more
variables. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation only explains 11% which is very low whereas speciﬁcation
(S5) explains almost two third of the total variance. Consequently, imposing a price ratio
seems too restrictive as R square rises to 32% in speciﬁcation (S2). Furthermore, the
coeﬃcient in front of log of housing rents (α2) equals 0.28, which is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from 1 at 99%, according to the Wald test. According to the theory, the coeﬃcient should
have been close to 1. In addition, coeﬃcients α2 in speciﬁcation (S3), (S4) and (S5) are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1 at 99% according to the Wald test.
Not surprisingly, when the short-term and the long-term interest rate are included in
the speciﬁcation, the short-term rate is not signiﬁcant in country group 1, and vice-versa,
long-term interest rate is not signiﬁcant in country group 2. Thus, arbitrage decision in
countries with ﬂoating mortgage rate are more sensitive to short maturity bonds; whereas
households in countries where ﬁxed mortgage rate is predominant rather focus on bonds
with longer maturity. Five year bond yield (respectively 3 month inter-bank oﬀered rate)
is the natural counterpart to ﬁxed mortgage rate (respectively ﬂoating). Consequently,
the short-term interest rate in country group 1 and the long-term in country group 2 are
dropped.
The interest rate semi-elasticities between country group 1 and group 2 are signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from each other according to the Wald test at 99% in (S2), (S3), (S4) and
(S5). Country group 1 semi-elasticities are larger in absolute value than country group
2 in speciﬁcation (S1), and vice-versa for all other speciﬁcations. This result casts some
more doubts on the validity of speciﬁcation (S1). Meen (2002) shows that in the long-run,
the elasticity in the UK is around 3 times as great as in the US.16 In countries where
longer-term ﬁxed rate mortgage predominate, house prices tend to be less sensitive to
movements in short and even long-term interest rates. The explanation lies in the trans-
mission mechanism of the monetary policy. Monetary policy interest rate moves impinge
more strongly on the mortgage rate where adjusted (ﬂexible) mortgage interest rate is
current practice. The wealth eﬀect aﬀects more strongly households (IMF, 2001) and
15Including the Netherlands in the second group improved the estimates. This splits the cross-section
exactly into half: four countries in group 1 and four countries in group 2.
16In the USA, ﬁxed mortgage rate practices predominate, while adjustable ones predominate in the UK
mortgage market.
15the credit channel (Bernanke, 1983; Bernanke & Gertler, 1995) impinge more heavily on
household’s net worth. Together, these eﬀects may well explain the house price sensitivity
diﬀerential with respect to interest rate between country group 1 and 2. However, I am
aware that these explanations do not stem from the arbitrage theory.
Table 3: FE coeﬃcient estimates
Speciﬁcation (S1) (S2) (S3) (S4) (S5)
Dep. var. Pt
Rt lnPt lnPt lnPt lnPt
α0 0.93 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 0.05





lnRt α2 0.28 0.40 0.40 0.51
(1.80) (2.27) (2.27) (3.21)
i1t α3 -2.55 -2.23 -2.26 -2.41
(−3.36) (−2.16) (−2.16) (−2.79)
i2t α3 -4.01 -3.93 -3.94 -4.04
(−7.29) (−5.28) (−5.27) (−6.50)
πt α4 0.09 0.12 1.28
(0.88) (0.19) (2.24)






R2 0.11 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.63
F F(2,238) F(3.237) F(4,228) F(5,227) F(6,210)
=11.55 =36.09 =28.20 =22.47 =58.49
p-lim 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
As depicted in Table 4, the wide range of FE coeﬃcients indicates harsh heterogeneity
among countries. The null hypothesis of all FE equal to zero (ui = 0) is strongly rejected by
the Fisher test at any common level of signiﬁcance (Table 4, last rows). Finally, on average,
half of the total variance is due to the FEs, as can be seen in Table 4 (rho). Altogether,
this indicates strong heterogeneity among countries. Nevertheless, I follow the testing
strategy framed in Annex 10 and section 4.3. Moreover, despite strong heterogeneity
among countries, there is another candidate estimator which deals with heterogeneity
among sections: the RE estimator.
16Table 4: Fixed Eﬀect estimates
Speciﬁcation (S1) (S2) (S3) (S4) (S5)
Dep. var. Pt
Rt lnPt lnPt lnPt lnPt
DE u1 0.29 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.28
FR u2 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08
IT u3 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.14
ES u4 -0.16 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.03
NL u5 -0.13 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31
BE u6 0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03
FI u7 -0.01 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.21
IE u8 -0.33 -0.33 -0.32 -0.32 -0.35
σu 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.23






e 0.59 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.65
F F(7,238) F(7,237) F(7,228) F(7,227) F(7,210)
=25.2 25.87 =23.52 =21.06 =37.38
p-lim 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5.3 Heterogeneity tests
The heterogeneity tests prove overwhelming heterogeneity. Table 5 summarizes tests’
results. First, after the RE estimation, the Breush & Pagan test was performed, and
the null hypothesis of no-serial correlation in the error composite term is overwhelmingly
rejected. Second, as stressed by Baltagi et al. (2003), heteroscedasticity in the error
composite term (or error component term) should be tested jointly with serial and spatial
correlation in the residual. Consequently, Baltagi & Li’ test was performed. As can be seen
in Table 5, the joint null hypotheses are strongly rejected. Third, after the FE estimates
shown in the previous sub-section, I once again performed a Breush & Pagan test. The
null hypothesis of no-correlation among country error terms is rejected at any common
level. Annex 11 reports the correlation matrix for each speciﬁcation. Fourth, the Fisher
test under the null hypothesis of equal R square between pooled OLS and FE, is strongly
rejected as well. Fifth, the modiﬁed Wald test where under the null hypothesis all variance
of the FE coeﬃcients are equal is rejected. Altogether, these tests prove that pooled OLS
for any speciﬁcation would have lead to inconsistent estimates.
17Table 5: Heterogeneity tests: RE, FE
specif. Test stat. Random Eﬀect (RE) Fixed Eﬀect (FE)
(S1) Br.&Pagan χ2(1) = 384.3 p=0.00 χ2(28) = 196.9 p=0.00
Bal.&Li/F LM = 443.1 p=0.00 F = 44.1 p=0.00
M. Wald. χ2(8) = 63.2 p=0.00
(S2) Br.&Pagan χ2(1) = 857.9 p=0.00 χ2(28) = 167.2 p=0.00
Bal.&Li/F LM = 650.1 p=0.00 F = 25.9 p=0.00
M. Wald. χ2(8) = 431.5 p=0.00
(S3) Br.&Pagan χ2(1) = 484.2 p=0.00 χ2(28) = 180.9 p=0.00
Bal.&Li/F LM = 552.4 p=0.00 F = 23.5 p=0.00
M. Wald χ2(8) = 359.0 p=0.00
(S4) Br.&Pagan χ2(1) = 350.8 p=0.00 χ2(28) = 180.5 p=0.00
Bal.&Li/F LM = 431.9 p=0.00 F = 21.1 p=0.00
M. Wald χ2(8) = 323.5 p=0.00
(S5) Br.&Pagan χ2(1) = 350.8 p=0.00 χ2(28) = 137.03 p=0.00
Bal.&Li/F LM = 431.9 p=0.00 F = 37.4 p=0.00
M. Wald p=0.00 χ2(8) = 270.9 p=0.00
Finally, to decide whether the FE or RE is more appropriate, I performed the Hausman
test. Statistically, the FE estimator always guarantees consistent estimates but they may
not be as eﬃcient as with the RE estimator. Under the null hypothesis, both estimators
are consistent but the RE coeﬃcients are the most eﬃcient, while under H1, only FE
estimator coeﬃcients are consistent. If FE and RE coeﬃcient estimates are statistically
alike (insigniﬁcant p-value, Prob>χ2 larger than .05, at 95%) then it is safe to use the RE
estimator. In the opposite, if p-value is signiﬁcant the within FE estimator should be used.
Table 6 summarizes the results for all 5 speciﬁcations. The null hypothesis for speciﬁcation
(S1), (S2) and (S3) cannot be rejected. This result is at odds with econometrics intuition.
The probability to be able to use RE estimator should be much larger in a more speciﬁed
model than less speciﬁed. The result casts some doubts on the validity of the Hausman
test. The Hausman test does lack power due to the low time dimension. Nevertheless,
speciﬁcation (S1), (S2) and (S3) have been estimated by means of the RE estimator.
Annex 12 shows the RE estimates. The coeﬃcient estimates are very close to the FE
estimates. Hausman test results may be reliable, after all.
Table 6: Hausman test
specif. Test stat. p-value
(S1) χ2(2) = 3.82 p=0.15
(S2) χ2(3) = 0.73 p=0.87
(S3) χ2(4) = 0.55 p=0.97
(S4) χ2(5) = 23.8 p=0.00
(S5) χ2(6) = 27.5 p=0.00
Since the R square of speciﬁcation (S1) is very low, I will attempt to better specify the
model. In opposite to FE estimator, a RE model allows a dummy variable.17 Countries
where MEW is developed have been identiﬁed in Table 2. The dummy variable equals 1
for the Netherlands, Ireland and Finland and 0 for the other countries. This MEW dummy
variable (du1) is signiﬁcant, unfortunately, the R squares remains at 11%. Table 7 reports
17Indeed, a dummy variable drops with a within estimator.
18the results. The p-value value of the Hausman test of this new speciﬁcation is even larger
(p=0.3) and consequently RE coeﬃcient estimates are still very close statistically to FE
coeﬃcient estimates.

















Annex 13 depicts the residuals of speciﬁcation (S1),18 (S3) and (S5) for each country.19
The diagnostic tests for the normality of residuals were performed. Except speciﬁcation
(S1), the joint tests show that the residuals are normally distributed at 5% level (see
Table 8). One cannot trust these results. As can be seen in Annex 13, the residuals
exhibit very strong autocorrelation. Interestingly, the volatility of the speciﬁcation (S5)
is lower because it includes past year house prices. The variables in speciﬁcation (S5)
are in level while consumer price inﬂation and past years house prices stemming from
expectation operator are expressed in growth rates. Thus, it is not an autoregressive
term, but it may indicate that the house price is an autoregressive process, i.e. serially
correlated. Furthermore, I performed the Moon & Perron and Choi unit root test, the null
hypothesis of unit root cannot be rejected at any common level. Altogether, should one
conclude to a misspeciﬁed model? Empirically yes. This means that the standard errors
and the results of the inference tests are not reliable. Worse, the coeﬃcient estimates
might be biased.
18In speciﬁcation (S1), the ratio housing price over rents is not in logarithm form. Consequently, the raw
residuals have been transformed to express percentage points deviation and so comparable to the residuals
of the other speciﬁcations.
19Residuals of speciﬁcation (S2) and S(4) are so close to (S3) that they are omitted on the graph for the
sake of clarity.
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Figure 6:
Table 8: test for normality of residuals
Spec. Skewness Kurtosis Joint
p-lim p-lim χ2(2) p-lim
(S1) 0.00 0.02 12.48 0.00
(S2) 0.08 0.73 3.20 0.20
(S3) 0.13 0.70 2.48 0.28
(S4) 0.13 0.71 2.45 0.29
(S5) 0.06 0.26 4.83 0.09
Annex 2 gives a detailed explanation of the aggregation methodology. Euro area ag-
gregates are constructed for the entire time span, including the period prior to the launch
of the euro. The ﬁtted values of the euro area house price were calculated by means of
the panel FE coeﬃcients presented in Table 3. Figure 6 depicts the euro area residuals
which were derived. How can one interpret the residuals? Considering speciﬁcation (S5)
for instance, one might suppose that all the variables of the fundamental arbitrage equa-
tion are speciﬁed whereas the residuals cannot be considered white noise. Consequently,
any systematic residual deviation from x-axis as seen in Figure 6, might be considered
as a missing variable. This missing variable can be interpreted as a speculative behavior
close to the bubble deﬁned by Stiglitz (1990). Indeed, supposing speciﬁcation (S5) as the
"fundamental" equation, the residuals can thus be considered as the "speculative part"
not explained by housing rents, interest rates, depreciation and the naïve expectation
hypothesis.
Thus, according to the arbitrage theory, the overvaluing of the current euro area hous-
20ing price ranges from 10 to 15% depending on the estimation. At the end of the period
under consideration, the deviation is about 12% for both speciﬁcations (S1) and (S5).
Moreover, the deviation of speciﬁcation (S3) is larger than the one in speciﬁcation (S1)
while during the bubble in the beginning of the 90’s, it was the opposite. This is ex-
plained by relatively important consumer price inﬂation in the 90’s while then, inﬂation
has remarkably fallen. Housing rents have also increased more since 1997 relative to the
beginning of the 90’s. Indeed, speciﬁcation (S1) imposes a one to one relationship between
housing price and rents, whereas speciﬁcation (S3) not even one to half. Overall, the cur-
rent deviation in percentage points is roughly identical to the peak reached during the
bubble in the beginning of the 90’s. Finally, the residuals of speciﬁcation (S5) exhibit the
lowest volatility and are lagged of two periods with regard to the two other speciﬁcations
residuals. This is due to the house price expectation term. The naïve forecast assumption
imply that past house price growth rates are picked up in estimation (S5) in level.
On a country level the following conclusions can be derived. The arbitrage theory
suggests that in 2005 (last year of the sample) the Belgian (respectively the Dutch) house
price level is overvalued of over 25% (respectively 40%). For the Spanish and the Irish
current real house price level, the overvaluing is even larger, but diﬀers between speciﬁca-
tions. Speciﬁcation (S5) may indicate an overvaluing of 25% in France, 40% in Spain and
50% in Ireland. Speciﬁcation (S1) shows an even larger overvaluing of more than 60% in
Spain and Ireland. Annex 13 shows these deviations by countries. It is however important
to stress that a panel econometric model which imposes strong homogeneity is not the best
tool to conclude on a sectional (country) level despite the heterogeneity in interest rates
slopes between group 1 and 2 and the ﬁxed eﬀects. For this very reason panel parameter
estimates have been used to simulate residuals on euro area series.
6 Conclusion
According to the arbitrage theory and to the most speciﬁed model, the misalignment with
respect to the fundamental price in the euro area is about 12%. However, interpreting
the residuals of the arbitrage equation as the deviation of price rent ratio from their
fundamental valuation might be misleading. Omitted variable bias is of huge concern, it
is very unlikely to have solely non fundamental elements in the residuals. Residuals might
include other factors not captured by the very restrictive assumption of the arbitrage
theory, and the missing factor may not only be the speculative part. Residuals exhibit
strong autocorrelation because house prices seem to be a persistent process not captured
by the arbitrage theory. This empirical model underpinned by the asset pricing theory is
misspeciﬁed.
I will now try to review two core variables of the model, namely house prices and
rents. These two variables are determined very diﬀerently, thus they actually diverge.
House prices and rents level evolve around a time trend. ECB (2003) argues that the
deterministic trend of the former is much steeper than the latter. On the one hand,
the scarcity of available land drives land costs above the costs of living. On the other
hand, public government regulations keep housing rents in line with the cost of living,
as already explained in section 2. As a consequence, the gap between house prices and
rents is building up over time. This structural misalignment might explain the lackluster
performance of the asset pricing theory applied to house price. State regulations impede
21arbitrage mechanisms from working as eﬃciently as it should in a free market. The asset
pricing theory is not only ﬂawed by the discrepancy between rents and house prices.
Only a minority of households invests in housing in accordance with the arbitrage theory.
Importantly, housing is non-tradable by nature and the arbitrage theory cannot be applied.
These remarks cast serious doubts on the validity of the arbitrage theory as regards
housing.20 House prices are not essentially driven by arbitrage and speculative behavior.
Baker (2002) and The economist (2005) assert that a bubble has developed on the ground
of very high house price rent ratio. This empirical survey assails their analyses based on
the underlying asset pricing theory. Another theoretical framework should be investigated
instead, where house prices result from the matching of demand and supply of housing.
According to the literature, housing supply might be driven by factors like the availability
and cost of land, the cost of construction and investments. Factors that impinge on the
demand for housing over longer terms include growth in household’s disposable income,
shifts in demographics, permanent institutional framework as for example the legal tax
framework promoting home ownership against other type of wealth accumulation, ﬁnanc-
ing conditions (level of mortgage interest rate) but also ﬁnancing tradition. Addressing this
question makes us suggest to investigate house price long-term and short-term dynamics
by considering the house market directly.
20Nevertheless, it may be plausible that arbitrage theory explains better commercial real estate move-
ments rather than residential. Indeed, the part of investors and speculators is traditionally larger in the
commercial real estate segment. Furthermore, the yearly frequency might not be appropriate, a lower
frequency would have been preferable. Finally, I have to acknowledge that I do not take into account
transaction costs and taxes due to data scarcity. Would arbitrage models enhanced by tax and transaction
costs better explain house price movements?
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24ANNEX 1: Data
Annual data from 1975 to 2005 are used covering the longest available common period
of 8 EMU countries: Germany (DE), France (FR), Italy (IT), Spain (ES), the Netherlands
(NL), Belgium (BE), Finland (FI) and Ireland (IE). As the Residential Property Price
is not available for the period under consideration, Luxembourg, Portugal, Greece and
Austria were excluded. As a result, the sample consists of 31 observations in the time
dimension and 8 cross-sections. The panel series are: residential property price, housing
rents, consumer price index, interest rate short-term, long-term, housing depreciation rate.
Real series were constructed by deﬂating the nominal series by the corresponding domestic
CPI indices.
The residential property price is provided by the ECB, which in turn was calculated
from the national Central Banks and private agencies like the BulwienGesa AG in Germany
and the European Mortgage Federation, for instance. This ECB database was completed
by the one of Claudio Borio from the Bank of International Settlement. The collection
is a weighted average of series for new dwellings and existing dwellings. Data before
1995 include only West Germany. Concerning the year 2005, I completed the dataset
on residential property price thanks to Livia Figà-Talamanca of the European Mortgage
Federation (2006).
The CPI is the yearly average of the monthly HICP (Harmonized Index Consumer
Price) from 1980 to 2005. ECB database uses Eurostat data and national CPI with a
ﬁxed euro conversion rate. The database was ﬁlled by the cost of living index for all
households, all items, provided by the BIS. The source of the Irish CPI however is the
National Central Bank of Ireland as the BIS cost of living index is not available.
For all countries including Germany, the ECB Desis database was used for the nominal
short and long-term interest rate which is the 5 year government bond yield and the 3
month interbank oﬀered rate, respectively. Once again, the data set was ﬁlled by the
European commission DG-ECFIN AMECO database for data prior to 1990 except for
Germany, where I used the International Financial Statistics of the IMF for the long term
interest rate and the OECD Main Economic Indicator for the short term interest-rate.
The sectorial Housing CPI was chosen as proxy for rents, except for Finland prior to
1995, where a rent index provided by the Finish National Statistic Oﬃce (Veli Kettunen)
was used. The ECB database on rents was also been ﬁlled for Spain, from 1976 to 1984,
for Ireland from 1975 to 2004. These data were provided by respectively the Instituto
Niacional de Estadística (Web site) and the Irish Central Bank (McQuinn Kieran). As
1975 was missing for Germany, Spain and the Netherlands, I projected the missing value
by linear extrapolation over approximately the last 10 years (depending on the pattern of
the series).




GFCF and NCS stand for Gross Fixed Capital Formation and Net Capital Stock in
housing sector, respectively. National sources but also the European Mortgage Federation
database were used.
25ANNEX 2: Euro area aggregation
Currently 12 EU countries have joined the EMU, the member states are: Belgium (BE),
Germany (DE), Greece, Spain (ES), France (FR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Luxembourg,
the Netherlands (NL), Austria, Portugal and Finland (FI). The euro area was restricted
however to 8 countries due essentially to the lack of data for some countries. The weighting
was recalculated for the eight countries (Table 1A2.1) by following ECB methodology
(see ECB, 2005b) applied to the Residential Property Price (RPP) and the Harmonized
Consumer Price Index (HICP).21 National series of interest rates and CPI, respectively
RPP index and housing rent indices were aggregated to euro area series by applying HICP
weighting, respectively RPP weighting. First, The HICP for the euro area is published
by Eurostat. However, as the study only uses the national data set of 8 countries, for
congruence reasons an artiﬁcial euro area CPI was constructed according to the European
consumer basket (see Table A2.1) for the entire sample. Second, in opposite to the CPI,
the national RPPs are not harmonized. Despite the possible error margins, price trends
and movements are correctly reﬂected (see BIS, 2005). The GDP weighted index used to
aggregate the national RPPs (Table A2.1) is an acceptable solution given the available
data. Overall, the reliability of the euro area RPP is strong. Finally, the euro area
depreciation rate was calculated with respect to the formula given in Annex 1. For this
purpose the national Gross Fixed Capital Formation and the Net Capital Stock in the
housing sector were added up to euro area series.
Table A2.1
Weightings









21see "Compendium of HICP reference documents (2/2001/B/5)" under http://forum.europa.eu.int
26ANNEX 3: Price rent ratios and residential property price growth rates
27ANNEX 4: Risk premiums and house price growth rates (in %)
28ANNEX 5: First diﬀerence risk premiums naïve expectation and house price growth
rates (in %)
29ANNEX 6: Fundamental real residential property price expectations (in %)
30ANNEX 7: House price present value
The empirical literature (see Weeken, 2004) suggests a housing pricing equation derived
by Aoki, Proudman & Vlieghe (2002) and Piazzesi, Schneider & Tuzel (2003) models.
These models consider the house price as the present value of its expected future payoﬀs
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31ANNEX 8: Moon & Perron (2003), Choi (2002) panel unit root tests
Var Test Deterministic terms Statistics Z(Choi), tb (M&P) p-value
P
R Choi c -3.53 0.00
M&P c -1.89 0.03
r1 Choi c -7.18 0.00
c -13.98 0.00
r2 M&P c -6.37 0.00
c -8.11 0.00
lnP Choi c,t 1.90 0.97
c -0.12 0.45
M&P c,t -0.46 0.32
c -2.26 0.01
lnR Choi c,t 1.02 1.00
c 0.70 0.76
M&P c,t -0.09 0.46
c -3.09 0.00
i1 M&P c,t 0.81 0.79
c -3.65 0.13
i2 Choi c 0.62 0.73
M&P c -3.67 0.12
π Choi c 1.74 0.96
M&P c -4.10 0.20
δ Choi c 0.51 0.85
M&P c -3.58 0.17
∆lnP Choi c -5.49 0.02
M&P c -5.18 0.11
ANNEX 9: Pedroni’s cointegration tests parametric panel ADF statistic and paramet-
ric group ADF statistic
Speciﬁcation lnP lnR i1 i2 π δ panel ADF group ADF
(S1) x x -2.0 -1.5
x x x -0.76 -0.32
x x x 0.13 1.23
(S2) x x x x -2.1 1.85
(S3) x x x x x 1.49 2.88
(S4) x x x x x x 1.85 1.52
32ANNEX 10: Testing strategy static estimator: pooled OLS, random eﬀect (RE), ﬁxed
eﬀect (FE) estimator
NO Reject H0: σ2
i= σ2 for all i =1,…,8 YES
Groupwise heteroscedasticity (Modified Wald test)
Breush-Pagan (1980) LM test
NO Reject H0: σ2
u= 0 ￿ corr(ηi,s, ηi,t) = 0 YES
NO Reject H0: Corr(εi, , εi,) = 0 YES
Breush-Pagan (1980) LM test 
Baltagi-Li (1995) Joint LM test
YES
YES
Reject Ho: σu=0 ; ρ=0, (νi,t= ρνi,t-1+ξi,t ; εi,t= νi,t+ξi,t)









Random Effect (GLS) 
(Generalized Least 
Square)
Yi,t=X’i,tβ + α + ηi,t
and ηi,t= ui + εi,
Fixed Effect (LSDV)
(Least Square Dummy 
Variables)
Yi,t=X’i,tβ + α + ui+εi,t NO Reject H0: σ2
i= σ2 for all i =1,…,8 YES
Groupwise heteroscedasticity (Modified Wald test)
Breush-Pagan (1980) LM test
NO Reject H0: σ2
u= 0 ￿ corr(ηi,s, ηi,t) = 0 YES
NO Reject H0: Corr(εi, , εi,) = 0 YES
Breush-Pagan (1980) LM test 
Baltagi-Li (1995) Joint LM test
YES
YES
Reject Ho: σu=0 ; ρ=0, (νi,t= ρνi,t-1+ξi,t ; εi,t= νi,t+ξi,t)









Random Effect (GLS) 
(Generalized Least 
Square)
Yi,t=X’i,tβ + α + ηi,t
and ηi,t= ui + εi,
Fixed Effect (LSDV)
(Least Square Dummy 
Variables)
Yi,t=X’i,tβ + α + ui+εi,t
L1: likelihood value iterated 
GLS (Σ heteroscedasticity)
L0: GLS (homoscedasticity) 
λ= L0/L1 ; χ 2=-2ln(λ)
(εi,t-εi,t-1)=ρ(εi,t-2-εi,t-3) + ξi,t
First differenced series
Reject H0 : L0=L1
(homoscedasticity)









Pooled OLS (Ordinary Least Squares)
Yi,t=X’i,tβ+α+εi,t
L1: likelihood value iterated 
GLS (Σ heteroscedasticity)
L0: GLS (homoscedasticity) 
λ= L0/L1 ; χ 2=-2ln(λ)
(εi,t-εi,t-1)=ρ(εi,t-2-εi,t-3) + ξi,t
First differenced series
Reject H0 : L0=L1
(homoscedasticity)









Pooled OLS (Ordinary Least Squares)
Yi,t=X’i,tβ+α+εi,t
χ 2= (βFE- βRE)’[ΣFE- ΣRE]-1(βFE- βRE)
Reject Ho: βFE= βRE
YES NO
βFE: (OLS) consistent under H0and H0 ; corr(X, ηi,t)=0
βRE: (GLS) inconsistent under H1 , efficient under H0
HAUSMAN TEST
χ 2= (βFE- βRE)’[ΣFE- ΣRE]-1(βFE- βRE)
Reject Ho: βFE= βRE
YES NO
βFE: (OLS) consistent under H0and H0 ; corr(X, ηi,t)=0
βRE: (GLS) inconsistent under H1 , efficient under H0
HAUSMAN TEST
Note:
u : fixed effect
η : composite error term
ξ : white noise
Σ : variance-covariance matrix 
33ANNEX 11: Correlation matrix of residuals FE estimates by speciﬁcations
Speciﬁcation (S1): correlation matrix of residuals FE
ε1 ε2 ε3 ε4 ε5 ε6 ε7 ε8
ε1 1.00
ε2 -0.58 1.00
ε3 0.19 0.33 1.00
ε4 -0.74 0.87 0.28 1.00
ε5 -0.63 0.53 -0.19 0.47 1.00
ε6 -0.69 0.55 0.03 0.63 0.86 1.00
ε7 -0.08 0.38 -0.15 0.30 -0.13 -0.28 1.00
ε8 -0.84 0.67 -0.11 0.61 0.81 0.76 0.04 1.00
Speciﬁcation (S2): correlation matrix of residuals FE
ε1 ε2 ε3 ε4 ε5 ε6 ε7 ε8
ε1 1.00
ε2 -0.14 1.00
ε3 0.57 0.52 1.00
ε4 -0.31 0.68 0.17 1.00
ε5 -0.45 0.39 0.12 0.28 1.00
ε6 -0.23 0.58 0.41 0.38 0.90 1.00
ε7 -0.01 0.15 -0.19 0.16 -0.49 -0.55 1.00
ε8 -0.35 0.69 0.25 0.32 0.65 0.75 -0.15 1.00
Speciﬁcation (S3): correlation matrix of residuals FE
ε1 ε2 ε3 ε4 ε5 ε6 ε7 ε8
ε1 1.00
ε2 -0.19 1.00
ε3 0.56 0.48 1.00
ε4 -0.34 0.65 0.13 1.00
ε5 -0.44 0.40 0.13 0.22 1.00
ε6 -0.27 0.55 0.39 0.31 0.91 1.00
ε7 0.01 0.14 -0.21 0.18 -0.50 -0.57 1.00
ε8 -0.34 0.68 0.21 0.25 0.58 0.69 -0.13 1.00
Speciﬁcation (S4): correlation matrix of residuals FE
ε1 ε2 ε3 ε4 ε5 ε6 ε7 ε8
ε1 1.00
ε2 -0.19 1.00
ε3 0.56 0.49 1.00
ε4 -0.36 0.65 0.14 1.00
ε5 -0.43 0.39 0.13 0.22 1.00
ε6 -0.26 0.55 0.39 0.32 0.91 1.00
ε7 0.00 0.15 -0.22 0.19 -0.49 -0.56 1.00
ε8 -0.33 0.68 0.22 0.24 0.58 0.69 -0.13 1.00
34Speciﬁcation (S5): correlation matrix of residuals FE
ε1 ε2 ε3 ε4 ε5 ε6 ε7 ε8
ε1 1.00
ε2 -0.47 1.00
ε3 0.38 0.20 1.00
ε4 -0.52 0.60 -0.01 1.00
ε5 -0.33 0.43 0.18 0.08 1.00
ε6 -0.39 0.55 0.29 0.13 0.90 1.00
ε7 0.10 -0.06 -0.33 0.12 -0.50 -0.63 1.00
ε8 -0.32 0.58 0.13 -0.00 0.74 0.73 -0.14 1.00
ANNEX 12: Random Eﬀect (RE) coeﬃcient estimates
FE coeﬃcient estimates
Speciﬁcation (S1) (S2) (S3)
Dep. var. Pt
Rt lnPt lnPt






lnRt α2 0.29 0.42
(1.89) (2.41)
i1t α3 -2.41 -2.8
(−3.30) (−2.08)








R2 0.11 0.32 0.34
Wald χ2(2) χ2(3) χ2(4)
=20.46 =110.35 =115.43
p-lim 0.00 0.00 0.00
35ANNEX 13: Residuals speciﬁcation (S1), (S3) and (S5) by country
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Abstract
This paper aims ﬁrst at shedding more light on factors driving house prices and mortgage
loan growth and, second, at evaluating the quantitative impact of an interest rate shock on
house price dynamics in the euro area. The use of the Arellano & Bond (1991) dynamic
panel estimator improves greatly the robustness of the estimation. In line with the literature
on housing, the quantitative analysis shows, ﬁrst, that disposable incomes and interest rates
mostly drive the house price dynamics, while demographic proxies and housing rents are not
signiﬁcant; second, the house price growth rate is strongly persistent. As regards the mort-
gage market, collateral is the core factor and disposable incomes but to a lesser extent, while
interest rate eﬀect is benign. Mortgage loan is also a very strongly persistent process. In
addition, the empirical estimates prove that the house market and the mortgage loan market
interact signiﬁcantly essentially through the collateral eﬀect. Banks relax their lending stan-
dards by favorable house price prospects. Households can then capture more mortgage credit
volume, which fuels further house demand. Higher house price in turn impinges positively
again on households’ wealth and banks requirements due to an increasing collateral value.
This self-perpetuating process leads mortgage loan volume and house prices to track each
other. A trigger event like monetary policy tightening can reverse the "vicious circle". An
interest rate shock is simulated which sheds light on this interaction. As regards the quan-
titative eﬀect: a 1% interest rate point increase in the long-term causes ﬁrst, a steady real
house price growth fall of roughly 1%, and second, a real mortgage growth decline of over
0.4%.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C33, R21, R22, R31
Key words: Dynamic panel estimation, panel unit root tests, house price dynamics
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11 Motivation
Current soaring house prices have reached unprecedented levels for 30 years in almost all
euro area countries, except in Germany (see Annex 3). Since 1996, Ireland has experienced
a real house price growth rate in average larger than 10%. In the Netherlands, the upsurge
also took place very early in the middle of the 1990’s with a peak in 2000, since 2002
however house prices have grown moderately at 2%. In Spain, the dramatic increase
occurred around 2000, since the real growth rate has been larger than 10% every year. In
France and Italy the real house price has risen steeply since 1999 and 2001, respectively
at 5% in average. Although the Italian and French ones increased more slowly, the pace
of the French rate has nevertheless accelerated in the last three years overshooting 10%.
Altogether, despite the falling house price in Germany accounting for roughly one third
in the weighting, the euro area real house price has increased steadily since 1999 from 4
to 6.5% in 2005. The rise on its own is not as striking as the long lasting eﬀect of the
phenomenon. Indeed, during the bubble in the beginning of the 90’s, euro area house price
growth reached equivalent peaks. However, a real growth rate above 2% lasted roughly four
years. In contrast, the ongoing current cycle shows a much larger duration. The strong
real house price appreciation has already lasted for eight years. Questions have arisen
regarding the sustainability of house price increase. Is there any fear of sharp decline?
Rising commodity prices and the risk of abrupt decline, along with oil price shocks have
become a center stage in monetary policy debate.
Dramatic asset price volatility can have signiﬁcant eﬀects on real economic activity,
as witnessed by numerous historical episodes ranging from 1929 Wall Street crash to the
more recent Tokyo housing and equity bubble. Boom-bust cycles in asset prices can
eventually cause credit crunch or even a collapse of the entire ﬁnancial system -systemic
failure- via bank bankruptcy. Besides, strong asset price volatility can harm the real
economy essentially through two other eﬀects. First, households’ housing wealth can have
a strong impact on private consumption and aggregate demand (OECD, 2002; IMF, 2001).
Second, asymmetric information in the credit market makes the supply of credit depend
on households’ collateral, the so-called ﬁnancial accelerator (Bernanke, 1983; Bernanke
& Gertler, 1995, 2000). Altogether, strong appreciations and subsequent rapid reversals
in asset prices can harm output growth and jeopardize price stability. At least, they
can convey information about future inﬂation not picked up by current indicators. As
the primary objective of the ECB is to maintain price stability, the ECB pays attention
to asset price movements, especially house prices, without targeting asset prices directly.1
The central bank stresses the risk that an accommodative monetary policy might facilitate
house price increase. More precisely, the ECB argues that strong monetary and housing
credit growth fuel "strong house price dynamic" (ECB, 2005a).
This paper aims ﬁrst, at shedding more light on the driving factors of house price
growth and, second, at evaluating the quantitative impact of an interest rate shock on
house price dynamics in the euro area. Thus, the interaction between house market,
mortgage market and monetary policy transmission must be analyzed thoroughly to avert
misspeciﬁcation and spurious estimations. Households’ strong dependency on mortgage
1Rents in the housing market account in the HICP for about 6.3% (ECB, 2003). However rents growth
does not track house price growth, and the direct link between house prices and HICP is very weak, and
about 2%. Consequently, a doubling of rents (100% increase) might lead to an increase of 2% of the HICP.
2loans in order to purchase real estate is well-established. An outline of the paper is as
follows: Section 2 depicts some stylized facts observed in the euro area house market and
mortgage market. Section 3 presents a short review of literature on the housing market.
Section 4 reviews basic theoretical aspects as regards the main determinants not only on
house price demand and supply but also, on the mortgage loan market. Section 5 outlines,
ﬁrst the econometric methodology used in view of the purpose of the paper and the data
availability. The issue of endogeneity is also addressed. Second, the empirical results are
reported. In section 6 the estimated panel coeﬃcients are used to highlight the factors
driving house price dynamics in the euro area. Finally, an interest rate shock is simulated.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Data and stylized facts
The euro area real house price growth rate has risen steadily from year to year since 1997
reaching more than 6.5% in 2004 and 2005 (see Figure 1). From 1975 to 2005,2 such a
large growth rate was only attained once, in the peak year of the well-known 90’s bubble3
which occurred in the majority of euro area countries (see Annex 3). The average real
euro area annual growth rate for the period 1997 to 2005 is more than twice as large as the
growth rate of the whole sample. This statement holds for all euro area countries except
Germany. Indeed, the German real house price growth rate has been negative for the last
8 years, whereas Germany accounts for more than one third of the euro area house price
(see Annex 2 where aggregation methodology is discussed). Despite this fact, euro area
house prices have experienced a strong increase. As can be remarkably seen in Figure 1,
the house price motions has lasted for a long time, a striking feature in this last cycle.
House price movements in the last eight years correspond to a booming phase, which is
nothing exceptional. However, never before 1975 had such a house price increase lasted
so long, i.e. more than 8 years and that in so many countries. Countries which have
experienced the last eight years outstanding real house price increase are: Ireland, Spain,
France and the Netherlands with respectively: 11.5, 8.7, 6.4 and 6.2 on average. The other
euro area countries have also experienced a strong house price increase4 albeit to a lesser
extent.
According to the literature on housing, the ratio of house price over real disposable
income shows mean reversion. If the house price deviates relative to income, this mis-
alignment tends to be corrected over time (Lamont & Stein, 1999; IMF, 2004; Lecat &
Mesonnier, 2005). Thus, Figure 1 and Annex 4 depict the growth rate of real disposable
income per capita (population aged from 15-64) together with house price for the in the
euro area. At ﬁrst glance both cycles co-move, although house price exhibits stronger
volatility. Disposable income growth precedes upon one year booming house price. How-
ever, disposable income slowdown since 2001 has not depressed the housing market. As
income does not seem to explain everything, an alternative and non-fundamental factor is
investigated: mortgage loan development.
2Annex 1 gives inside on data sources and construction.
3The house price bubble at the beginning of the 90s was particularly sharp in Spain, Finland and Italy,
and to a lesser extent in Ireland, France and Germany.
4Except Germany which is an outlier with regard to the rest of the euro area. The reuniﬁcation provoked
a booming house price which in turn surged housing supply. Thereafter, housing demand declined and the
staggered house supply did not follow as quickly. Not only weak disposable income growth but also excess
housing supply may explain the subdued German house price.
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Figure 1:
Mortgage loan development might explain house price boom. Since 1997, the euro
area mortgage loan market has displayed an average annual growth rate of roughly 7%
with a peak of 11% in 1999, while the average growth rate before 1997 was only about
4%.5 At the same time, euro area house price has shown a remarkable yearly increase
of almost 5% on average between 1997 and 2005. Rapidly increasing house price coupled
with expansionary outstanding mortgage debt means that the ﬁnancial risks for the euro
area households have increased signiﬁcantly. On a micro-level, ﬁnancial institutions and
other lenders examine before approving a mortgage. The Loan To Value (LTV) ratio is one
lending risk assessment amid manifold others (Jackson & Kasserman, 1980). Beside the
prudential ceiling ﬁxed by law, the LTV determines how conservative mortgage lending
is. Typically, high LTV ratios are associated with higher risk. Maclennan, Muellbauer &
Stephens (1999) show that countries with low LTV ratios and high transaction costs tend
to experience lower house price volatility. One straightforward question worth asking is
whether lax banking practises artiﬁcially fuel current dramatic house price increase. By
the same token, on a macro-level total outstanding loans are divided by house price and
the stock of dwelling, which yields the Current Loan To Value (CLTV).
The changes in the CLTV ratio over time might convey information on households’
residential mortgage default risk exposure. Macroeconomic high risk exposure might be
commensurate with large CLTV. The CLTV ratio has been detrended as the raw series
exhibits a very strong time trend. Important structural reforms across euro area countries
might explain this trend. Manifold countries embarked on extensive ﬁnancial liberalization
across the EU. Deregulation began in the early 80’s and the pace varied markedly across
countries. Liberalization typically led to more market-based mortgage markets, increased
securization of mortgage loans, higher LTV ratio and an expansion in mortgage debt.
This development spurt credit growth across numerous countries, which could reﬂect an
5This is the average growth rate of outstanding mortgage loan from 1976 to 1996.































































Loan To Value detrended House price
Figure 2:
equilibrium adjustment from repressed to liberalized ﬁnancial markets. The detrended
CLTV for the euro area captures well real house price movements roughly four years in
advance. Figure 2 proves that the CLTV ratio was a reliable leading indicator to forecast
house price in the past. If this leading indicator remains stable in the future, euro area
house price should start decreasing in 2006. Annex 5 depicts country speciﬁc CLTV
together with the real residential growth rate.
The alternative theory to measure default risk exposure is the ability-to-pay outstand-
ing mortgage loans -the cash-ﬂow approach. According to this approach, mortgages refrain
from loan default as long as income ﬂows are suﬃcient to meet the periodic payment with-
out undue ﬁnancial burden. Under the ability-to-pay model, the current debt servicing
ratio, deﬁned as the monthly repayment obligations as a percentage of current monthly
income, which captures the repayment capacity of the borrower. The ﬁrst crude aﬀord-
ability indicator (AFR) is measured by the ratio real disposable income per household
over real residential property price. Since 1999, AFR has fallen dramatically and steadily
as depicted in Figure 3 (and Annex 6 informs by country). Analyzing the historical curve,
AFR seems to exhibit a forward of approximately 3 years over the real house price, al-
though the regularity is sometimes tenuous. The fall of the ratio has not been followed by
the residential property price even after 5 years, and so breaking the three years regularity.
However, AFR does not take into account the mortgage ﬁnancing conditions. Not only
are households’ disposable income a key factor but so are interest rates in determining the
aﬀordability of houses as regards mortgage loan payments.
The American National Association of realtors (www.realtor.org) instead proposes an
interest rate adjusted aﬀordability ratio (ARR). The median family income divided by
the monthly mortgage payments of a typical home gives this ratio. It relies on three
assumptions. First, the median family income grows at the same rate as the disposable





























































Mean Affordability ratio crude
House price
Figure 3:


























































Affordability ratio interest rate adjusted




















































Affordability indicator interest rate adjusted
Mean Affordability indicator int. rate adjusted
House price
Figure 5:
home grows at the same rate as the residential property price. A detailed explanation
of this ratio is given in Annex 9. This aﬀordability ratio (ARR) shown in Figure 4
(by country in Annex 7) corroborates previous empirical ﬁndings. Household debt has
remained aﬀordable despite the economic slowdown since 2001. Low interest rates, i.e.
the favorable mortgage ﬁnancing conditions alleviated households’ indebtedness and so
fuelled mortgage loans. Indeed, the ratio has remained broadly unchanged at a relatively
high level -around 115- for the last eight years. However, as depicted in ﬁgure 2, house
capital value6 increase outweighs real mortgage loan development. Indeed, CLTV has
decreased since 2000. This might reﬂect the fact that fewer households borrow at very
high LTV ratios. At the euro area level, the representative household’s ﬁnancial health
remains strong.
In evaluating households’ debt burdens, the direct measure is the residual income after
servicing the monthly mortgage payment. Annex 9 explains an aﬀordability indicator as
the residual income left after mortgage payment. Figure 5 depicts this aﬀordability indi-
cator (AIR) for the euro area and country speciﬁc graphs are presented in Annex 8. AIR
corroborates the conclusion drawn from the interest rate aﬀordability ratio. Indeed, the
strong economic growth after the mid-90’s and the favorable ﬁnancing conditions partially
due to the launch of the EMU and the accompanying low interest rates alleviated house-
holds’ indebtedness for current and past mortgage loan payments. Both measures prove
that households’ aﬀordability reached its lowest level in the beginning of the 90’s; there-
after, the economic recovery substantially alleviated the ﬁnancial distress of households
and even consolidated their ﬁnancial position with the low interest rates. Despite the
economic slowdown since 2001, the fall in the interest rates has oﬀset this adverse eﬀect.
Both ﬁnancial health indicators have remained stable since 1998 albeit AIR has shown a
6The real house price multiplied by the stock of dwelling gives the real house capital value.
7downward trend but at a very moderate scale. While circumstances can change suddenly,
both measures suggest that, by the standards of the past decade, relatively few households
are currently close to a stressed position. The vast majority of indebted homeowners with
mortgages appear to have few diﬃculties at present in serving it. At the euro level, the
representative household’s ﬁnancial health is reliable.
3 Literature review
So far in the literature on housing, empirical house price estimation have been underpinned
by the theory of asset pricing valuation or by a structural model. The former is based on
the arbitrage opportunity between housing assets and alternative assets like bonds (Ayuso
& Restoy, 2003; Bessone, Heitz, & Boissinot, 2005), while the latter model investigates
the determinants of housing demand and supply (Kenny, 1999; McCarthy & Peach, 2004;
Lecat & Mesonnier, 2005). The ﬁrst approach of house price evaluation, however, is ﬂawed
by one major deﬁcit. Indeed, house prices might not essentially be driven by arbitrage
behaviors. Interpreting the residuals of the arbitrage equation as the deviation of the
price rent ratios from their long-term valuation might be misleading. Omitted variable
bias is of concern (Ott, 2006a). Consequently, the asset pricing approach is eschewed.
In contrast, the second approach analyses the matches of housing demand and supply
which in turn determines the price. Factors like land cost and availability, construction
cost, and investments drive housing supply. Factors determining demand for housing,
on the other hand, include households’ disposable income, ﬁnancing conditions (level of
mortgage interest rate, access and conditions to mortgage loans), shifts in demographics,
the institutional framework,7 and arbitrage opportunities against house demand (housing
rents, equities).
Equilibrium house prices, as in any other market is the match between demand and
supply of housing. However, most estimates of house price equation are best viewed as
inverted demand (IMF, 2004, 2005; Lecat & Mesonnier, 2005; Tsatsaronis & Zhu, 2004).
The supply side factors are often absent. The ﬁrst reason is the lack of reliable data on
land costs and investment. The second is due to the problem of disentangling demand and
supply (simultaneous equation bias). Construction costs index, when available can help
estimating a supply in a time series VECM framework (Bessone et al., 2005; McCarthy &
Peach, 2002; Martínez & Ángel, 2003; Kenny, 1998). Factor proxies of the inverted house
price supply are residential housing investments, the building permits granted over time,
the construction cost indices and the credit interest rates (Bessone, Heitz & Boissinot,
2005; McCarthy & Peach, 2002; Martínez & Ángel, 2003).
Demand side factors are investigated by numerous proxies. For instance Tsatsaronis &
Zhu (2004) use the GDP per capita as proxy to capture households’ income, unemployment
and wage, while almost all authors (e.g. Lecat & Messonier (2005)) use the disposable
income per capita in real terms. Nevertheless, some authors employ the permanent income
as aﬀordability variable, which in turn is proxied by consumption of non-durables and
services and ﬁnancial wealth (McCarthy & Peach, 2004, 2002; Bessone, Heitz & Boissinot,
2005). In Tsatsaronis & Zhu (2004) the link between GDP per capita and house prices
is very tenuous while disposable income is highly signiﬁcant in Lecat & Messonier (2005)
7As for example the legal tax scheme promoting home ownership against other type of wealth accumu-
lation.
8and IMF (2004). This may be due to the diﬀerent choice of proxy. In Tsatsaronis &
Zhu (2004), CPI inﬂation has the strongest impact on the real house prices. This can
be explained especially in high-inﬂation countries where hedging against inﬂation risk is
current practice.
As regards ﬁnancial conditions proxies (the capability to borrow), authors also diﬀer,
distinguishing between short/long-term and between nominal/real. Tsatsaronis & Zhu
(2004) use the short-term nominal interest rate while all other variables are expressed
in real terms in their model speciﬁcation. Frictions in the credit market and inﬂation
expectations underpin the use of nominal interest rates instead of real ones. To take
into account the real aﬀordability of the household, they incorporate the consumer price
growth rate (CPI) and the real spread (diﬀerence between 10 years bonds and 3 month
treasury bills deﬂated by the CPI). The importance of property investments as a hedge
against inﬂation is investigated by including the CPI in the model. Lecat & Messonier
(2005) employ the same ﬁnancial condition proxies as Tsatsaronis & Zhu (2004) except
that the short-term interest rate is expressed in real terms and the CPI is excluded. An
alternative proxy for ﬁnancial conditions instead of interest rates, is the user cost of housing
(Bessone et al., 2005; McCarthy and Peach, 2004; Martinez & Ángel, 2003). This user
cost of housing depicts the cost of holding a dwelling, including taxation, the expected
valuation (capital gain) of the asset and its depreciation. The last ﬁnancial condition
variables investigated in the literature on housing, are real bank credit (mortgage loans,
housing credits to households, or credit to the private sector) and real stock prices, which
respectively aim at proxying mortgage rationing and the eﬀort of households to rotate their
portfolio in favour of housing (Lecat et al., 2005; Martinez & Ángel, 2003; Tsatsaronis &
Zhu, 2004).
The less controversial result among the surveys, is the strong signiﬁcance of ﬁnancial
condition variables (interest rate either, real-nominal or short or long-term, or even the
spread, but also credit), while stock market prices are insigniﬁcant. Borio & McGuire’s
results (2004) can be reconciled with the non-signiﬁcance of equity market return by
supposing that both house prices and stock market prices are pro-cyclical. According
to Tsatsaronis & Zhu (2004) not only do interest rate changes matter but so do national
ﬁnancial features like variable versus ﬁxed mortgage interest rate, maximum loan-to-value,
the level of deregulation, equity withdrawal, securized mortgage assets. For instance, the
link between credit growth and house prices is stronger in countries with more market-
sensitive valuation methods (Tsatsaronis & Zhu, 2004). Lamont & Stein (1997) proved
that credit constraint is a very important factor especially for indebted households. In the
same stance, Lecat & Messonier (2005) show that ﬁnancial conditions are essential factors
explaining house price movements. They investigated the impact of structural changes.
According to them, the deregulation of ﬁnancial and credit markets mostly explain the
house price bubble observed in the late 80’s in France.
The third type of structural factors aﬀecting housing demand may be the gradual shift
in demographics, the change of the number of household proxied by the population aged
from 15-65 years (IMF, 2004) or the total population (Lecat & Mesonnier, 2005). Accord-
ing to the cited literature, these variables change very softly and have a low explanatory
power in the short-term. In the long-run, however, demographic factors have an inﬂuence
(Ott, 2006b; Mankiw & Weil, 1989).
94 Model speciﬁcation and estimators
4.1 House market
The model speciﬁcation does not follow a thorough theoretical framework. Instead, the
data are examined directly by using the basic house market relationship suggested by
theory and by taking insights from the existing literature. Following for instance Poterba
(1984) and Brueckner (1994), I suppose that a representative household maximizes its
utility under budget constraint. The solution of this maximization problem is an inverted
demand function (Muellbauer & Murphy, 1997), which can be written in log linear form:
pd
t = −α2dwt + α3yt − α4uct + α5pot + α6rtt + α7lmt + u. (1)
Equation (1) expresses real house price demand at period t, pd, as a linear function of
the following variables, the stock of housing/dwelling dw, the real income per households
y, the user cost of housing uc and a demographic variable, po. These four variables stem
from the neoclassical framework. House prices react in opposite direction to the quantity
of dwelling as in any demand function. Larger incomes alleviate budget constraints, which
in turn allows households to purchase real estate. The user cost is born by the house
owner and thus has a deterrent eﬀect on house purchase. Empirical housing price models
include the ratio population over stock of housing as a rule, for instance in Muellbauer &
Murphy (1997). In this model, I prefer to split for the sake of estimation. Migration and
population growth put house demand and so prices under pressure. Two other variables
are added, rt which denotes housing rents and lm, a mortgage variable. The former is
added on the ground of uncertainty (see Rosen, Rosen & Holtz-Eakin, 1984). Indeed, house
renting is a substitute to owner occupancy. The latter is underpinned by the assumption of
asymmetric information between ﬁnancial institutions and households. Most households
are not able to raise money from their own sources and so have to meet credit requirements.
When a household purchase a real estate, it will typically rely on a ﬁnancial institution
like a bank to raise the needed funds. The relationship between ﬁnancial institutions and
households plays an important role in credit development and so in housing demand. As
banks face asymmetric information about the moral rectitude and ﬁnancial capabilities of
the borrower, they screen the households.
The seminal paper of Stiglitz & Weil (1981) highlights how asymmetric information
leads to credit/borrowing constraints. A few noteworthy theoretical and empirical studies
have proved that borrowing constraints inﬂuence the house price equilibrium (Ortalo-
Magné & Rady, 1999, 2005; Vigdor, 2004). Households are unable to maximize their
intertemporal consumption path as there are liquidity constraints. In this respect, this sub-
optimality depresses the house price equilibrium. Ortalo-Magné & Rady (1999) shed light
on this negative relationship between credit constraints and house prices by appraising an
empirical fact. They argue that deregulation of the mortgage market and the end of credit
rationing especially for young households contributed to the house price boom from 1982
to 1989 in the UK. Euro area countries followed the liberalization and ﬁnancial innovation
policy pioneered in the UK, each country at its own pace. This institutional shift led
to a spurt in mortgage loan growth in almost all euro area countries in the 90’s albeit
at diﬀerent times (see ECB, 2003). The relaxation of borrowing constraint has quite a
sizeable inﬂationary eﬀect on house prices, according to Vigdor (2004). By appraising the
10VA mortgage program,8 he estimates that if 10% more of American households had access
to the same credit conditions as war veterans, the house price over rent ratio would increase
of about 6% nationwide. Since all credit constraints proxies failed to be signiﬁcant in the
empirical estimation, I followed IMF (2004) by proposing a positive relationship between
house price and outstanding mortgage loan development.
The user cost in non log-linear form is commonly deﬁned as:
UCt = Pt
 





see for instance Muellbauer & Murphy (1997), McCarthy & Peach (2002); and r is the
tax-adjusted interest rate, δ is the depreciation rate or the maintenance cost rate including
property taxation, and the last term is the expected appreciation of house, while Pt is the
real house price in non log-form. The risk free interest rate can be assimilated to an
opportunity cost, whereas future house price growth is considered as a future capital
gain. Assuming naive real house price expectation, i.e. the real expected house price is a
weighting of the two previous realizations with weight γ and 1 − γ respectively, the user
cost in log-linear form can be rewritten thus:
uct = rt + δ + (1 − γ)pt − (1 − γ)pt−1. (2)
I assume a naive backward expectation instead of a more realistic "semi-rational"
one as in Muellbauer & Murphy (1997). In the light of the purpose of the estimation,
another hypothesis regarding expectations would have been more cumbersome and useless.




1 + α4(2 − γ)
 
α4(1 − γ)pt−1 − α2dwt + α3yt − α4rt
+α5pot + α6rtt + α7lmt + u − α4δ
 
. (3)
House price demand exhibits persistence grounded on households’ expectations. This
staggered price adjustment stems from historic backward prices expectations. Indeed,
when households expect real house price increase, they hasten to purchase real estate.
Households typically fear not being able to aﬀord a house in the future market during
boom periods. The renewed rise will encourage ﬁrst-time buyers, worried about missing
out on the property ladder. This self-fulﬁlling eﬀect shapes the persistence eﬀect (serial
correlation).
Housing supply9 can be interpreted as an investment equation as in Kearl (1979) and
McCarthy & Peach (2002):
ivt = β1pt − β2cct − β3rt + ν, (4)
and cc is the construction cost borne by ﬁrms, and r the ﬁnancial conditions (cost
of credit). For the sake of simpliﬁcation, I suppose that the interest rate of households
and building ﬁrms is the same. The investment level depends on the current house price.
When the house price increases, the proﬁt margins increase as well before new entrants
8After the second World War, the US government implemented friendly legislative schemes for war
veterans in order to facilitate their access to mortgage credits. The VA mortgage program refers to this
legislative package.
9For a thorough theoretical investigation of housing supply, see Kenny (2003).
11enter the market, making house construction more proﬁtable, and the existing ﬁrms in
the construction and building sector will start investing. The larger the price, the more
important the amount invested. Finally, the construction costs and the ﬁnancial burden
of credit borrowing (interest rate) have a deterrent eﬀect on investment. By deﬁnition,
the law of motion of the stock of dwelling is:
dwt+1 = dwt + ivt − δdwt.
By inserting this deﬁnition in the investment equation (3), the supply can be rewritten as
a cobweb model:
dwt+1 = (1 − δ)dwt + β1pt − β2cct − β3rt + ν. (5)
The quantity supplied to the house market is determined by previous year price, a
bygone. The stock of dwelling is not only determined by investments costs (construction
costs and interest rates) but also by house prices. An increase of house prices will trigger
a positive reaction (albeit sluggish) of the supply (simultaneous equation demand and
supply, see Annex 10). Thus, the supply in the current period is perfectly inelastic. The
literature on housing stresses that inertia is one salient feature of housing supply. Empirical
investigations have proven that the supply is typically constrained (Muellbauer & Murphy,
1997; Kenny, 2003).
Assuming demand equals supply, and thus substituting equation (5) into (3) yields the
reduced house market model in log-level:
pt =
1
1 + α4(2 − γ)
 
(α4(1 − α2β1))pt−1 − α2(1 − δ)dwt−1 + α3yt + α4β3rt−1




The literature on housing highlights two salient features of the house price process.
First, house price is a highly persistent process due to backward looking expectations on
the demand side and inelastic housing supply. Second, supply-demand interaction over
time leads to a house price cycle, where short-term dynamics deviate from their long-term
trend (Annex 10). In time series, Error Correction Model (ECM) is the most suited tool
to disentangle long-term from short-term dynamics. One alternative is to estimate the
model in two steps according to the Engle-Granger procedure. It consists in estimating
the long-term cointegrated relationship in log-level, and then the short-term equation in
ﬁrst diﬀerences including the lagged residuals of the estimated long-term equation. In a
panel framework, however, this would lead to inconsistency. Instead, I propose to frame
the equations in ﬁrst diﬀerence to cope with the unit root problem and to introduce an
error correction term (ECT). This gives respectively equation (7), (8) and (9):
∆pi,t =
1
1 + α4(2 − γ)
 
α4(1 − γ)∆pi,t−1 − α2∆dwi,t + α3∆yi,t
−α4∆ri,t + α5∆poi,t + α6rti,t + α7lmi,t
 
+ τi − λECTd,i,t−1,
(7)
∆dwi,t = (1 − δ)∆dwi,t−1 + β1∆pi,t−1 − β2∆cci,t−1 − β3∆ri,t−1 + νi − ηECTs,i,t−1, (8)
12∆pi,t =
1
1 + α4(2 − γ)


(α4(1 − α2β1))∆pi,t−1 − α2(1 − δ)∆dwi,t−1
+α2β2∆cci,t−1 + α3∆yi,t + α4β3∆ri,t−1




In the testing strategy, I begin with 2 lags, the insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients are dropped.
Consequently, equation (9) can be written in generalized form:
Γ0∆Xt = Γ1∆Xt−1 + Γ2∆Xt−2 + ωi − µECTi,t−1 + ǫi,t.
with X′
t = (pt,dwt,cct,yt,rt,pot,rtt,lmt).
The ﬁnal forms of the three equations, i.e. the inverted house price equation (7),
the housing supply (8) and the reduced house market (9) are all three characterized by
an ARDL (Autoregressive Distributed Lags) process and a lagged mean reverting ECT
as long-term equilibrium adjustment proxy. The indexes i = 1.....8 denote the 8 EMU
countries investigated, τi = ui − α4iδi , νi , and ωi = ui − α4iδi − α2iνi are country ﬁxed
eﬀects, of respectively demand, supply and reduced house market equation, whereas t is
the lag operator indicator (time) ; all growth rates are measured as ﬁrst diﬀerences of
logarithms except interest rate ∆r , which is not expressed in logarithm. The growth
rates are: ∆p for the house price, ∆dw for the stock of dwelling, ∆cc for the construction
costs, ∆y for households’ real disposable income, ∆po for the population, ∆rt for housing
rents and ∆lm for the real mortgage loan.
The adjustment error correction terms reﬂect the dynamic adjustment to long-run
equilibrium, i.e. the gap between actual house prices and the house price equilibrium.
Following the literature (IMF, 2004; Lecat & Mesonnier, 2005), the ECT in the demand
(7) and reduced equation (9) is proxied by aﬀordability ratios and indicators. In the
previous section, three diﬀerent seemingly mean reverting variables were respectively in-
vestigated, i.e. the crude aﬀordability ratio (AFR), the interest rate adjusted aﬀordability
ratio (ARR) and the aﬀordability indicator (AIR). The ﬁrst, i.e. AFR, supposes that
solely income is the fundamental variable towards real house prices tend in the long-term
(Lamont & Stein (1999), IMF (2004) and Lecat & Mesonnier (2005)). The last two, i.e.
ARR, and AIR might be even better ECTs proxies as they include interest rates. It is
not far-fetched to suppose that interest rates in level impinge on the long-term house price
level (Ott, 2006b). Finally, the ECT in equation (8) is the construction cost index in
level divided by the residential property price in level. Cost of land should be included,
as scarcity of land is an essential determinant of long-term house prices. Once again, due
to a lack of data, I am obliged to use this proxy. The stationarity properties of all ECT
proxies are investigated in section 5.1
4.2 Mortgage market
To gain insight into the relationship between the house market and the mortgage market,
it is important to expose a basic mortgage market model. Indeed, the mortgage market
dynamics will also strongly inﬂuence house prices. Once again, instead of developing a
thorough theoretical framework, the speciﬁcation of the model will be taken from the
existing literature, e.g. Brueckner (1994) but also Gary-Bobo & Larribeau (2003). In
log-linear form, the demand of mortgage loan can be speciﬁed as:
13lmt = ϕ1lmt−1 + ϕ2yt − ϕ3rM
t + ϕ4rtt + υ. (10)
The demand of credit for housing purpose, lmt depends positively on the mortgage
development of previous years, on households’ disposable income and on housing rents but
it will depend negatively on the mortgage interest rate, rM
t (cost of ﬁnancing the house).
The decision to own a house and the size (value) of the house will depend positively on the
aﬀordability of the household. The direct cost borne by the borrower is the mortgage rate
and will, of course, inﬂuence negatively the demand of mortgage loan. The rent variable
is considered as an arbitrage decision as the tenant will aspire to ownership if the costs of
renting increases relative to the house price. In contrast, mortgage supply is considered as
a mark-up equation of monopolist banks (see Gary-Bobo & Larribeau, 2003 for instance):
1 + rM
t = φ1rt + F(
LMt
PtDWt
,yt) + ς. (11)
The bank will charge a mortgage loan depending on the cost opportunity to invest in an
alternative asset, which in our system of equations is a risk-free interest rate government
bond yield of short or longer maturity, namely r. The ratio mortgage loan supplied over
the value of the house is considered as the LTV ratio. Thus, the F function accounts for
the default risk monitored by the bank; the decision to lend for a given mortgage rate
depends positively on the current and expected income of the household which is proxied
by the disposable income (y), and negatively on the LTV. Banks monitor households’
global ﬁnancial wealth including the property value (house price) considered as a collateral.
Indeed, in order to reduce moral hazard ﬁnancial institutions require households to pledge
their property. If households are unable to meet mortgage interest payments, banks are
entitled to sell the pledged collateral and to cash in the proceeds to cover the claims. This
explains why mortgage loans are the most common and widespread practice as they reduce
considerably moral hazard.
Mortgage loan supply and demand will not be estimated due to missing mortgage
interest rate data, only the reduced mortgage loan market will be. The ﬁrst step to derive
a reduced equation consists log-linearizing the F function. The second step consists in
inserting (11) into (10) and in solving the sub-system of mortgage equations with respect





ϕ1∆lmi,t−1 + (ϕ2 + ϕ3φ5)∆yi,t − ϕ3φ1∆ri,t
+ϕ3φ3∆pi,t + ϕ3φ4∆dwi,t + ϕ4∆rti,t
 
+ εi,t. (12)
The equation is framed in ﬁrst diﬀerence to cope with unit root problems. As variables
are expressed in log, the equation is expressed in growth rates except the interest rate;
ﬁnally υi + ςi is the country ﬁxed eﬀect of the reduced mortgage market equation (12). I
follow the same strategy by supposing ﬁrst 2 lags10 and then eliminating the insigniﬁcant
coeﬃcients. Consequently, equation (12) can be written in a generalized form:
 0∆Zt =  1∆Zt−1 +  2∆Zt−2 + υi + ςi + εi,t,
with Z′
t = (lmt,yt,rt,pt,dwt,rtt).
10After veriﬁcation, it came out that no coeﬃcient variable lagged beyond 2 periods was signiﬁcant.
This is in line with what was expected with annual data.
144.3 Endogeneity and econometric methodology
Equations (3), (5), (10) and (11) establish a system of equation determining house prices,
i.e. a simultaneous equation model (SEM) with four endogenous variables: pt, dwt, rM
t
and lmt. Since mortgage interest rates data are not available, the reduced mortgage
market equation (12) is considered and equation (10) and (11) cancel out. This reduces
the system to three endogenous variables. First, the house price and the stock of dwelling
are determined simultaneously by the supply and demand of housing. For instance an
increase of house prices provoked by a demand push triggers a positive reaction (albeit
sluggish) of the supply. Second, the volume of mortgage loan is endogenous to the house
price via the lending collateral. As this collateral is the house itself, an increase of the
house price will induce an increase of the mortgage loan. Third, the real disposable income
may also be endogenous. This link is tenuous as the proxy disposable income does not
include the house valuation, while households’ wealth would. However, housing rents
are included in disposable income, and house price movements might be coupled with
rents growth through arbitrage. In fact, housing rents account for such a minor part in
households’ disposable income that it is not far-fetched to consider it exogenous. Fourth,
bond and short-term interest rate are essentially monetary policy driven especially for
short-term maturity. These interest rates will inﬂuence the supply and demand but they
are exogenous to the mortgage market. It is assumed that monetary policy does not
react (albeit exceptionally, see ECB 2005) to house price variations.11 Fifth, in equation
(3) and (6) the mortgage loan variable could be replaced by a credit constraint indicator
characterized to be non-endogenous. Diﬀerent credit constraint proxies were investigated
during the empirical estimation, none of them were signiﬁcant. Moreover, the credit
constraint indicators might also be endogenous to the mortgage market, albeit to a lesser
extent. Consequently, I suppose, instead, a positive endogenous relationship between
mortgage loan growth and house price.
The equations fulﬁll the autonomous requirement as explained in Baltagi (1995). In
a SEM, an equation is considered as autonomous if it has an isolated economic meaning
independently from the other equations in the system. Furthermore, as at least one
exogenous variable, i.e. construction cost, does not appear in the demand function, supply
equation (5) is clearly identiﬁed under the condition that the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. Instead, the concern focuses on endogeneity and more generally on
the ARDL ﬁxed eﬀect models. The autoregressive term house price at time t-1 (R.H.S.
regressor) is correlated with the error term and so OLS and Random Eﬀect estimators are
biased and inconsistent. Moreover, the country eﬀect helps picking up omitted variables.
Thus, it is likely that these country-speciﬁc characteristics are correlated with the other
regressors, ﬂawing the use of Pooled OLS and RE GLS. The within LSDV estimator
(Least Square Dummy Variable) seems at ﬁrst sight to be the perfect candidate as it
allows to estimate the FE term and the within transformation cancels out the FE term.
Unfortunately a correlation still arises with the error term since one regressor is a lagged
11Although the FED as well as the ECB have shown concern about house prices, it is realistic to suppose
that house price movements are not included in the reaction function of the central bank. Monetary policy
interest rate is mainly driven by output gap and CPI inﬂation movements. However, I understand that
interest rate is endogenous to inﬂation and output gap. Indeed, a house price increase has a positive
impact on households’ wealth, which in turn puts the aggregated demand and inﬂation under pressure.
Since monetary policy reacts to inﬂation and to output gap, interest rate is indirectly endogenous to house
price. I suppose interest rate weakly exogenous to house prices.
15dependent variable, even if the other variables were exogenous. Although the within FE
estimator will be biased, as T tends to inﬁnity the bias dies out. Nickel (1981) derives
a rigorous formulation of the bias of the within FE estimator in a dynamic panel data
model. In dynamic panel econometrics, where the R.H.S. of the equation contains lags of
the dependent variables, the within-country estimator can be severely downward biased
when the time dimension is short. Thus, the LSDV estimator only performs well when the
time dimension of the panel is relatively larger with respect to the number of cross-sections.
To obtain consistent parameters any estimation technique requires instrumental vari-
able methods like two-stage least squares (2SLS). Several estimators were proposed to
estimate equations (7), (8), (9) and (12) when T is not large. Anderson & Hsiao (1981)
propose two instrumental variable procedures. First, they remove the FE term by diﬀer-
encing the model. Second, they suggest to use as instrumental variables the dependent
variable lagged two periods (in level) or its ﬁrst diﬀerences. These instruments will not
be correlated with the ﬁrst diﬀerenced error terms as long as they are not themselves
serially correlated. Thus, this IV estimation method leads to consistent, but not necessar-
ily eﬃcient estimates of the parameters. Arellano (1989) proves that Anderson & Hsiao
estimator that uses diﬀerence rather than level for instruments has a very large variance.
In the same stance, Arellano & Bond (1991) also diﬀerentiate the model to remove the FE
terms and produce an equation that is estimable by instrumental variables. They derive
a GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) estimator. The orthogonality between lagged
values of the dependent variables and other endogenous variables is ensured by the use
of all the lags at each period as instruments for the equation in ﬁrst diﬀerences. The
GMM procedure gains in eﬃciency by exploiting additional moment restrictions. Finally,
Arellano & Bond (1991) conﬁrm the superiority of using the lagged level as an instru-
ment (instead of ﬁrst diﬀerence), since the lagged diﬀerence as an instrument results in
an estimator that has a very large variance.
Keane & Runkle’s solution (1992) to estimate dynamic panel data models will not been
used. They propose a test strategy to determine endogeneity. The starting point is to
estimate the model with three diﬀerent estimation techniques: FE 2SLS, ﬁrst-diﬀerence
FD 2SLS and 2SLS using the exogenous variables, the lagged values of the exogenous
variables and the predetermined variables as instrument. To test the null hypothesis of
strict exogeneity of the lagged house price, stock of dwelling and mortgage loan, Keane
& Runkle (1992) propose two Hausman tests except that the variances are complicated
because Keane and Runkle do not use the eﬃcient estimator under the null. If the Chi
square statistic rejects the null hypothesis, it means that explanatory variables are not
strictly exogenous, i.e. FE-2SLS is not consistent. If Ho is rejected, Keane & Runkle
propose a second type Hausman test to determine whether FD-2SLS or 2SLS should be
used. Under the null hypothesis of the Hausman test, it is supposed that the explanatory
variables are correlated with ﬁxed eﬀects. If this hypothesis is not rejected, the FD-2SLS
should be used. The Keane & Runkle (1992) strategy does not apply to the case studied
here as I can assert that the variables are endogenous. The FD-2SLS is the only consistent
estimator and the Anderson & Hsiao is a ﬁrst diﬀerenced two stage least square model.
Finally, three stage least square estimator is averted. Although the systems methods
are asymptotically better, they have two problems. First, any speciﬁcation error in the
structure of any equation will be propagated throughout the system by 3SLS. Second, in
the same fashion as the SURE (Seemingly Unrelated Regressions) model, the ﬁnite-sample
16variation of the estimated covariance matrix is transmitted throughout the system. Thus,
the ﬁnite-sample variance of 3SLS may well be as large as or larger than that of 2SLS. The
advantage of the systems estimators in ﬁnite samples are more modest than the asymptotic
results would suggest. As a result, a 2STLS estimator is used despite the relatively low
time dimension.
After all, the choice of the best estimator depends on the panel dimension. As T
gets larger, the eﬃciency of the LSDV estimator might outweigh the bias depicted in the
mean squared error of the estimator. Judson & Owen (1997) simulate a Monte Carlo
experiment and analyze dynamic panel estimator performance with respect to the panel
dimension (time and cross-sectional). They conclude that "when T=30, the average bias
becomes signiﬁcantly smaller" but the bias can still be signiﬁcant, ranging from 3% to
20%. Haque, Pesaran & Scharma (1999) have an even larger conﬁdence in non IV type
estimators. Indeed, they argue that for "models where T(=22) is reasonably large and the
same order of magnitude as (N=21)", the application of instrument variables to a ﬁrst
diﬀerenced models like equations (7), (8), (9) and (12), does not seem necessary, and can
even lead to considerable loss of eﬃciency. According to them, Anderson & Hsiao (1981)
or Arellano & Bond’s GMM estimators (1991) should only be applied to estimate dynamic
panel data ﬁxed eﬀect models when the time dimension is short, ranging from 3 to 10,
and cross-sectional relatively large, about 50 or more. It is well-known that the GMM
Arellano & Bond (1991) procedure is usually employed in estimation of panel with a large
number of individuals and short time series. Nevertheless, there are two procedures to
estimate with GMM Arellano & Bond (1991), the one step estimator and the two step
procedure. The latter can lead to overidentiﬁcation, it is necessary to perform an Sargan-
type overidentiﬁcation restriction test as it uses the full set of instruments. This actually
increases consistency but at the cost of eﬃciency. The former however is a restricted GMM
estimator since it uses a subset of the available lagged values as instruments. Judson &
Owen (1997) conclude that the one-step GMM procedure outperforms the two-step GMM
estimator by producing smaller bias and smaller standard deviation of the estimates. This
holds of course in macro panel data where the time dimension is typically larger than the
cross-sectional dimension. This result is in line with Arellano & Bond (1991) who show
that increasing the number of instruments creates a trade-oﬀ between the average bias
and the eﬃciency.
To summarize, the choice of the econometric methodology is based on four considera-
tions. The ﬁrst involves panel econometrics. The time dimension of the available data on
a country level is too short for robust estimates. Indeed, the annual data available ranges
from 1975 to 2005 (T=31 observations). Panel econometrics allows a substantial gain in
power. Moreover, panel estimators are proven to deal with the problem of measurement
bias better (see Baltagi, 1995). Second, according to the theoretical framework and earlier
empirical studies on house market (Muellbauer & Murphy, 1997; McCarthy & Peach, 2004;
IMF, 2004; Lecat & Mesonnier, 2005), house price dynamics is a highly persistent process
due to the staggered supply and households’ house price expectations. Third, the inter-
action between mortgage market and house market but also between demand and supply
within the markets render some explanatory variables endogenous. Fourth, as described in
ECB (2003) and by Tsatsaronis & Zhu (2004), house and mortgage markets diﬀer widely
across EU countries, i.e. strong heterogeneity is observed between adjustable versus ﬁxed
mortgage loan interest rate, required LTV ratio, practice of mortgage equity withdrawal,
17legal scheme concerning house renting etc. Although the use of the estimated coeﬃcient
on a euro area aggregates assuages the heterogeneity problem, a ﬁxed eﬀect term in the
estimation equation is the minimum heterogeneity to specify. Altogether, the two most
used consistent estimators which tackle all four issues are ﬁrst diﬀerenced IV estimator
developed by Anderson & Hsiao (1981) and the dynamic panel GMM estimator developed
by Arellano & Bond (1991) denominated respectively AH and AB. Nevertheless, there is
a trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and consistency as stressed by Haque, Pesaran & Sharma
(1999) and Judson & Owen (1997). As a result, to check the robustness of the results
two more eﬃcient but biased estimators are investigated, i.e. the panel within ﬁxed ef-
fect estimator (Least Square Dummy Variable) and a ﬁxed eﬀect two stage least square,
respectively called LSDV and FE-IV. The former is a simple one way within FE estima-
tor whereas the latter is a within FE estimator with IV. To conclude on the asymptotic
properties of the chosen estimators, Judson & Owen (1997) show that among AH, AB
and LSDV estimators, for suﬃciently large N and T, the diﬀerences in eﬃciency and bias
vanishes. Alvarez & Arellano (2003) also prove the closeness of the GMM relative to the
within group FE estimator as N and T tends to inﬁnity, contrary to the 2SLS estimators.
5 Empirical investigations
5.1 Unit root tests
The major caveat of classical time series unit root tests (e.g. ADF or KPSS tests) applied
individually to each country (group or section) is the lack of power. Indeed, the relatively
short time span (T=31) gives too few observations. However the time span is long enough
to be concerned by the stationary proprieties of the series. As a consequence, to gain
power, panel unit root tests are used. The ﬁrst generation of panel unit root tests do
not take into account possible cross-sectional correlations. The ﬁrst test was developed
by Levin, Lin & Chu (1993). Beside omitting the problem of cross sectional correlation,
this test only allows for heterogeneity across sections (countries) by a ﬁxed eﬀect. The
problem of heterogeneity is better taken into account by Im, Pesaran & Shin (1997)
and Maddala & Wu (1999) tests. These tests allow under H1 not only heterogeneous
autoregressive coeﬃcients among sections, but also divergent cases among sections in view
of stationarity. Im, Pesaran & Shin propose an average ADF test over the sections, and
under H0 all sections have a unit root without ﬁxed eﬀect.
A new generation of panel unit root tests12 have been developed, taking into account
the problem of cross-sectional correlation: Bai & Ng (2001), Moon & Perron (2003),
Choi (2002) and Pesaran (2003). Monetary union and the convergence process imply a
very strong cross-sectional correlation among the series. This is particularly true for the
interest rates. All four tests perform a unit root test only on the idiosyncratic component.
The Bai & Ng test supposes to know the number of common factors in a total factor
model. On the other hand, Moon & Perron, but also Choi, eliminate the common
components of the series, and so perform a unit root test on the transformed series. These
last two tests are certainly the most relevant ones in this empirical study in view of
their asymptotic properties. Finally, Pesaran’s test (augmented Dickey-Fuller) does not
transform the data. Instead the test is performed on the raw data.
12The new generation of unit root tests were performed thanks to the matlab codes developed by
Christophe Hurlin.
18The number of lags were chosen automatically section by section based on the SIC
(Schwartz Information Criteria). The null hypothesis for all tests is unit root. All variables
are in log level, except the ECTs proxies and interest rates. First generation panel unit
root tests, (1) Levin, Lin & Chu, (2) Breitung, (3) Im, Pesaran & Shin, (4) ADF
Fisher (Fisher Chi-square, Choi Z-stat), (5) Phillips Perron test (Fisher Chi-square, Choi
Z-stat), but also second generation: (1) Bai & Ng, (2) Moon & Perron, (3) Choi (4)
Pesaran’s test have been performed. All tests were performed with maximum lag order of
4. As depicted in Annex 11, according to the second generation of panel unit root tests,
all variables are found to have a unit root, except real interest rates (r) which are I(0).
These results are in line with the theory and with what was expected. Indeed, inﬂation
as well as nominal interest rates are found to be I(1) by the new generation of panel unit
root tests. According to Fisher’s theory, both are cointegrated, and so the residual of the
nominal interest rate minus the inﬂation rate must be I(0).
Finally, the log of residential property price is found to be trend-stationary according
to all three old generation tests (see Annex 12). The log of dwelling is also found to be
trend-stationary according to the Levin, Lin & Chu and Breitung’s tests. On the other
hand, Choi and Moon & Perron’s tests conclude to a unit root process for both series. I
rather trust the new generation of panel unit root, as there might be strong cross-sectional
correlation. For these two series, however, I also performed a country speciﬁc ADF tests
(see Annex 13). Once again, the lag order chosen is based on SIC. According to the ADF
test with or without trend, unit root process cannot be rejected at 5 %. In ﬁrst diﬀerence,
the unit root is clearly rejected (see Table 1) for all these series. Thus, I conclude that
all series investigated are I(1) except real interest rates, which is in line with what was
expected.
19Table 1: Choi and Moon & Perron unit root test (ﬁrst diﬀerenced series)
Var Test Deterministic terms Statistics Z(Choi), tb (M&P) p-limit
∆p Choi c -5.49 0.00
M&P c -5.18 0.00
∆dw Choi c -3.57 0.00
M&P c -3.62 0.00
∆y Choi c -8.69 0.00
M&P c -10.5 0.00
∆po Choi c -4.87 0.00
M&P c -5.37 0.00
∆rt Choi c -8.49 0.00
M&P c -7.15 0.00
∆i Choi c -9.76 0.00
M&P c 26.5 0.00
∆lm Choi c -4.25 0.00
M&P c -4.43 0.00
∆sp Choi c -7.40 0.00
M&P c -8.91 0.00
∆cc Choi c -9.21 0.00
M&P c -6.63 0.00
AFR Choi c 0.70 0.76
M&P c -3.09 0.01
ARR Choi c -0.40 0.35
M&P c -3.90 0.00
AIR Choi c -4.08 0.00
M&P c -4.38 0.00
ECTs Choi c -0.15 0.44
M&P c -3.36 0.00
The ECTs stationarity properties must also be checked. On the house market, three
diﬀerent ECT proxies will be investigated. First, the AFR (crude aﬀordability) should
show mean reversion. Indeed, residential property price and households’ income should
be cointegrated. Besides, as residential property price and households’ disposable income
per capita are both I(1), the ratio of two unit roots should be I(0). Second, the AFR and
the AIR are found to be non stationary process. Indeed, Choi and Moon & Perron unit
root tests fail to reject the null hypothesis at common levels. I suspect that trends in some
countries explain this result. However, with a deterministic trend, the result of the two
unit root tests is the same. It is not surprising, as a trend in one country oﬀsets the other.
Consequently I perform Hadri unit root test (Table 2). Indeed, the null hypothesis which
assumes that all 8 time series in the panel are stationary processes is strongly rejected.
This might prove that only some countries exhibit no-mean reverting ratios in a non time
deterministic framework. It is preferably to detrend AFR and ARR ratios in Germany
and Spain. Indeed, once these two countries are detrended, the new ratios contain no unit
root according to Moon & Perron unit root test (see Table 1).
20Table 2: Hadri panel unit root test
Var Z(mu) P-value Z(tau) P-value
AFR Homo 26.5 0.00 26.5 0.00
Hetero 21.3 0.00 19.9 0.00
Ser. Dep 4.12 0.00 4.54 0.00
ARR Homo 25.9 0.00 27.2 0.00
Hetero 23.7 0.00 21.4 0.00
SerDep 3.86 0.00 4.49 0.00
Homo: homoscedastic disturbances across units
Hetero: heteroscedastic disturbances across units
SerDep: controlling for serial dependence in errors (lag trunc = 6)
5.2 Empirical results
5.2.1 House market demand and reduced form
Appendix 1 gives a detailed explanation of data construction and their sources. All se-
ries employed are of course I(0) as checked in the previous section, including the diﬀerent
ECTs proxies. I estimate equation (7), (8), (9) and (12) with a considerable number
of alternative regarding proxies, lag structure and estimators. The maximum lag order
is two, which is enough for annual data, and lagged variables with insigniﬁcant coeﬃ-
cients are dropped from the ﬁnal estimated equations. The time span of the available
number of households per country was too short. Consequently, two other demographic
variables were investigated, i.e. total population and population aged from 15 to 64. The
occurrence of right sign of the total population was far above the population aged from
15-64. Both demographic proxies were used to scale disposable income. Real disposable
income per capita aged from 15 to 65 gave better results, and thus was chosen in the ﬁnal
speciﬁcations. Following Muellbauer & Murphy (1997) and Pain & Wesstaway (1996), I
experimented as credit constraint proxy, the rate of acceleration of outstanding mortgage
loan volume, and diﬀerent CLTV. None of them turned out to be signiﬁcant. The dif-
ference between mortgage rate and interbank interest rate would have certainly been a
good proxy. This option could not be tested, due to missing data. In contrast, the growth
rate of mortgage loan volume was frankly signiﬁcant for almost every speciﬁcation and
almost every estimator. Mortgage loan growth rate has to be interpreted as a credit access
indicator. This interpretation also has its silver lining, it gives a clearer understanding
of the interaction between mortgage market and house market since the same variable is
used in the mortgage market equation. Moreover, IMF (2004) used the same proxy.
Table 3 and 4, respectively, summarize the coeﬃcient estimates of the demand and
the reduced model. In both tables, the three ﬁrst columns contain the estimates based
on the LSDV estimator, simple one way linear within FE estimator, according to all
three demand ECTs proxies. The fourth (D1) and the ﬁfth (E1) column, respectively,
refer to the within 2SLS estimator (IV-FE) and the Anderson & Hsiao ﬁrst diﬀerenced
2SLS estimator (AH), respectively. Columns sixth (F1) to eight (H3) depict the Arellano-
Bond estimates according to the diﬀerent ECT proxies.13 Concerning the IV-FE, AH and
AB estimators, I followed the model speciﬁcation and instrumented in ﬁrst diﬀerence the
following variables: the stock of dwelling and the lag order 1, of the real residential property
13Demand ECTs and reduced form ECTs proxies are alike.
21price, of the real mortgage loan, and of the stock of dwelling. All exogenous variables were
used as instruments. To meet the required size of the set of instrument variables, more
instrument variables were needed for the IV-FE and AH estimators. In IV-FE estimations,
the ﬁrst diﬀerence of construction costs and the ﬁrst diﬀerence lag order 3 of, residential
property price, stock of dwelling, mortgage loan were added, while in AH estimations,
ﬁrst diﬀerence of construction costs, but lag 2 of variables in level, residential property
price, stock of dwelling and mortgage loan were also used. Finally, I privileged the one
step estimation procedure in the AB estimation with robust estimator of the variance-
covariance matrix of the parameter estimates. Arellano & Bond (1991) already found that
the two-step standard errors tend to be biased downward in small samples. Furthermore,
Judson & Owen (1997) highlighted the eﬃciency loss due to many instruments for macro-
data. Although the null hypothesis of Sargan-type for overidentifying restrictions might
be rejected, AB two step estimator perform poorly in small samples. In our empirical
estimation, the Arellano & Bond Sargan-type test for overidentiﬁcation restriction strongly
rejects the null hypothesis in any speciﬁcation, as expected since the one step procedure is
used. Levels of the endogenous variables lagged two are used to serve as instruments. I also
performed Arellano & Bond (1991) autocorrelation test. For all six AB estimates, the null
hypothesis of no ﬁrst-order autocorrelation in the diﬀerenced residuals is rejected at 5%,
while the null hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation is never rejected. Second-
order autocorrelation would imply that the estimates are inconsistent, while ﬁrst-order
autocorrelation in the diﬀerenced residuals does not.14
To check the robustness of the results, I will ﬁrst examine whether the diﬀerent es-
timators give similar coeﬃcient estimates. Haque, Pesaran & Sharma’s caveat (1997)
considering the use of IV-type estimators seems justiﬁed. Despite the bias, the LSDV
estimator yields very realistic estimates, while the AH and specially FE-IV do not ren-
der satisfactory results. Referring to the description of the FE-IV estimator in previous
section, the weird results of the FE-IV estimator were expected. It is worth noting that
coeﬃcient estimate of the lagged dependent variable is above 1, which raises a station-
ary problem (see column D1 in Table 3 and 4). As proved by Arellano & Bond (1991)
the eﬃciency gains of the GMM AB estimator against the AH estimator is substantial.
Consequently, the AB estimates are the benchmark results, where standard errors are ro-
bust. Interestingly, there is little diﬀerence between the coeﬃcient obtained on the focus
variables between the LSDV and the AB estimator. Indeed, between the two estimators,
the lagged dependent, the income, the interest rate, and the ECTs have similar coeﬃcient
estimates. Second, from column (A1) to (C3) as well as from (F1) to (H3), I investigate
whether the main results are robust when I account for diﬀerent ECTs proxies. Obviously,
the ECT coeﬃcient estimates diﬀer across the diﬀerent speciﬁcation, but not between the
diﬀerent estimators. Moreover, the focus variable estimates also remain stable across the
speciﬁcations. Third, coeﬃcient estimates are very narrow between Table 3 and Table
4 which is not surprising as demand and reduced house price equations are very close.
Altogether, the three points prove that the results are robust to changes in the baseline,
including lag structure, adding diﬀerent variables and using diﬀerent estimators (especially
between AB and LSDV).
14See Arellano & Bond (1991, pp. 281-82) for a discussion on this point.
22Table 3: Coeﬃcients estimates reduced house market (9)
Dependent variable: ∆pt Real residential property price growth
Var LSDV LSDV LSDV FE-IV AH AB AB AB
(A1) (B2) (C3) (D1) (E1) (F1) (G2) (H3)
∆pt−1 0.51 0.48 0.49 1.56 0.59 0.50 0.48 0.49
(8.41) (8.06) (8.01) (1.31) (0.79) (21.15) (19.38) (10.64)
∆dwt−1 -0.53 -0.79 -1.08 12.1 -1.54 -0.62 -0.51 -0.34
(−2.16) (−2.04) (−1.98) (0.51) (−0.61) (−3.19) (−2.67) (−1.88)
∆yt 0.39 0.48 0.36 -0.50 1.62 0.41 0.46 0.40
(2.07) (2.97) (2.17) (−0.38) (0.69) (2.57) (3.94) (2.86)
∆yt−1 0.33 0.36 0.41 -0.32 0.98 0.34 0.42 0.37
(2.14) (2.97) (2.59) (−0.33) (0.66) (3.65) (4.71) (5.85)
rt -0.30 -0.18 -0.13 -0.71 -1.45 -0.41 -0.28 -0.32
(−2.57) (−1.79) (−1.61) (−0.65) (−1.41) (−2.01) (−1.82) (−2.05)
∆it−1 0.06 0.08 0.08 -0.53 1.25 0.07 0.09 0.05
(0.33) (0.39) (0.39) (−0.38) (0.79) (0.28) (0.54) (0.88)
∆pot 1.77 1.75 1.75 -13.0 -4.68 0.43 -0.12 0.59
(1.24) (1.22) (1.83) (−0.42) (−0.29) (0.57) (−0.09) (0.90)
∆lmt 0.28 0.20 0.24 0.98 -2.13 0.25 0.17 0.21
(4.36) (3.21) (3.64) (0.65) (−0.61) (4.83) (3.54) (4.26)
∆spt 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06
(3.97) (3.21) (3.85) (1.50) (0.85) (4.92) (4.38) (6.52)
∆cct−1 0.13 0.05 0.09 0.48 0.21 0.04 0.05 0.06
(1.09) (0.64) (0.63) (0.01) (0.86) (1.08) (1.59) (6.52)
AFRt−1
15 -0.11 -0.29 -0.29 -0.15





cst 0.09 0.06 -0.00 0.15 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(4.19) (3.21) (−0.36) (1.43) (1.08) (1.78) (1.37) (1.04)
15The inverse of the AFR, ARR and AIR enter the speciﬁcation.
23Table 4: Coeﬃcients estimates demand house market (7)
Dependent variable: ∆pt Real residential property price growth
Var LSDV LSDV LSDV FE-IV AH AB AB AB
(A1) (B2) (C3) (D1) (E1) (F1) (G2) (H3)
∆pt−1 0.49 0.47 0.47 1.38 0.60 0.49 0.48 0.49
(8.31) (13.8) (7.71) (1.92) (0.75) (10.84) (6.93) (3.19)
∆dwt -2.43 -2.17 -2.84 -21.02 -13.3 -2.71 -2.31 -1.94
(−1.67) (−2.51) (−1.89) (−0.81) (−0.26) (1.67) (−1.06) (−1.53)
∆dwt−1 2.10 2.22 1.53. 28.90 8.37 1.26 2.16 2.05
(1.36) (2.16) (0.83) (0.76) (0.19) (6.10) (1.53) (1.40)
∆yt 0.39 0.50 0.41 0.54 1.62 0.44 0.50 0.40
(2.39) (3.38) (2.56) (0.50) (0.69) (2.53) (2.94) (1.13)
∆yt−1 0.32 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.98 0.33 0.43 0.47
(2.07) (4.21) (2.61) (0.51) (0.66) (3.20) (3.20) (1.54)
rt -0.36 -0.17 -0.14 -0.52 -1.45 -0.34 -0.21 -0.12
(−2.85) (−1.71) (−1.46) (−0.89) (−1.41) (−1.82) (−0.23) (−0.30)
∆pot 1.46 1.33 1.58 -0.23 -3.88 -1.91 -2.01 -1.51
(1.01) (1.08) (0.98) (−0.56) (−0.29) (−0.92) (−1.02) (−0.63)
∆lmt 0.30 0.19 0.23 0.83 -2.01 0.20 0.15 0.15
(4.70) (4.62) (3.64) (0.88) (−0.58) (1.15) (0.09) (0.47)
∆rtt -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.08 -0.01 -0.12 -0.16 -0.08
(−0.10) (0.08) (10.07) (0.19) (−0.02) (−0.76) (−0.94) (−0.38)
∆spt 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07
(4.06) (5.06) (4.15) (1.98) (0.85) (4.78) (3.89) (2.05)
AFRt−1
16 -0.13 -0.26 -0.45 -0.14





cst 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00
(4.11) (1.75) (0.38) (2.05) (1.08) (1.66) (1.43) (1.04)
Table 3 and 4 report the preferred speciﬁcations and proxies. I choose the preferred
estimates with regard to statistical signiﬁcance and theoretical plausibility. The results
are quite satisfactory, both from the view point of the sign and level of signiﬁcance of the
coeﬃcients. In particular, the regression coeﬃcients are broadly statistically signiﬁcant at
conventional signiﬁcance levels, with the exception of the coeﬃcients on the population and
housing rents, which were never signiﬁcant for any speciﬁcation. Consequently, I left them
out in the reduced model. Dropping these two variables did not alter the other coeﬃcient
estimates markedly. Furthermore, coeﬃcients are all signed according to expectations
except once again population and rents, but they are not signiﬁcant anyway. Finally, I
consider AB estimates as benchmark models, column F1 and G2 in Table 4. Two reasons
explain this choice. First, the standard errors of the coeﬃcients are corrected to be robust.
Second, importantly, AB is a consistent estimator in view of the speciﬁcation, and LSDV
estimates are used to check the robustness of the AB estimates.
16The inverse of the AFR, ARR and AIR enter the speciﬁcation.
24Population does not count in the short-term dynamics of house prices, while it has a
signiﬁcant and measurable eﬀect in the long-term (Ott, 2006b) even if the link is more
complicated than what was expected at ﬁrst sight. In 1989, Mankiw & Weil (1989)
forecasted that real house prices in the USA would drop of over 3 % per year for the
next 15 years because of the elderly boom. In reality, real house prices in the USA
increased on average over 3.5% in the same period. Housing is a superior good where
wealth and income eﬀects play an important role. The average square meters of dwelling
tends to increase even though the size of household shrinks as long as they can aﬀord it.
Hereinafter the present study focuses on the dynamics of house price, the non-signiﬁcance
of population is no surprise despite the importance of demographic shifts in the long-term.
Two household arbitrage variables were included -as exogenous variables- to measure
whether households rotate their portfolio by changes in stock prices and rents.17 These two
portfolio variables were used by McCarthy & Peach (2004) and IMF (2004), respectively.
First, housing rents are not signiﬁcant. The arbitrage theory between ownership and ten-
ancy is ﬂawed by Government intervention. Indeed, tax relief to promote homeownership
and on the other hand social policy in favor of low housing rents explain this result (Ott,
2006a). Furthermore, the lagged of stock price is not signiﬁcant either. However the stock
price index growth shows contemporaneous correlation with house price growth; the corre-
lation around 0.06 is twice as large as the one estimated in IMF (2004). The positive sign
is in line with Borio & McGuire (2004). The positive sign was criticized by Tsatsaronis &
Zhu (2004) who argued that this is a spurious relationship. Both, house price movements
and stock prices are pro-cyclical, consequently a third factor, i.e. the business cycle renders
the correlation between both apparent even if there might be no link between house prices
and stock price movements. Newspaper journalists and especially The Economist (2005)
challenged this view as they argue that after the burst of the “new economy” stock prices,
traders invested in housing, fueling another bubble. If this statement held, the relationship
would be negative and lagged. The positive contemporaneous correlation between stock
prices and residential property prices are at odds with The economist view. The empirical
result rather suggests that both house prices and stock prices might be correlated posi-
tively with the output (and so households’ disposable income), as argued by Tsatsaronis
& Zhu (2004). An alternative explanation is the link between households’ wealth, stock
prices and house price. Indeed, sharp growing stock prices have a positive wealth eﬀect,
and so promote real estate purchase. Borio & McGuire (2004) housing booms tend to lag
equity booms with the lag length depending on interest rates.
House price is a highly persistent process and roughly half of today’s house price is
explained by last’s year house price growth. The autocorrelation is in any speciﬁcation and
estimator always highly signiﬁcant. This is consistent with the main theoretical literature
and earlier empirical ﬁndings. The quantitative importance of the serial correlation of
approximately 50% is in line with IMF (2004) while Lecat & Messonier (2005) ﬁnd a
lower persistence, around 35%. The economic interpretation means that there is a strong
tendency for real house prices to rise tomorrow if they rise today. House price inertia stems
from the strong supply inelasticity and households’s expectations based on past prices, as
already mentioned.
The models point towards strong relationships between residential property price and
households’ disposable income. The growth rate of house prices is positively aﬀected by
17Housing rents revenues are included in households’ disposable income.
25real disposable income growth per capita —as this increases households’ purchasing power
and borrowing capacity. The contemporaneous relationship between house price growth
and real disposable growth ranges from 0.41 to almost 0.50 depending on the speciﬁcation
between the two benchmarks. These quantitative results are in line with the studies
already mentioned. According to the coeﬃcient estimates, a 1% real income growth will
roughly result in a 1 % increase in the real house price over two periods by taking into
account the autoregressive eﬀect of the real house price. Indeed, the cumulative impact
in the ﬁrst benchmark model is calculated as follow: 0.41+0.34+0.5*0.41≈0.96.18
In estimating the demand equation, the ﬁrst diﬀerence of nominal interest rates, short
and long, were never signiﬁcant for any speciﬁcation. This corroborates the empirical
ﬁndings in Ott (2006b): interest rates did not count in short-term house price dynamics.
Hereinafter, short-term real interest rate in level which is I(0) is included in the spec-
iﬁcation, and it turned out to be signiﬁcant at conventional levels. In estimating the
reduced model, the lagged ﬁrst diﬀerence of the short nominal interest rate belonging to
the supply is not signiﬁcant. Nevertheless, the sign is positive. On the other hand, the
short-term real interest rate in level which stems from the demand is again signiﬁcant and
is right signed; this coeﬃcient in absolute values is larger than in the demand speciﬁcation.
This is a logical result, as interest rates belonging to the supply react in opposite to the
demand related interest rate. Comparing the estimates of the demand model with the
reduced model, the overall eﬀect of interest rates on house prices are very similar. The
negative impact of interest rates on real residential property prices largely dominates the
positive supply eﬀect. The predictions of the model concerning an interest rate shock will
be investigated in the next section.
As already explained, in my estimation strategy I ﬁrst allowed two lags. Thereafter, I
dropped the insigniﬁcant lags. Stock of dwelling at time t and lag 1 together are signiﬁcant
and that in both speciﬁcation, demand as well as reduced form. This does not exactly ﬁt
into the theoretical equation, where only the stock of dwelling at time t enters in equation
(7), respectively lag 1 in equation (9). Consequently, I estimated the reduced form without
stock of dwelling at time t to be in line with the theory (see Table 3). In the demand model
(Table 4) the contemporaneous negative coeﬃcient pertains to the demand, whereas the
positive coeﬃcient belongs to the supply. Indeed, as in every demand-supply framework,
the relationship between price and quantity is negative with respect to the demand while
positive with respect to the supply. Furthermore, supply reacts with delay relative to
demand changes, as already argued. The order of the estimated coeﬃcient: at time t
negative and t-1 positive corroborate this salient feature of house market functioning.
A house price increase triggers residential investments. The stock of dwelling can only
increase one period following the investment. Finally, the absolute value of the demand
coeﬃcient outweighs systematically the supply coeﬃcient. This proves a structural excess
of demand.
Mortgage loan growth development is positively correlated with real residential prop-
18I rewrite equation (9) : ∆pt = α∆pt−1+λ1∆yt+λ2∆yt−1+...By iteration, it yields: ∆pt = α
n∆pt−1+
λ1∆yt + (αλ1 + λ2)(∆yt−1 + α∆yt−2 + α
2∆yt−3 + ... + α
n−1∆yt−n−2) + ... Suppose: ∆yt = ∆yt−1.... =
∆yt−n−2. Thus, house price growth becomes: ∆pt = α
n∆pt−1 +
￿















. Over two periods (lag
n=1), the derivative is:
∂∆pt
∂∆yt = λ1 + (αλ1 +λ2).
26erty price growth. This relationship is strongly signiﬁcant, as expected. The causality is
not established, as mortgage loan is endogenous. Surprisingly, the coeﬃcient found is more
than twice as large as in IMF (2004). This diﬀerence might be explained by the fact that
a variable is missing concerning important frictions on the credit market. Indeed, IMF
(2004) includes a bank crisis variable which aims at capturing periods of credit crunch
where the supply of credit shifted back (Gertler & Lown, 1991); in the same stance, Lecat
& Mesonnier (2005) include a ﬁnancial liberalization variable which accounts for the end
of credit rationing.
Finally, the ECT coeﬃcients are negative for each speciﬁcation, indicating that in the
long-run house prices move in line with their fundamentals. In other words, the growth
rates of real house prices show fundamental mean reversion, if house prices are out of line
with the fundamentals, there is gradual tendency for this misalignment to be corrected.
The crude aﬀordability assumes that income is the only fundamental value, whereas the
two proxies take also into account interest rate. However, these coeﬃcients diﬀer markedly
across the three diﬀerent speciﬁcations. Indeed, the speed of adjustment is 7 years for the
crude aﬀordability ratio (F1), 9 years for the interest rate adjusted aﬀordability ratio
(G1), and even 16 years for the aﬀordability indicator (H3). Also IMF (2004) and Lecat
& Mesonnier (2005) estimate a speed of adjustment of roughly 7 years. Although 9 years
may seem a long period of time, it is still realistic. However, the 16 year adjustment span
casts serious doubts on the validity of the aﬀordability proxy indicator. For these reasons,
speciﬁcation (H3) in Table 4 is not included in the benchmark model.
5.2.2 House supply and mortgage market
Housing supply typically depends on investment, which in turn are constrained by ur-
banization schemes and land availability. In addition, the law of motion of the stock of
dwelling, where future stock depends on previous year stock generates an inertia on its
own. Supply of new housing can only respond sluggishly to demand shocks. On the other
hand, demand might move faster as it depends on factors characterized to be more volatile,
like income and interest rates. As a result house price may overshoot or undershoot its
long-term trend for a given period. Thus, the house price cycle is also a consequence of
supply inertia not only backward demand expectations as depicted in Annex 10.
The most suited econometric tool to disentangle together not only long-term from
short-term but also supply from demand is the VECM. Indeed, the dynamics of the process
is picked up by the ﬁrst diﬀerenced equation while the long-term adjustment is captured
by the ECT. Moreover, supposing that the identiﬁcation of two cointegrating vectors
(cointegration rank of two) is established: one stands for the supply and the other for
the demand. Together, this modelling strategy fulﬁlls all requirements in view of the
functioning of the house market. Kenny (1999), McCarthy & Peach (2002, 2004) and
Bessone & Heitz & Boissinot (2005)19 succeeded in estimating demand and supply beside
long- and short-term dynamics in a time series VECM setting. Kenny (2003) sheds light
on the sluggish adjustment of the supply by estimating asymmetric non-linear equilibrium
ECM, once again in a time series framework. To the best of my knowledge, I have no
literature to cite as regards the estimation of a supply equation in panel econometrics.
19Bessone et al. (2005) are obliged to impose a cointegration rank of two.
27In the long-term, house price supply tracks land costs due to the scarcity of land, as
already explained. Unfortunately, land costs data are not available. As a rule, construction
cost index is used. It is a weighting of wage costs in the sector and house building material.
Construction cost index is not available either. I used instead the sectorial nominal unit
wage cost divided by productivity in the building and construction sector. Thus, this
indicator only partially captures construction costs since it does not include either land
costs or construction material costs. Consequently, long-term house price supply cannot
be estimated due to the scarcity of data. The only alternative is to estimate equation (8)
in its raw form by means of a dynamic panel estimator. I include an ECT proxy, the ratio
of residential house price over construction costs might be a poor proxy, but actually it is
the only one available.
Table 5 reports the preferred estimates according to all four estimators already dis-
cussed. Diﬃculties arise to identify the supply. A myriad of diﬀerent speciﬁcations have
been tested, and construction costs proxy, interest rate and the error correction term were
never signiﬁcant at any common level. For all three IV estimators, the instrumented vari-
ables are lag 1 of both, stock of dwelling and residential property price. The instrument
matrix diﬀers however, except the exogenous variables of the speciﬁcation: interest rate
and construction costs which are common to all IV estimators. As regards the FE-IV
estimation, I added all exogenous variables of the SEM to the set of instruments, i.e.,
disposable income, population, rents, stock index. The estimates worsened when I used
the same instrument matrix in AH estimation procedure. Consequently, I followed the
recommendation of Arellano & Bond (1991) and added, as instruments, lag two periods in
level, the stock of dwelling and house prices. Finally, in AB estimation one step procedure
as well, levels of the endogenous variables lagged two are used to serve as instruments
(Arellano & Bond, 1991).
Interestingly, the IV-FE estimator performs barely better than the LSDV, AH and AB
estimators, while it was the opposite in estimating the reduced model and the demand.
To ﬁnd instrument variables orthogonal to price vector is much less challenging since the
demand equation includes many exogenous variables. In the opposite, construction cost
is the only exogenous variable which does not enter the demand equation. Thus, the
quality of the instrument matrix might explain the better results of IV-FE estimator in
estimating the supply relative to the demand. Furthermore, the need of identiﬁcation the
supply is very strong since it relies only on construction costs. An FE-2SLS procedure
and the corresponding instrument matrix may be better suited for this task. Besides,
AB estimates provide better results than AH estimates while they have the same set
of instruments. It conﬁrms Arellano & Bond’s argumentation (1991) in favour of AB
estimator. GMM estimators are more eﬃcient as they rely on more moment conditions.
The short-run supply points towards a strong persistence of housing stock, which is in
line with the theory of inelastic supply. For every estimate, the coeﬃcient is systematically
higher than 80% (except AH). Aggregated house depreciation does not exceed 3% per year.
The coeﬃcient estimated by AH exactly matches the theoretical model, unfortunately, the
coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant. The other coeﬃcient estimates are lower but signiﬁcant. The
silver lining is that coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one, averting unit root
process. In addition, the collateral value (lagged real house price) is also signiﬁcant at
conventional levels except in AH estimates. However, the coeﬃcient is very low. According
to the estimates, investors’ sensitivity to house price movements is quite nil. Indeed, a
281% real house price increase, ceteris paribus, fosters a gross investment of 0.01% at most
(including depreciation). Finally, construction cost proxy, interest rates and the ECT are
not signiﬁcant at any common level and the coeﬃcients are very low.
Table 5: Coeﬃcients estimates supply house market (7)
Dependent variable: ∆dwt Stock of dwelling growth
Var LSDV FE-IV AH AB
∆pt−1 0.01 0.01 0.005 0.004
(2.39) (3.53) (0.49) (2.64)
∆dwt−1 0.85 0.92 0.97 0.82
(22.07) (12.48) (1.01) (14.31)
∆it−1 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001
(−0.21) (−0.33) (−0.39) (−0.10)
∆cct−1 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00
(0.20) (−1.53) (−0.36) (−1.17)
ECTs,t−1 -.001 -.000 -.000 -.007
(−1.04) (−0.53) (−0.11) (−1.42)
cst 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(2.63) (0.61) (−0.21) (−1.39)
The reduced mortgage loan equation (12) was estimated to shed more light on the
interaction between house market and mortgage loan. I applied the same estimation
strategy as previously. I estimated the generalized equation with a maximum number of
two lags, lagged variables with insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients were left out of the ﬁnal estimation.
To choose the preferred models, I tried manifold alternative speciﬁcations and selected
the model that best ﬁtted the data and the theory. Again, to check the robustness of the
results, the coeﬃcient estimates of the four estimators are reported in Table 6. Growth
rate of stock of dwelling was never signiﬁcant in any case and even deteriorated the results.
Consequently, I eschewed it. The endogenous variables are instrumented, i.e. the lagged
one and two of the dependent variable (mortgage loan growth), and the house price. As
regards both 2SLS estimations (FE-IV and AH), all exogenous variables are included in the
set of instruments. Growth rate of, population, rents, and stock of dwelling, respectively
growth rate of income lagged one, residential property price lagged two and mortgage loan
in level lagged three have been added in the instrument matrix of the FE-IV, respectively
AH, estimation. Finally, in AB estimation one step procedure as well as levels of the
endogenous variables lagged two are used to serve as instruments in line with Arellano &
Bond (1991) recommendations.
Table 6 reports the preferred speciﬁcation with regard to the four estimators. The
estimation technique based on the one step AB procedure gives similar coeﬃcient estimates
to those obtained by the LSDV. AB estimates are the benchmark since AB is a non biased
estimator and is more eﬃcient than the AH estimator. AB coeﬃcients are very narrow
with respect to LSDV coeﬃcients, this proves the robustness of the results. Mortgage loans
exhibit strong serial correlation, since mortgage loan development depends on previous
mortgage lending two periods back. Over two periods, the cumulative persistence ranges
from 50% (benchmark) to 60% (2SLS). Housing rents is hardly ever signiﬁcant, the results
do not corroborate the arbitrage theory. According to the estimates, households do not
essentially rotate their portfolio in favor of real estate by asking for a mortgage credit
29when housing rents increase. In contrast, the interest rate, the disposable income and
the residential property price are core factors explaining mortgage loan development. A
nominal interest rate increase (short) of 1% point leads to a mortgage loan decline of
0.3%. Similarly, a 1% increase in the disposable income, or in the residential property
price respectively cause an increase in the real mortgage loan of 0.4% and 0.2%. All these
coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at any common level. The strong signiﬁcance of the house price
coeﬃcient in the mortgage market but also mortgage loan in the house market model
proves that the mortgage market and the house market interact.
Table 6: Coeﬃcients estimates reduced mortgage market
Dependent variable: ∆lmt Real mortgage loan growth
Var LSDV FE-IV AH AB
∆lmt−1 0.74 0.58 0.74 0.73
(11.52) (1.76) (4.57) (6.31)
∆lmt−2 -0.15 0.12 -0.24 -0.16
(−2.37) (0.36) (−3.30) (−3.10)
∆it -0.28 -0.35 -0.14 -0.24.
(−1.71) (−1.52) (−0.20) (−2.08)
rtt−1 0.06 0.05 -0.01 0.06
(0.62) (1.16) (−0.08) (0.49)
∆yt 0.38 0.21 0.59 0.41
(2.96) (0.77) (4.60) (2.74)
∆pt 0.23 0.34 0.15 0.21
(5.25) (1.57) (1.07) (3.24)
cst 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00
(3.73) (2.46) (0.20) (0.76)
The adjusted R square of LSDV estimates respectively prove that the reduced house
market model and the mortgage market model explain approximately 65% and 75% of the
total variance. The overall goodness of ﬁt is quite satisfactory. Annex 16 and 17 depict
the residuals by section (country) of the two reduced house market models (F1 and G2)
and Annex 18 shows the reduced AB mortgage market model.
6 Euro area house prices and mortgage loan dynamics
6.1 Determinants of euro area house price
This section derives conclusion on a euro area level. Deriving country speciﬁc conclusions
based on panel estimates raises the problem of homogeneity assumptions. Instead, in line
with the purpose of the paper, I suggest to infer insights on a euro area level. National
series were aggregated to euro area series and Appendix 2 gives a detailed explanation
of the aggregation methodology. The euro area series are depicted in Annex 15. Given
the set of coeﬃcient estimates of the two house market benchmark reduced models and
the reduced mortgage market model, I use respectively euro area series to generate euro
area ﬁtted values, residential property price and real mortgage loan. Figure group 1
and 2 depict the growth of actual euro area house price and ﬁtted of both benchmark
speciﬁcations (in-sample forecast). The second speciﬁcation which includes interest rate
adjusted aﬀordability ratio, does not capture well the development of the house price
30bubble at the end of the 80’s. Apart from that, the two models perform fairly well in
explaining euro area house price movements except at the end of the sample from 2002
to 2005. Interestingly, in Ott, (2006b) exactly the same problem arose when explaining
the last four years from 2002 to 2005. Indeed, the ﬁrst model with omitted mortgage
loan and excess demand predicted a ﬁtted house price 4% below the actual price 2005 and
the second fully speciﬁed model predicted 1.6% below (see Ott, 2006b). Hereinafter, the
former model (which includes crude aﬀordability ratio) undervalues house prices at 2%
below the actual (Figure group 1), while the latter does so at 1% below (Figure group 2).
However, the former outperforms the latter over the entire sample especially from 1975
to 1997. Despite the relative lackluster in forecasting euro area house prices at the end
of the sample, the crude aﬀordability ratio model explains fairly well the history of euro
area house prices.
Both models indicate that disposable income and persistence (autoregressive term)
mostly explain the house price cycle. This corroborates earlier empirical ﬁndings and the
theoretical discussion. Each house price boom phase was triggered by a strong disposable
income increase which in turn is linked with the business cycle. Thereafter, with an ac-
celerating house price growth, persistence builds up and extends the house price dynamic
beyond the business cycle. The two other underlying factors which drive the real house
price cycle are interest rates and mortgage loan developments. Since real interest is spec-
iﬁed in level the impact on house prices is constantly negative over time. To assess more
precisely the role of interest rate over time, I added to the interest rate eﬀect the constant
of the speciﬁcation. Thus, Figure group 1 and 2 display a better understanding of the
current positive impact of interest rate on house prices. They also show the beneﬁcial
eﬀect of the launch of the euro and the ECB policy on house prices on two aspects. First,
there is clearly a regime shift in 1997 from negative to positive eﬀect corresponding to
EMU convergence. In the wake of the EMU process, the eventual ECB reputation allowed
for a structural real interest fall. Second, the slow down of the business cycle (and so
disposable income) since 2001 is oﬀset by favorable ﬁnancial conditions. This optimal
"leaning against the wind" policy with respect to economic activity has no pedigree in the
euro area according to our data.
Furthermore, real mortgage loan development gained pace from the mid-90’s to 2000,
and so accompanied the dramatic house price increase. As mortgage loan is endogenous,
there is no causality but rather a correlation in our estimates. Mortgage loans and house
price growths are fueling each other. In the wake of the recession and the 2001 terrorist
attack, mortgage loans depressed but since 2002 they have gained pace again, partially
explaining the new house price rise thereafter. Although mortgage loan development is
not directly managed by the central bank, it is however a counterpart of M3, and to some
extent it can be considered as a monetary policy stance indicator. The ECB might try
to keep the lid on mortgage loan development to deter households from taking excessive
risk on real estate purchase. With only one instrument policy, it is challenging, on the
one hand to foster economic activity with favorable interest rates and, on the other hand
to maintain a subdued mortgage market. Moreover, mortgage loan growth rates are
constantly positive over the entire sample. Nevertheless, Figure group 1 and 2 depict a
relatively strong increase from 1996 tp 2000 and moderate since 2002. Finally, with both
models, construction costs proxy and population impact on house price are benign.
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Figure group 1:
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Figure group 2:
Nevertheless, the two model predictions diﬀer in long-term adjustment estimates, which
was expected since the ECT proxies are diﬀerent. The second model ECT is interest rate
sensitive while the ﬁrst is not. This explains why the second model performs better at
the end of the sample and worst during the previous house price cycle. The second model
undervalues house prices during the last house price cycle (mid-80’s to the mid-90’s),
which corresponds also to an interest rate cycle. The Bundesbank raised its discount rate
in 1988, and kept tightening it until 1992 due to the German monetary reuniﬁcation,
thereafter it decreased smoothly until the mid 90’s. The other member countries of the
33ERM20 and since the EMU members had to follow, which means that euro area interest
rates increased dramatically. Beyond the cyclical component, the overall interest rate level
was excessively high due to the German reuniﬁcation. Amid rising real estate prices, sharp
rises and high levels of interest rate increased the inverse of the adjusted aﬀordability ratio
while the crude aﬀordability ratio not. Consequently, the latter model predicted a lower
euro area house price growth than the former. On the other hand, thanks to the EMU,
euro area interest rates decreased at the end of the sample. For the same reason the second
speciﬁcation captures better (albeit not completely) euro area house price movements at
the end of the period under consideration. Finally, excess demand (stock of dwelling)
story between benchmark one and two is alike, and the diﬀerence lies in the coeﬃcients.
6.2 Determinants of euro area mortgage loan
Mortgage loan growth depends predominantly on previous developments in mortgage lend-
ing itself. Last year mortgage loans explain two thirds of current mortgage loans. The
predicted value accurately follows one year behind current mortgage loan movements. This
characteristic is due to the strong two period back autoregressive terms. Indeed, Figure
group 3 states that past mortgage loan realizations mostly explain current mortgage loan
over more than 50% (cumulative impact over two periods). The real house price (collateral)
is the center stage variable driving mortgage loan. This proves the strong economic (after
the statistical signiﬁcance established in section 5.2.2) interaction between the mortgage
market and the house market. The second most important variable explaining mortgage
loan development is disposable income. Interestingly, interest rates do only account for
a very tiny eﬀect on mortgage loan development. Finally, the eﬀect of housing rents as
explanatory factor is benign, quite nil, and actually statistically not even signiﬁcant.
Large year to year swings in mortgage lending growth rates lead to large residuals.
The spurt in credit from 1982 to 1983 or from 1998 to 1999, or in the opposite the
dramatic fall from 1990 to 1991 cannot be explained by the core variables like house
collateral value, income or interest rate. At least one volatile variable is missing in the
speciﬁcation. Also the strong persistency might be due to a missing variable. Indeed, the
model speciﬁcation does not capture the credit channel directly. The unexplained large
swings in mortgage loan can be explained by the ﬁnancial accelerator which ampliﬁes the
credit cycle (Bernanke & Gertler, 1995). During booming house price periods, growing
households’ wealth capture more mortgage volume banks as banks relax their standards.
House prices and mortgage loans fuel each other through the collateral eﬀect leading to
a self-perpetuating eﬀect. Changes in expectations or falling business cycle can trigger a
reverse in the vicious circle. Banks adopt suddenly a more conservative lending policy,
ceteris paribus. Finally, structural factors like liberalization, deregulation and innovation
might also play an important role, not only in level, but also in growth short-term dynamic.
They are not included in the speciﬁcation either.
As regards the mortgage market the last 4 years, the upsurge in mortgage credit is not
well explained by the model. Interest rates in 2002 and 2003 had a tiny positive impact on
mortgage loans. At the end of 2005 interest rates were rising but this new rising trend is
not covered in the sample. House price collateral explains only partially the acceleration
20European Exchange Rate Mechanism, introduced by the European Community in March 1979, as part
of the European Monetary System (EMS).
34in mortgage loan growth at the end of the sample. The supply of credit might explain
the strong growth rate. Banks might have eased their credit standards for the approval
of mortgage loan. According to ECB (2006), bank credit standards depend on economic
activity, house market prospects, expectations regarding the general economic activity,
competition from other banks, and balance sheet constraints.
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Figure group 3:
6.3 Monetary policy shock
In this sub section, simulation of real interest rate shocks are designed to assess the knock-
on eﬀect on house price, mortgage borrowing and stock of dwelling. I apply the well-known
Cholesky’s decomposition to orthogonalize the shock. I use the two reduced models, i.e.
35Table 3 (F1) and Table 6 (last column). Thus, I have only two endogenous variables: house
price and mortgage loan. At time 1, the monetary authority raises its short-term interest
rate of 1% and inﬂation expectations remain unaltered.21 I suppose house price decline
aﬀects negatively the following period mortgage loan volume instead of simultaneously
rate. Two shocks are simulated. The ﬁrst supposes an increase of 100 basis point in short-
term lasting for ever (permanent), while the second only lasts for 5 years (temporary).
Since real interest rate enters in level in reduced model (F1), and has the property of being
stationary, a permanent increase might be challenged. Consequently, both are proposed.
Figure group 4 (respectively Figure group 5) shows the consequence of a permanent22 1%
interest rate increase (respectively temporary).
Monetary policy tightening directly impinges on house prices through two eﬀects.
First, commercial banks or mortgage institutions pass-through the interest shock instan-
taneously. Thus, households’ aﬀordability decreases with the rise of mortgage interest
payments (income eﬀect). Also households’ debt burden increases with the rise of mort-
gage interest payments. Households with adjustable mortgage interests are even hit by
outstanding loans (wealth eﬀect). Thus, households’ housing demand falls, and conse-
quently house prices decline. As a result, the demand of mortgage credit shifts leftward
(ceteris paribus). This describes in outline the traditional view of mortgage loan demand
and monetary policy transmission without friction. In contrast, the credit channel view
(Bernanke & Gertler, 1995) assume asymmetric information between credit institutions
and households. First, on the one hand, the collateral declines, on the other hand, the
debt burden increases. Consequently, households’ net worth, which equals house value
minus outstanding debts, declines on both sides (wealth eﬀect as previously). Together,
the decline of households’ aﬀordability and the fall of households’ net worth bring to the
fore the problem of asymmetric information. Credit institutions focus then on expected
repayment capacities and harshen their lending standards. On a macro-view, banks adopt
a more conservative lending policy and eventually reduce the supply of mortgage loan.
This is called the balance-sheet channel.23 Leftward shift of credit supply and of demand
squeeze loan volume in the mortgage market. Liquidity constrained households depress
even more housing demand, which in turn decreases house price further. An even lower col-
lateral shrinks households’ net worth further which prompts credit institutions to squeeze
the mortgage supply even more. This self-perpetuating eﬀect is called the ﬁnancial ac-
celerator. The ﬁnancial accelerator of the credit channel only ampliﬁes the eﬀect of the
traditional demand transmission mechanism.
On the empirical side, as regards the estimates of this paper, the mortgage loan and the
supply were not identiﬁed separately due to a lack of data. The reduced mortgage market
estimates do not allow to disentangle toxic supply side eﬀects relative to demand move-
ments. However, a mortgage loan squeeze is shown in Figure group 4, ﬁrst graph based
on Table 6 estimates. Indeed, monetary policy has an impact on house prices through
the mortgage market. Following the negative interest rate shock, credit institutions pass-
through mortgage rate (equation 11). The cost of ﬁnancing a house changes (income
21Consumer price expectations might change following a monetary policy move. The purpose here is to
appraise the knock-on eﬀect of interest rate move and to derive some quantitative informations.
22A permanent interest rate increase means that it increases 1% in level once and for all, i.e. at time
t=1 the ﬁrst diﬀerence equals one, thereafter 0 for the rest of the period under consideration.
23Credit institution balance sheet variation can also aﬀect credit supply, which is called the bank lending
channel.
36eﬀect) and the debt burden increases (equation 3). Consequently mortgage loan demand
(equation 10) and the accompanying housing demand (equation 3) declines sharply at
time t=2. I can suppose that the fall in residential property price, i.e. lower collateral
triggers uncertainty bringing to the fore the problem of asymmetric information. Banks
will focus more severely on their lending standards and eventually squeeze their credit sup-
ply (equation 11), depressing even more the subdued house market. However, the basic
theoretical model of this paper does not deal with asymmetric information problems and
the estimates of SEM do not allow this conclusion so exactly. Instead, a "collateral eﬀect"
at t=3 reinforces the preceding year eﬀect on house prices movement slightly. Thus, from
t=3 until the end of the simulation the "collateral eﬀect" on mortgage and house price
keeps working. Furthermore, at time t=3, also, supply (equation 5) starts reacting and
so oﬀsets partially the second round "collateral eﬀect". Indeed, falling house prices and
higher interest rates have a deterrent eﬀect on investment. Consequently, the quantity
of dwelling supplied shifts left next period. However, ﬁrst diﬀerence interest rate enter
as supply side element in the reduced house market model (and so has only a temporary
shock), besides the coeﬃcient is very low and is not even signiﬁcant.
According to the estimates, the supply does not account for much. Instead, the interest
rate which enters in level in the house market has a long lasting eﬀect on house price
growth. The interest rate shock in the house market impinges on the mortgage market,
causing a long lasting squeeze in mortgage volume through the "collateral eﬀect". Thus,
households strong dependency on mortgage loans in order to purchase real estate is well
established. As can be seen in Figure group 4, the negative interest rate shock would be
temporary and mortgage loan would be bottoming out after one or two years (t=3) and
eventually converge back to the zero line over time, if the mortgage market was isolated.
Indeed, all variables are in ﬁrst diﬀerence, including interest rates in the mortgage loan
speciﬁcation. The negative impact of the permanent interest rate shock does not die out
in the mortgage market because house price growth rates fall in the house market (Table
5, AB coeﬃcient estimates).
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Suppose now that the monetary authority raises the short-term interest rate of 1%
and after 5 years decrease it of 1%. Euro area real residential house price drops quickly
following the tightening of monetary policy, bottoming out exactly 5 years after the mon-
etary policy shock, as a sheer matter of shock pattern implementation. The dynamics are
the same as previously and can be assimilated to a negative interest rate shock followed
ﬁve years later by a positive shock. This temporary interest rate shock was implemented,
because the real interest rate is I(0) according to the unit root test. Supposing that the
real interest rate remains at 1% above its steady state value once and for all is not realistic,
since the real interest rate is stationary.





























This empirical survey investigates house price and mortgage loan determinants. To shed
more light on the interaction between the mortgage credit market and the house market,
a basic theoretical model was set up. The theoretical model underpins the set of variables
and their characteristics (endogenous/exogenous) included in the speciﬁcation. The choice
of the estimators is based on four aspects. First, the theoretical part but also earlier
empirical ﬁnding indicate that house price might be an autoregressive process. As a rule,
this paper focuses on short-term dynamics rather than long-term relationships. Second,
the time span is short and does not allow robust estimates on a sectional level. Third, the
purpose of the paper is clearly to derive conclusions on a euro area and not on a country
level. Fourth, coeﬃcients must be estimated in a SEM as mortgage and house market
interact. Not many estimators fulﬁll all requirements. However, potential good estimators
in order of importance are: Arellano & Bond (1991) GMM one step procedure, the within
ﬁxed eﬀect estimator LSDV, the Anderson & Hsiao (1981) 2SLS estimator and ﬁnally the
within ﬁxed eﬀect 2SLS estimator. All four estimators are used to assess the empirical
relationship of house prices with the mortgage and house market determinants. First, it
allows to check the robustness of the estimated coeﬃcients with regard to the estimation
technique. Second, as regards the estimators, there is a trade-oﬀ between consistency and
eﬃciency. In the framework of the study, to obtain consistent estimates, any estimation
technique requires instrument variables methods like GMM or 2SLS. Consequently, only
the Arellano & Bond (1991) and Anderson & Hsiao (1981) are consistent. Indeed, both FE
estimators are biased due to the autoregressive term. However, the asymptotic properties
in view of the panel dimension proved that consistent panel estimators are ineﬃcient.
Indeed, when the time dimension is larger than the cross-sections GMM estimators or
ﬁrst diﬀerenced estimators may be ineﬃcient.
Arellano & Bond (1991) and LSDV proved to be the best estimators in view of the re-
sults. The SEM estimates provide overall good results as regards the sign, the signiﬁcance
of coeﬃcients and the explanatory power of the regressions. The residuals do not exhibit
abnormal patterns. The coeﬃcient estimates of both reduced models, mortgage and house
markets, as well as house demand, are quite sensible with a strong economic meaning. The
empirical results conﬁrm earlier empirical ﬁnding. First, house price is a strong persis-
tence process due to the staggered supply but also to households’ expectations. Second,
disposable income is the most important fundamental value in house price determination.
Disappointingly, interest rate changes have no direct impact on house price, unlike real
interest rate in level. Thus, a shift in households’ borrowing capacity in the medium term
has been detected since the launch of the euro, and has a measurable impact on house
price dynamics. Moreover, the demographic variables (total population, population aged
from 15-64) do not account in the short-term house price dynamic according to the es-
timates. In the long-term, however, migration and population growth rate might have a
substantial eﬀect on the house price level. In addition, housing rents are not found to be
signiﬁcant, proving that the arbitrage between ownership and tenancy is more elaborated
than in a simple portfolio framework. Government regulations to keep the lid on housing
rents evolution and tax relief for homeownership might explain this result. Finally, stock
of dwelling and so excess demand and its interaction with supply side elements play a
role in house price determination. The robustness of the coeﬃcient estimates of stock
of dwelling across estimators and speciﬁcation are lower relative to the other coeﬃcients.
40The supply side elements in the reduced house market model (construction costs, interest
rate) are not signiﬁcant. In addition, the estimation of a supply equation on its own is
rather poor. The lackluster performance in estimating a supply equation is due to missing
data like construction cost index and land costs.
Real house prices show mean reversion to both aﬀordability ratios, crude and interest
rate adjusted. The estimated adjustment speed of 7 years for the former is realistic,
while 9 for the later is relatively low (interest rate adjusted aﬀordability ratio). The
ﬁrst model with the crude aﬀordability ratio tracks actual house price fairly well except
from 2002 to 2005. In this paper, I suggest that the crude aﬀordability ratio does not
capture the falling interest rates due to the euro eﬀect. The second benchmark model
which captures better the long-term shift in euro area interest rate explains partially
actual real house price the last 4 years. Indeed, with regard to the unprecedented house
price boom which began in the mid 90’s, lower interest rates in level partly explain it. In
addition strong disposable income growth, especially in the beginning of the boom phase
as usual, drove real house price growth. The slowdown of the economy since 2001 has
been oﬀset by an accommodative policy. Monetary policy stance indicators like interest
rate levels and mortgage loan development prove a leaning against the wind policy which
sustained strong demand. Excess demand factor indicates that sticky supply did not react
quickly enough, the overshooting of demand kept soaring house prices. Altogether, all
these factors explain mostly the boom which began in the mid 90’s. Nevertheless, the
ﬁtted values of both models undervalued actual euro area house price from 2002 to 2005
of 1 to 2%. Interestingly, the latter benchmark model performs better because the mean
reversion term (ECT) does not drive the ﬁtted values down, on the contrary, it has still
a positive eﬀect. This is not only explained by the lower adjustment speed (9 years) but
also and mostly by the sensitivity to interest rate. As interest rates are low, there is no
misalignment with respect to the fundamentals according to the interest rate adjusted
aﬀordability ratio.
One important subsidiary result, is the strong interaction between the mortgage and
the house market. Both markets are linked through the collateral value (essentially the
house price). This might prove that asymmetric information arises between households
and ﬁnancial institutions. Banks credit requirements will determine households’ capacity
to raise funds, which in turn determines house demand and price. In addition, to ensure
moral rectitude, ﬁnancial institutions require households to pledge their house as collateral,
which in turn inﬂuences the amount of credit. As a result, the house price and the mortgage
loan volume can feed each other in a self-perpetuating process. An interest rate shock sheds
light on the interconnection between both markets. Indeed, a 1% interest rate increase
causes a 1% house price inﬂation drop and a 0.4% decline in mortgage loan growth rate in
the long-term. The interest rate shock has only a temporary eﬀect on the mortgage market
on its own but the collateral (house price) drop leads to a long lasting fall in mortgage
loan volume. To conclude, interest rate increase impinges negatively on real house price
growth, proving that demand outweighs supply. As a result, monetary policy can inﬂuence
house price growth. This empirical study however does not allow for any statement about
price misalignment with respect to long-term house price equilibrium. Instead of proxying
ECTs with aﬀordability ratios, future research should try to disentangle better long-term
from short-term dynamics by means of a panel ECM, for instance.
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44ANNEX 1: Data
Annual data from 1975 to 2005 are used covering the longest available common period
restricted to 8 EMU countries: Germany (DE), France (FR), Italy (IT), Spain (ES), the
Netherlands (NL), Belgium (BE), Finland (FI) and Ireland (IE). As Residential Property
Price is not available for the period under consideration, Luxembourg, Portugal, Greece
and Austria were excluded. As a result, the sample consists of 31 observations in the
time dimension and 8 cross-sections. The panel series are: residential property price,
consumer price index, interest rate short-term, long-term, stock of dwelling, household
disposable income, population aged from 15-64, outstanding mortgage loan volume, credit
to households, housing depreciation rate, housing rents and stock price index, construction
cost. Real series were constructed by deﬂating the nominal series by the corresponding
domestic CPI indices, except household real disposable income, which is GDP deﬂated.
The ECB provided the residential property price, which was calculated from the na-
tional central banks and private agencies like the BulwienGesa AG in Germany and the
European Mortgage Federation, for instance. The database of Claudio Borio from the
Bank of International Settlement helped completing the ECB database. The collection is
a weighted average of series for new dwellings and existing dwellings. Note that data be-
fore 1995 include only West-Germany. Concerning the year 2005, I completed the dataset
on residential property price thanks to Livia Figà-Talamanca of the European Mortgage
Federation (2006).
The CPI is the yearly average of the monthly HICP (Harmonized Index Consumer
Price) from 1980 to 2005. ECB database uses Eurostat data and national CPI with a
ﬁxed euro conversion rate. The database was ﬁlled by the cost of living index for all
households, all items, provided by the BIS. The source of the Irish CPI however is the
National Central Bank of Ireland as the BIS cost of living index is not available.
For all countries including Germany, the ECB Desis database was used for the nominal
short- and long-term interest rate which is the 5 year government bond yield and the 3
month interbank oﬀered rate, respectively. Once again, the data set was ﬁlled by the
European commission DG-ECFIN AMECO database for data prior to 1990 except for
Germany, where I used the International Financial Statistics of the IMF for the long-term
interest rate and the OECD Main Economic Indicator for the short-term interest rate.
The sectorial Housing CPI was chosen as proxy for rents, except for Finland prior to
1995, where a rent index provided by the Finish National Statistic Oﬃce (Veli Kettunen)
was used. The ECB database on rents was also ﬁlled for Spain, from 1976 to 1984,
for Ireland from 1975 to 2004. These data were provided by respectively the Instituto
Niacional de Estadística (Web site) and the Irish Central Bank (McQuinn Kieran). As
1975 was missing for Germany, Spain and the Netherlands, I projected the missing value
by linear extrapolation over approximately the last 10 years (depending on the pattern of
the series).




GFCF and NCS stand for Gross Fixed Capital Formation and Net Capital Stock in
housing sector, respectively. National sources but also the European Mortgage Federation
database were used.
45Three diﬀerent demographic indicators were investigated: the number of households,
the population aged from 15 to 65 and the total population. Data scarcity on the number
of households obliged me to deal only with the other two variables. The source of the
data is Eurostat (European Labour Force Survey) but completed by OECD database.
The German database required some arrangements. The reuniﬁcation caused a structural
break, i.e. the OECD database jumps roughly from 60 millions to 80 millions around
1990. From 1990 to 2005, the new database provided by Eurostat was taken. Prior to
1990, the West-German population growth rate was applied backward to the new Eurostat
database.
The consumption of non durables and services and ﬁnancial wealth was not available for
many countries and GDP is a too broad aggregate to proxy households’ aﬀordability and
purchasing power. As a result, households’ real disposable income provided by the OECD,
the current issue was used. To settle the German reuniﬁcation data break, I took the raw
data from 1991 to 2005 and then calculated until 1975 by assuming the West-German
growth rate. Two sources were used: from 1975 to 1989, OECD database, and prior to
1990, ECB internal database (Forecasting section) except for Spain, Belgium and Ireland
where only nominal data were available. The OECD database does not provide data
for Ireland before 1977. Consequently, the database was ﬁlled by deﬂating the nominal
disposable income (source: Central Bank of Ireland) with the GDP deﬂator from the IFS
database (IMF).
Two proxies for housing credit were chosen: loans for house purchasing over 1 and
up to 5 years maturity and total loans to households. The former is the mortgage loan
and is the most accurate variable which theoretically impacts the house price, while the
latter encompasses credits including non housing purchases like consumption credits. Un-
fortunately, the ECB by using data from National Central Banks provides mortgage loan
data only from 1995 to 2005. Consequently, I calculated the series backward by using the
growth rate of housing loans which stems from the BIS. The source of the second credit
series: loans to households, is also published by the BIS. Unfortunately these series do not
cover the entire sample either. Consequently, the total loans to households was calculated,
backward and sometimes forward when necessary by the credit to private sector growth
rate also provided by the BIS. Counterpart of the credit to private sector includes house-
holds but also individual enterprises. Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Finland are
concerned by this arrangement. The series for Italy in 1989, Spain in 2002 and especially
Belgium in 1994 (more than 140% credit mortgage increase) used to show measurement
errors. Consequently they were corrected by assuming the growth rate of the next closest
and broader credit series. In the empirical study of this paper, only mortgage loan series
were used.
The sectorial Housing CPI (source: ECB) was chosen as proxy for housing rents, except
for Finland prior to 1995, where a housing rent index provided by the Finish National
Statistic Oﬃce (Veli Kettunen) was used. The series housing rents were also ﬁlled for
Spain, from 1976 to 1984, for Ireland from 1975 to 2005. These data were provided by
respectively the Instituto Niacional de Estadística (Web site) and the Irish Central Bank
(McQuinn Kieran). As 1975 was missing for Germany, Spain and the Netherlands, I
projected the missing value by linear extrapolation over approximately the last 10 years
(depending on the pattern of the series).
46Stock price indices stem from both, International Financial Statistics (IMF) and the
Main Economic Indicator (OECD), which are almost identical. Both sources were used
as, for example, the OECD index covers a larger time dimension for Germany but smaller
for Italy, Spain, Finland. The longest stock price index available for Belgium is provided
by the Bank of International settlement which starts in 1980 while IFS stock index is not
available and the Main economic Indicators only starts in 1986. Frans Buelens (University
of Antwerp) and Stijn Nieuverburgh (University of New York) provided the missing data
(source: National Bank of Belgium).
Construction costs as a rule is a weighted average of house building materials prices
and labor costs at current prices in this sector. The traditional construction cost index was
either only available for a very small time span or not available at all for many countries.
The only indicator I found was the nominal unit wage cost divided by productivity in
the building and construction sector published by the OECD. This indicator was used as
proxy for construction costs index.
47ANNEX 2: Euro area aggregation
Currently 12 EU countries have joined the EMU, the member states are: Belgium (BE),
Germany (DE), Greece, Spain (ES), France (FR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Luxembourg,
the Netherlands (NL), Austria, Portugal and Finland (FI). However, in this empirical
study the euro area was restricted to 8 countries due essentially to the lack of data for
the remaining countries. The weightings were recalculated for the eight countries (see
Table A2.1) by following ECB methodology (see ECB, 2005b) concerning the Residential
Property Price (RPP) and the Harmonized Consumer Price Index (HICP).24 National
series of interest rates and CPI, respectively RPP were aggregated to euro area series
by applying HICP weighting, respectively RPP weighting. First, the HICP for the euro
area is published by Eurostat. However, as the study only uses the national data set of 8
countries, for congruence reasons an artiﬁcial euro area CPI was constructed according to
the European consumer basket for the entire sample (euro area HICP). Second, contrary
to the CPI, the national RPPs are not harmonized. Despite the possible error margins,
price trends and movements are correctly reﬂected (see BIS, 2005). The GDP weighted
index applied to aggregate the national RPPs (Table A2.1) is an acceptable solution given
the available data. Overall, the reliability of the euro area RPP is strong. Finally, the euro
area depreciation rate was calculated with respect to the formula given in Annex 1. For
this purpose national Gross Fixed Capital Formation and Net Capital Stock in housing
sector were added up to euro area series.
Table A2.1: Weightings euro area series (%)
Country % in HICP % in RPP % in LM
DE 32.46 31.61 46.65
FR 22.26 23.13 24.12
IT 20.85 19.32 5.41
ES 11.84 11.06 9.33
NL 5.86 6.75 8.59
BE 3.58 4.00 3.32
FI 1.74 2.13 1.59
IE 1.41 2.00 1.00
National series were aggregated to euro area series in three diﬀerent ways depending
on the series. Stock of dwelling, population and real loans were added by countries. Two
diﬀerent euro area real disposable income were calculated by aggregating the national
series. The former was divided by total population while the later by population aged
from 15-64. In contrast, the other variables are indices, consequently a weighting was
applied (see Table A2.1 above ) as already explained. The euro area HICP and the nominal
residential property price were constructed. The real euro area residential property price
is the ratio nominal index over HICP. The HICP weighting was applied to the interest
rate. The euro area series can been seen in Annex 15.
24see "Compendium of HICP reference documents (2/2001/B/5)" under http://forum.europa.eu.int
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49ANNEX 4: Real disposable income and real residential property price growth rate (in
%)
50ANNEX 5: CLTV detrended and residential property price growth rate
51ANNEX 6: Aﬀordability ratio crude and residential property price growth rate
52ANNEX 7: Aﬀordability ratio interest rate adjusted and residential property price
growth rate
53ANNEX 8: Aﬀordability indicator and residential property price growth rate
54ANNEX 9: Aﬀordability ratio interest rate adjusted and indicator
1. AFFORDABILITY RATIO INTEREST RATE ADJUSTED
The US National Association of realtors25 deﬁnes an interest-adjusted aﬀordability.
The ratio consists in the median family income to the monthly mortgage payments on a
typical home. Hereafter, the ratio relies on three assumptions. First, the median family
income grows at the same rate as the disposable income. Second, the mortgage covers
80% of the house price. Third, the price of the typical home grows at the same rate as
the residential property prices. More precisely, considering a Monthly Payment (MP) for
home of representative household in country i, under the assumption that 80% of house
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and where index i,t respectively account for country and time. While Pi,t denotes
the real house price index, ri,t is the annual real interest rate (government bond maturity
10 years) expressed in %/100, and ﬁnally Yi,t is the annual real disposable income per
capita.26 Consider a Qualifying Income: QIi,t = 4 × 12 × MP1i,t, as the annual income



















Again, home buyers in the real world secure ﬁnancing from a ﬁnancial institution in
the form of home mortgage loan, and hence interest rates play a role in determining the
aﬀordability of houses. The aﬀordability indicator however, informs the agent of what
monthly payments they could expect to make when considering purchasing a speciﬁc







and γi,t denotes the amortization factor, while n stands for the number of months to
repay the mortgage loan:27


























26P (respectively Y) denotes the theoretical house price (respectively disposable income per capita),
while RPP (DY) refers to the proxy: residential property price (respectively disposable income per capita
population aged from 15-64).
27As a rule n is set to 360, meaning 30 years repayment.
55ANNEX 10: House price dynamics and cycle
Empirical investigations have proven that the supply is typically constrained (Muell-
bauer & Murphy, 1997; Kenny, 2003). The demand (equation 1) responds to the usual
forces (disposable income, user cost of housing etc.) and determines an equilibrium price
(graph 1), which feeds the following supply. Thus, the supply reacts with delay (Supply
2) relative to demand which typically moves much faster (demand 1 to demand 3). There
always remains the possibility for house prices to overshoot their long-run equilibrium
level following a sudden increase in housing demand (Kenny, 1999). This supply-demand
interaction (Graph1) over time leads to a house price cycle (Graph 2).
56ANNEX 11: Moon & Perron (2003), Choi (2002) panel unit root tests
Var Test Deterministic terms Statistics Z(Choi), tb (M&P) p-limit
logRPP Choi c,t 1.90 0.97
c -0.12 0.45
M&P c,t -0.45 0.32
c -2.25 0.01
logDW Choi c,t -0.91 0.18
c 4.29 1.00
M&P c,t 0.02 0.51
c -3.34 0.42
logY Choi c,t 1.10 0.86
c 0.97 1.00
M&P c,t -0.14 0.44
c -1.63 0.14
log PO Choi c,t -2.51 0.00
c 0.12 1.00
M&P c,t -0.20 0.42
c -3.94 0.41
r Choi c 10.3 0.02
M&P c -14.2 0.01
logLM Choi c 0.28 1.00
M&P c -2.18 0.02
logRT Choi c 0.70 0.76
M&P c -3.09 0.01
logSP Choi c -0.40 0.35
M&P c -1.90 0.48
logCC Choi c,t 0.82 0.77
c -2.38 0.01
M&P c,t -0.15 0.44
c -1.36 0.40
57ANNEX 12: Levin, Lin & Chu (1992), Im, Pesaran & Shin (1997)
Var Test Deterministic terms Statistics, t*(LLC), W(IPS) p-limit
logRPP LLC c,t -1.68 0.05
c 1.10 0.87
IPS c,t -3.21 0.00
c -0.83 0.80
logDW LLC c,t -2.07 0.02
c 0.45 0.70
IPS c,t 2.02 0.98
c 1.79 0.96
logY LLC c,t -0.79 0.21
c -0.64 0.26
IPS c,t -0.15 0.44
c 2.37 0.99
logPO LLC c,t 1.11 0.87
c 0.63 0.74
IPS c,t -0.96 0.17
c 6.10 1.00
r LLC c -5.18 0.00
IPS c -4.57 0.00
logLM LLC c 3.13 1.00
IPS c 6.81 1.00
logRT LLC c -0.27 0.39
IPS c -1.64 0.06
logSP LLC c -1.04 0.15
IPS c -5.73 0.00
logCC LLC c,t -0.74 0.23
c -1.07 0.14
IPS c,t -5.60 0.24
c 0.53 0.30
58ANNEX 13: Time series ADF tests of series logRPP and logDW
Var Count Lags Deterministic terms Statistics ADF 5% critical value
logRPP DE 1 c,t -2.72 -3.58
1 c -2.25 -2.97
FR 1 c,t -3.62 -3.58
1 c 0.03 -2.97
IT 4 c,t -5.98 -3.60
1 c -1.47 -2.97
ES 0 c,t -7.01 -3.57
1 c -0.52 -2.97
NL 1 c,t -2.33 -3.58
1 c -1.26 -2.97
BE 2 c,t -2.12 -3.59
2 c -0.32 -2.98
FI 2 c,t -3.18 -3.59
1 c -2.80 -2.97
IE 2 c,t -2.92 -3.59
1 c -0.28 -2.97
Var Count Lags Deterministic terms Statistics ADF 5% critical value
logDW DE 1 c,t -2.53 -3.58
3 c -1.63 -2.98
FR 1 c,t -2.83 -3.58
1 c 2.08 -2.97
IT 1 c,t -1.04 -3.58
1 c -2.55 -2.97
ES 1 c,t -2.15 -3.58
1 c 1.38 -2.97
NL 1 c,t -1.44 -3.58
1 c -3.44 -2.97
BE 1 c,t -1.45 -3.58
1 c -1.03 -2.97
FI 4 c,t -0.13 -3.60
4 c -1.96 -2.99
IE 1 c,t -1.77 -3.58
1 c 3.10 -2.97
59ANNEX 14: Time series ADF tests of series AFR
Var Count Lags Deterministic terms Statistics ADF 5% critical value
AFR DE 1 c,t -3.77 -3.58
1 c 0.23 -2.97
FR 1 c,t -1.98 -3.58
1 c -1.10 -2.97
IT 1 c,t -1.84 -3.58
1 c -2.06 -2.97
ES 1 c,t -2.06 -3.58
1 c -0.44 -2.97
NL 1 c,t -1.84 -3.58
1 c -1.28 -2.97
BE 1 c,t -2.37 -3.58
1 c -2.40 -2.97
FI 1 c,t -3.59 -3.58
1 c -3.559 -2.97
IE 1 c,t 0.12 -3.58
1 c 1.00 -2.97
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61ANNEX 16: Residuals house market benchmark model crude aﬀordability ratio (F1)
62ANNEX 17: Residuals house market benchmark model interest rate adjusted aﬀord-
ability ratio (G2)
63ANNEX 18: Residuals mortgage loan market benchmark model
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Abstract
The European central bank (ECB) has shown concern about real house price appreciation
in some countries of the euro area. Indeed, large real house price movements might cause
adverse shocks on the economy via the wealth eﬀect and the bank lending channel, which in
turn impinge on the consumer price. This raises the question whether current house prices are
in line with the fundamentals. Thus, the present paper aims at shedding more light on house
price movements in the euro area. The purpose of the paper is threefold: (1) to estimate
a euro area long-term house price equilibrium and to compare it with current prices, (2) to
determine which factors drive long-term house prices and short-term dynamics, (3) if there is
currently a disequilibrium, to depict how house prices would convergence back to their long-
term equilibrium. The use of panel econometrics improves substantially the robustness of the
estimation. More precisely, the PMG (Pooled Mean Group) estimator developed by Pesaran,
Shin & Smith (1997) is used to disentangle long-term from short-term dynamics. House
price equilibrium is mainly driven by disposable incomes and interest rates. In the short-
term, however, house prices are strongly persistent and mostly driven by disposable incomes.
About the ongoing house price cycle which has started in 1996, the following conclusions are
drawn. The steady growth of the European household’s disposable income coupled with the
decline of the nominal interest rate explain largely the strong house price growth from 1996
to 2001. However, current euro area house prices have overshot long-term price equilibrium
since 2001 according to the estimates. Mortgage loan developments might have fueled house
prices and the sluggish supply reacting too slowly relative to the strong demand. If the tide
started to turn, it would take ﬁve to six years for the current house price to catch up with
its equilibrium level.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C13, C23, R21, R22, R31
Key words: Heterogeneous dynamic panels, pooled mean group estimator, panel unit
root and cointegration tests, house price equilibrium
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11 Motivation
Current soaring house prices have reached unprecedented levels for 30 years in almost all
euro area countries, except in Germany (see Annex 3). Since 1996, Ireland has experienced
a real house price growth rate in average larger than 10%. In the Netherlands, the upsurge
also took place very early in the middle of the 90’s with a peak in 2000, since 2002 however
house prices have grown moderately at 2%. In Spain, the dramatic increase occurred
around 2000, since then the real growth rate has been larger than 10% every year. In
France and Italy the real house price has risen steeply since 1999 and 2001, respectively at
5% on average. Although the Italian and French ones increased ﬁrst at a lower extent, the
pace of the French rate has nevertheless accelerated in the last three years overshooting
10%. Altogether, despite the falling house price in Germany accounting for roughly one
third in the weighting, the euro area real house price has increased steadily since 1999
from 4 to 6.5% in 2005. The rise on its own is not as striking as the long lasting eﬀect of
the phenomenon. Indeed, during the bubble in the beginning of the 90’s, euro area house
price growth reached equivalent peaks. However, a real growth rate above 2% lasted
roughly four years. In contrast, the ongoing current cycle shows a much larger duration.
The strong real house price appreciation has already lasted for eight years. Questions
have arisen regarding the sustainability of house price increase. Is there any fear of sharp
decline? Rising commodity prices and the risk of abrupt decline, along with oil price
shocks have become a center stage in monetary policy debate.
Dramatic asset price volatility can have signiﬁcant eﬀects on real economic activity,
as witnessed by numerous historical episodes ranging from the 1929 Wall Street crash to
the more recent Tokyo housing and equity bubble. Boom-bust cycles in asset prices can
eventually cause credit crunch or even a collapse of the entire ﬁnancial system -systemic
failure- via bank bankruptcy. Besides, strong asset price volatility can harm the real
economy essentially through two other eﬀects. First, households’ housing wealth can have
a strong impact on private consumption and aggregate demand (OECD, 2002; IMF, 2001).
Second, asymmetric information in the credit market makes the supply of credit depend
on households’ collateral, the so-called ﬁnancial accelerator (Bernanke, 1983; Bernanke et
al., 1995, 2000). As a result, strong appreciations and subsequent rapid reversals in asset
prices can harm output growth and jeopardize price stability. At least, they can convey
information about future inﬂation not picked up by current indicators. As the primary
objective of the ECB is to maintain price stability, the ECB pays attention to asset price
movements, especially house prices, without targeting asset prices directly.1 The central
bank stresses the risk that an accommodative monetary policy might facilitate house price
increase. More precisely, the ECB argues that strong monetary and housing credit growth
fuel "strong house price dynamic" (ECB, 2005a).
The primary task the ECB has to tackle, however, is to gauge whether current euro area
house price increases are sustainable, i.e. in line with the fundamentals. If the caveats
are clearly understood, a valuable study can have a potentially useful role in policy-
makers’ information set. So far in the literature, empirical house price estimation has
been either underpinned by the theory of asset pricing valuation or by a structural model.
1Rents in the housing market account for about 6% in the HICP (ECB, 2003). However rent growth
does not always follow house price growth, and the direct link between house prices and HICP is very
weak, about 2% according to an internal ECB estimate. Consequently, a doubling of rents might lead to
2% increase of the HICP.
2The former is based on the arbitrage opportunity between housing assets and alternative
assets like bonds (Ayuso & Restoy, 2003; Bessone, Heitz, & Boissinot, 2005), while the
latter model investigates the determinants of housing demand and supply (e.g. Kenny,
1999, 2003; McCarthy & Peach, 2004; Lecat & Mesonnier, 2005). The ﬁrst approach of
house price evaluation, however, suﬀers from a major drawback. Indeed, house prices may
not essentially be driven by arbitrage behavior (Ott, 2006a). Interpreting the residuals of
the arbitrage equation as the deviation of price rent ratio from their long-term valuation
may be misleading. Omitted variable bias is of concern, as, empirically, it is very unlikely
to have solely non fundamental elements in the residuals. As a consequence, this theory
is ﬂawed by major deﬁcits and thus eschewed. The second approach, in contrast, analyses
the matches of housing demand and supply, which in turn determines the price. On the
one hand, housing supply is driven by proﬁt opportunities, materialized in investments
(McCarthy & Peach, 2002, 2004). On the other hand, factors that impinge on the demand
for housing over longer terms include growth in household’s disposable income, shifts in
demographics, permanent institutional framework as for example the legal tax framework
promoting home ownership against other type of wealth accumulation, ﬁnancing conditions
-level of mortgage interest rate, ﬁxed versus variable mortgage rates, conservative versus
liberal prudential rules- (see ECB, 2003).
This paper aims at shedding light on determinants driving house price in the euro
area and to identify a house price equilibrium. What belongs to a long-term and what
to a short-term dynamics? Is the current house price above/below its fundamental value?
Which long-term and short-term factors explain the movements of real estate prices? Short
sample time span is the ﬁrst challenge to overcome. Indeed, for house prices, the annual
data available ranges from 1975 to 2005 (31 observations). On the one hand, panel econo-
metrics allows a substantial gain in power. On the other hand, parameter homogeneity
assumptions can lead to inconsistent estimates. The last issue is to disentangle long-term
from short-term house price movements, since stickiness is a striking feature of the house
price process.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses some stylized facts observed
in the euro area house market and mortgage market. Section 3 sets up a theoretical
framework, which is used as a guide to select the relevant empirical model regarding the
variables, the lag structure and the autoregressive form. Section 4 reviews the previous
empirical housing literature and outlines the panel econometrics methodology used in this
paper. Section 5 presents the empirical results, from panel unit root and cointegration tests
to the estimation of the Panel Error Correction Model (PECM). The issues of homogeneity
and endogeneity are addressed. In section 6 the estimated panel coeﬃcients are used to
simulate a euro area house price equilibrium and the short-term dynamics. Finally, factors
explaining the euro area house price movements are highlighted and a return to a steady
state is simulated. Section 7 concludes.
32 Stylized facts
The euro area real house price growth rate has risen steadily from year to year since 1997,
reaching more than 6.5% in 2004 and 2005 (see Chart 1). From 1975 to 2005,2 such a
large growth rate was only attained once, in the peak year of the well-known 90’s bubble
which occurred in the majority of euro area countries (see Annex 3).3 The average euro
area real house price growth rate for the period 1997 to 2005 is more than twice as large
as the growth rate of the whole sample (see bar Chart 2). This statement holds for all
euro area countries except Germany. Indeed, the German real house price growth rate
has been negative for the last 8 years while Germany accounts for more than one third
of the euro area house price (see Annex 2, where aggregation methodology is discussed).
Despite this fact, euro area house prices have experienced a strong increase. As can be
remarkably seen in Chart 1, house price motions exhibit a long booming phase, a striking
feature in this last cycle. House price movements in the last eight years correspond to
a booming phase, which is nothing exceptional. However, never before 1975 had such a
house price increase lasted so long, i.e. more than 8 years and that in so many countries.
Countries which have experienced outstanding real house price increase in the last eight
years are: Ireland, Spain, France and the Netherlands with respectively: 11.5, 8.7, 6.4 and
6.2 on average. The other euro area countries have also experienced a strong house price
increase4 albeit to a lesser extent.
Chart 1



































House price Disposable Income per capita
2Annex 1 gives inside on data sources and construction.
3The house price bubble at the beginning of the 90’s was particularly sharp in Spain, Finland and Italy,
and to a lesser extent in Ireland, France and Germany.
4Except Germany which is an outlier with regard to the rest of the euro area. The reuniﬁcation provoked
a booming house price, which in turn surged housing supply. Thereafter, housing demand declined and
the staggered house supply did not follow as quickly. Not only weak disposable income growth but also
excess housing supply may explain the subdued German house price.
4According to the literature on housing, the ratio of house price over real disposable
income shows mean reversion. If the house price deviates relative to the income, this
misalignment tends to be corrected over time (Lamont & Stein, 1999; IMF, 2004; Lecat &
Mesonnier, 2005). Thus, Chart 1 and Annex 4 depict the growth rate of real disposable
income per capita (population aged from 15-64) together with house price in the euro
area. One can notice at ﬁrst glance that both cycles co-move, although house prices
exhibit stronger volatility. Disposable income growth are one year in advance of booming
house price. However the disposable income slowdown since 2001 has not depressed the
housing market so far. Since income does not seem to explain everything, an alternative
factor is investigated: mortgage loan development.
Chart 2
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Mortgage loan development might explain house price boom. Since 1997, the euro area
mortgage loan market has displayed an average annual growth rate of roughly 7%, while is
average growth rate before 1997 was only about 4%. On a micro-level, ﬁnancial institutions
and other lenders examine before approving a mortgage. The Loan To Value (LTV) ratio
is one lending risk assessment amid manifold others (Jackson & Kasserman, 1980). Beside
the prudential ceiling ﬁxed by law, the LTV determines how conservative mortgage lending
is. Typically, high LTV ratios are associated with higher risk. Maclennan, Muellbauer &
Stephens (1999) show that countries with a low LTV ratio and high transaction costs tend
to experience lower house price volatility. One straightforward question worth asking is
whether lax banking practice artiﬁcially fuels dramatic current house price increase. By
the same token, on a macro-level total outstanding loans are divided by house price and
the stock of dwelling to calculate the Current Loan To Value (CLTV).
The changes in the CLTV ratio over time might convey information on households’
residential mortgage default risk exposure. Macroeconomic high risk exposure might be
5commensurate with large CLTV. The CLTV ratio has been detrended as the raw series
exhibit a very strong time trend. Important structural reforms across euro area countries
might explain this trend. Manifold countries embarked on extensive ﬁnancial liberalization
across the EU. Deregulation began in the early 80’s and the pace varied markedly across
countries. This development spurt credit growth across numerous countries, which could
reﬂect an equilibrium adjustment from repressed to liberalized ﬁnancial markets (Ortalo-
Magné & Rady, 1999). Liberalization typically led to, ﬁrst, more market-based mortgage
markets, second, an increase in securization of mortgage loans, third, a higher LTV ratio
and an expansion in mortgage debt. The detrended CLTV for the euro area captures well
real house price movements roughly four years in advance. Chart 3 proves that the CLTV
ratio was a reliable leading indicator to forecast house prices in the past. If this leading
indicator remains stable in the future, euro area house prices should start decreasing in
2006. Annex 5 depicts country speciﬁc CLTV together with the real residential growth
rate.
Chart 3































































Loan To Value detrended House price
The sharp euro area house price growth rate has been caused by countries like Ireland,
Spain, the Netherlands, and, to a lesser extent, France and Italy. It is interesting to
investigate the question whether these countries exhibit larger variance over the entire
sample. If in the past these same countries have shown strong volatility, the current
phenomenon of large house price appreciation can be seen as predictable and expected to
decrease in the future. As a rule, the answer is yes for all countries. Indeed, Chart 4 shows
eﬀectively that Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands and Finland are high volatility countries
over the entire sample. Current large appreciation might be explained and expected to
decrease for the same reasons by these countries exhibiting large variance. On the other
hand, Belgium used to have a moderate volatility in the past while current volatility is
much larger. But the weight of Belgium within the euro area is minor. Finally, the
observed lower house price volatility from 1997 to 2005 relative to the entire sample for all
6countries is due to the pattern of the cycle. From 1997 onwards until today house prices
have exclusively experienced a booming phase. Over the entire sample, however, there are
several cycles characterized by a boom-bust pattern. As a result, it would be misleading
to conclude that house price volatility is decreasing over time. On the contrary, according
to Detken & Smets (2004) volatility of house prices increased over time due to ﬁnancial
deregulation.
Chart 4
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7The relationship between the strong house price growth since 1997 and the overall
volatility by country is deeper investigated. Two scatter diagrams show a relatively stable
relationship. Chart 5 states that countries with stronger average growth rates since 1997
have also experienced standard deviations over the whole sample. By the same token, euro
area house prices are regressed on country speciﬁc house prices from 1975 to 2005. The
estimated slope coeﬃcient has been associated with the average country speciﬁc growth
rate from 1997 to 2005 in Chart 6. Once again a relatively stable relationship between real
house price growth during the last eight years and house price responsiveness is established.
Consequently, countries currently experiencing dramatic house price increase have already
experienced large house price swings in the past. Thus, countries currently responsible
for the strong euro area house price increase -"hot countries"- should also depress in the
future at a larger scale than the "cold-countries". Finally, this proves also a systematic
heterogeneity in variance among countries within the euro area. Despite the convergence
of macro-aggregates due to the EMU, the functioning of the housing market depends
essentially on country and local structural factors. The mortgage market system, local
planing and urbanization scheme, taxes and land availability for instance remain country
and even local speciﬁc.
Chart 6
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Floating versus ﬁxed mortgage rate practice is one of the major national feature in
the European mortgage market. Mortgage market features aﬀect strongly house price
volatility as stressed in ECB (2003) and by Tsatsaronis & Zhu (2004). In countries where
longer-term ﬁxed rate mortgages with no prepayments have been more important, house
price tend to be less sensitive to interests and other macro-aggregates. This leads to a less
volatile house price. The scatter diagram (Chart 7) corroborates this statement. Indeed,
a robust negative correlation between house price volatility and the percentage of out-
standing mortgage loans with ﬁxed interest rate contracts is established. The Netherlands
is the only outlier as house price volatility is strong, despite a mortgage ﬁnance system
8predominantly based on ﬁxed mortgage rate payments. There are other features on the
house market like LTV and Mortgage Equity Withdrawal (MEW). Among countries with
predominantly ﬁxed mortgage interest rate adjustment, the Dutch mortgage market is the
only one characterized by a high LTV and where MEW is current practice. This might
explain the Dutch idiosyncrasy.
Chart 7
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Consider an economy in which there are two goods, a non durable composite commodity,
c (numerator) and a housing good, h, with relative price with respect to the non durable
good, p. Following for instance Poterba (1984) and Brueckner (1994), I suppose that a
representative household maximizes its discounted life time utility under budget constraint.





and β is the time discount factor. The economy evolves in a stochastic environment,
hence Et the expectation operator. At each period t = 1,2....,T, the representative house-
hold chooses how much of the composite commodity to consume, ct, how many bonds
that mature in the following period to buy, bt+1 and the level of housing consumption
to carry into the next period, ht+1. The household’s real income is yt. The period bond
interest rate is it, while the mortgage interest rate is iM
t , the amount of mortgage loan is
mt and πt is the inﬂation rate of the non durable good. The stock of housing depreciates at
the rate δ. The household chooses sequences of consumption, bond holdings, and housing
consumption subject to the constraint:




mt−1 = yt +
1 + it
1 + πt
bt + pt(1 − δ)ht−1 + mt. (2)
The L.H.S. of equation (2) pertains to the uses of the funds: the real value of bond
carried over the next period, current real consumption, current purchases of real housing
stock and the ﬁnancial burden (interest payments) from the previous period mortgage
loan. The R.H.S. of equation (2) deﬁnes the origin of the funds: real income endowment,
the yield of the bonds, the value of the house carried over the previous period net of depre-
ciation and the amount of mortgage loan subscribed. A borrowing constraint motivates a
separate market for mortgage loans:
mt = κptht, (3)
with κ the LTV ratio imposed by the prudential rules which lies between 0 and 1.
Annex 6 gives details of the intertemporal and intratemporal maximization. The straight-
















Equation (4) is the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between consumption and
housing and equals the user cost of housing. The latter is the slope of the budget line,
which depicts the opportunity cost. The opportunity cost -or price- of an additional unit
of housing is the amount of non durable goods that must be foregone to obtain it. 1 − κ
is the proportion of house value not ﬁnanced by mortgage, i.e. the direct cost born by
household to purchase the house. The second term in the ﬁrst bracket:5 represents the
expected opportunity cost of ﬁnancing part of the house by mortgage borrowing. The
last and remaining term reﬂects the expected future value of the undepreciated portion of
housing, discounted to the current period.
First, I calculate the MRS for the given instantaneous utility function: U(ht,ct) =
lnht + lnct. Inserting the budget constraint (2), the borrowing constraint (3) and the




































































Equation (6) expresses the inverted demand of housing; price and quantity are char-
acterized by an inverse relationship. Furthermore, real house price depends negatively
on, ﬁrst the current and expected real mortgage rate (current and expected mortgage
payments), second the amount of bonds subscribed in period t+1, and third the spread
between mortgage rate and bond rate. This latter actually reﬂects the borrowing con-
straint. Finally, ceteris paribus, real house price depends positively on disposable income
(bond yield included), the amount of loan endowment and the expected discounted future
house price, net of depreciation (net capital gain expectation).
Housing supply replete the dynamic general equilibrium model. In the short-term,
housing supply6 can be interpreted as an investment equation (see McCarthy & Peach,
2002):
It = ζEt(pt+1). (7)
The higher the expected house price, the larger the amount invested in housing by real
estate investors. Equation (7) is a poor speciﬁed investment equation where construction
costs and interest rate are omitted for the sake of clarity. On the other hand, the law of
motion of the housing stock is:
ht+1 = ht + It − δht. (8)
Substituting the investment equation (7) into the law of motion of housing stock (8),
supply can be rewritten as a cobweb model:
ht+1 = ht + ζEt(pt+1) − δht. (9)
The quantity supplied to the house market is determined by expected future house
price. Supply in the current period is perfectly inelastic. Inertia in the supply of housing
is featured in most of the literature dealing with housing supply. Empirical investigations
have proven that the supply is typically constrained (Muellbauer & Murphy, 1997; Kenny,
2003). The demand, equation (6), responds to the usual factors (disposable income, user
cost of housing etc.) and determines an equilibrium price, which feeds into next year’s
supply, see Annex 7. Thus, the supply reacts with delay (supply 2) relative to the demand
which typically moves much faster (demand 1 to demand 3). As a result, there always
exists the potential for house prices to overshoot their long-run equilibrium level following a
sudden increase in housing demand (Kenny, 1999, 2003). This supply-demand interaction
over time leads to the house price cycle.
6For a thorough theoretical and empirical investigation of housing supply, see Kenny (2003).











Again, substituting supply equation (9) into the denominator this time of L.H.S. of







(1 − δ)ht−1 + ζEt−1(pt)
  
. (10)
For the sake of clarity, the expression (10) and R.H.S. of equation (6) will be simpliﬁed.
First, common knowledge between representative household and supplier is assumed. The
house price expectations of household and investor are identical. Moreover, although the
view of naïve forecast expectation has been challenged by Muellbauer & Murphy (1997),
rational expectation hypothesis is not realistic either. Following Levin & Wright (1997)
expectations of future changes in real housing prices are proxied by past changes in real
housing price. It is assumed that expectations are based on current and past realization.
This allows the introduction of inertia in the house price process which stems from the
demand, a realistic assumption. By the same token, expected interest rates depend on
past realizations. Consequently, the following expectations are introduced:
Et(pt+1) = αpt + (1 − α)pt−1,
Et(iM
t+1) = γiM
t + (1 − γ)iM
t−1,
Et(it+1) = γit + (1 − γ)it−1.
Second, wealth is introduced and reﬂects the total revenue of income and bond interest
payment:




Finally, in view of the forthcoming estimation and panel cointegration results, the total
amount of households: Nt and the aggregated stock of houses: Ht are introduced in the
economy, thus: ht = Ht
Nt.
Altogether, inserting all these elements in the expression (10) and R.H.S. of equation
(6) yields, I approximate a log-linearized equation, of the following form:
˜ pt = a11˜ pt−1 + a12˜ pt−2 − a20 ˜ Ht + a21 ˜ Ht−1 − a30 ˜ Nt + a31 ˜ Nt−1
+a40 ˜ wt − a50iM
t − a51iM
t−1 − a60it − a61it−1 + a70 ˜ mt, (11)
and aii > 0 for all i.
Housing market house prices exhibit signiﬁcant serial correlation. This autoregres-
sive term (lagged dependent variable) is in line with the literature (IMF, 2004; Lecat &
Mesonnier, 2005) and depicted in Annex 7. Indeed, the housing supply is inelastic and
12this inertia makes the house price process highly persistent (Muellbauer & Murphy, 1997;
Kenny, 1998; IMF, 2004; McCarthy & Peach, 2002). Not only does the supply side of the
housing market adjust gradually, due to the housing stock being ﬁxed in the short-term,
but so does the demand side. Households develop expectations by looking backward at
historic prices. The relationship between real house price and stock is negative at time t,
but positive at time t-1. The former describes the demand side, the latter the supply side.
Finally, the largest lag order is 2 for house prices, consequently the following generalized
dynamic process is proposed:
A0 ˜ Zt = A1 ˜ Zt−1 + A2 ˜ Zt−2, (12)
with vector: ˜ Z′
t = (˜ pt, ˜ Ht, ˜ Nt, ˜ wt,iM
t ,it, ˜ mt).
4 Econometric methodology
4.1 Proxies in literature on housing
Equilibrium house price, as in any other market is the match between demand and supply.
However, most estimates of house price equation are best viewed as inverted demand
(Lecat & Mesonnier, 2005; IMF, 2004 and Tsatsaronis & Zhu, 2004). Supply side factors
are often absent. Consequently, they estimate a demand function by assuming an inelastic
supply. At ﬁrst sight, one may think that this may cause a problem of miss-speciﬁcation.
Indeed, if, for example, the observed house prices result from a supply shift along the
demand curve, the estimates are biased (simultaneous equation bias, Hamilton, 1994).
However, the risk of misspeciﬁcation is not so important as they do not estimate the long-
term relationship in level but the dynamics of house price growth rates which are mainly
demand-driven.
Demand side factors are investigated by numerous proxies. For instance Tsatsaronis &
Zhu (2004) use the GDP per capita as proxy to capture households’ income, unemployment
and wage, while some authors (e.g. Lecat & Messonier, 2005) use the disposable income
per capita in real terms. Nevertheless, some other authors employ the permanent income
as aﬀordability variable, which in turn is proxied by consumption of non-durables and
services and ﬁnancial wealth (McCarthy & Peach, 2004, 2002; Bessone, Heitz & Boissinot,
2005). In Tsatsaronis & Zhu (2004) the link between GDP per capita and house prices
is very tenuous while disposable income is largely signiﬁcant in Lecat & Messonier (2005)
and IMF (2004). This may be due to the diﬀerent choice of proxy. In Tsatsaronis &
Zhu (2004), CPI inﬂation has the strongest impact on the real house prices. This can
be explained especially in high-inﬂation countries where hedging against inﬂation risk is
current practice.
As regards ﬁnancial conditions proxies (the capability to borrow), authors also diﬀer,
distinguishing between short/long-term and between nominal/real. Tsatsaronis & Zhu
(2004) use the short-term nominal interest rate while all other variables are expressed
in real terms in their model speciﬁcation. Frictions in the credit market and inﬂation
expectations underpin the use of nominal interest rates instead of real ones. To take
into account the real aﬀordability of the household, they incorporate the consumer price
growth rate (CPI) and the real spread (diﬀerence between 10 years bonds and 3 month
treasury bills deﬂated by the CPI). The importance of property investments as a hedge
13against inﬂation is investigated by including the CPI in the model. Lecat & Messonier
(2005) employ the same ﬁnancial condition proxies as Tsatsaronis & Zhu (2004) except
that the short-term interest rate is expressed in real terms and the CPI is excluded. An
alternative proxy for ﬁnancial conditions instead of interest rates, is the user cost of housing
(Bessone et al., 2005; McCarthy and Peach, 2004; Martinez & Àngel, 2003). This user
cost of housing depicts the cost of holding a dwelling, including taxation, the expected
valuation (capital gain) of the asset and its depreciation. The last ﬁnancial condition
variables investigated in the literature on housing, are real bank credit (mortgage loans,
housing credits to households, or credit to the private sector) and real stock prices, which
respectively aim at proxying mortgage rationing and the eﬀort of households to rotate their
portfolio in favour of housing (Lecat et al., 2005; Martinez & Àngel, 2003; Tsatsaronis &
Zhu, 2004).
The less controversial result among the surveys, is the strong signiﬁcance of ﬁnancial
condition variables (interest rate either, real-nominal or short or long-term, or even the
spread, but also credit), while stock market prices are insigniﬁcant. Borio & McGuire’s
results (2004) can be reconciled with the non-signiﬁcance of equity market return by
supposing that both house prices and stock market prices are pro-cyclical. According to
Tsatsaronis & Zhu (2004) not only do interest rate changes matter but so do national ﬁnan-
cial features like variable versus ﬁxed mortgage interest rate, maximum loan-to-value and
other prudential rules, or the level of deregulation, equity withdrawal, securized mortgage
assets also have a signiﬁcant impact on house prices. For instance, the link between credit
growth and house prices is stronger in countries with more market-sensitive valuation
methods (Tsatsaronis & Zhu, 2004). Lamont & Stein (1997) proved that credit constraint
is a very important factor especially for indebted households. In the same stance, Lecat
& Messonier (2005) show that ﬁnancial conditions are essential factors explaining house
price movements. They investigated the impact of structural changes. According to them,
the deregulation of ﬁnancial and credit markets mostly explain the house price bubble
observed in the late 80’s in France.
The third type of structural factors aﬀecting the housing demand may be the gradual
shift in demographics, the change of the number of households proxied by population aged
from 15-65 years (IMF, 2004) or total population (Lecat & Mesonnier, 2005). According
to the cited literature, these variables change very softly and have a low explanatory power
in the short-term. In the long-run, however, demographic factors might have an inﬂuence
(Mankiw & Weil, 1989) but it is diﬃcult to assess since housing is a superior good.
Finally, about empirical results concerning price misalignment with respect to the
fundamentals, the conclusions are diﬀerent according to the countries. The IMF (2004)
survey covering 18 industrial countries show that not only structural factors, like the fall in
average short-term interest rates and the increase in the average growth rate of disposable
income have contributed to the house price boom, but also the boom in credit. Guene
(2004) also observes in the euro area a price misalignment with respect to fundamentals
but it is much more moderate. This may be due to the falling real house price in Germany
which account for more than a third in the euro area aggregate. Martinez & Àngel (2003)
might observe in Spain a bubble as the strong signiﬁcant interest rates can only explain
partially the house price boom. In contrast, McCarthy & Peach (2004) conclude that there
is no bubble in the USA ; house price increase is coupled with personal income growth
and decline in nominal interest rates. In the same stance, Bessone et al. (2005) ﬁnd no
14evidence of a bubble in France, especially currently when compared with the risk premium
level reached in the beginning of the 90’s. Lecat & Messonier (2005) ﬁnancial deregulation
proxy does not oﬀer any explanation for the recent house price boom. According to the
authors, the current house price boom can be explained by the interaction between low
interest rates and a friendly legislative framework boosting access to mortgage credit.
4.2 The model speciﬁcation
Recalling equation (11), the lack of some data obliges to assume that the gap between
mortgage rate and bond interest rate is time-invariant, i.e. iM
t +µ = it => Et(iM
t+1)+µ =
Et(it+1), and µ is a constant. Following this assumption, mortgage loans vanishes in
equation (13). On the one hand, the risk of multicollinearity is averted. On the other
hand, a credit constraint indicator is not taken into account, that is for the bad news.
Last remark, interest rate increase has also a positive eﬀect on households’ wealth through
bond interest payments, which increase consumer aﬀordability and so positively impact
house prices. I suppose this eﬀect is benign, i.e. the negative eﬀect through the increased
mortgage burden largely outweighs the wealth eﬀect. Including these elements in equation
(13), the reduced form of the housing market equation with respect to the proxies gives
an ARDL (2,2,2,2,2,2) process:





ψi,jkXi,j,t−k + ui + ǫi,t, (13)
and i = 1.....8 are the 8 EMU countries investigated, ui is the country ﬁxed eﬀect,
whereas k is the lag operator indicator (time) ; ﬁnally j = 2....67 is respectively, log of
stock of dwelling, log of real income per capita (population aged from 15 to 64), nominal
short-term interest rate, population aged from 15-64, and detrended log of mortgage loan8
which can be written as transpose of the vector X:
(Xi,2,t;Xi,3,t;Xi,4,t;Xi,5,t;Xi,6,t) = (dwi,t;dyi,t,ini,t,poi,t,lmi,t).
Starting from the general ARDL model, I derive at time t the long-run reduced house
price function (steady state):
pi,t =
1









 + ηt. (14)
The PMG estimation procedure allows to estimate a common long-run coeﬃcient. I
have to test whether the variables are I(1) and cointegrate, making η an I(0) process. So,
the error correction equation is:9









ψi,jk∆Xi,j,t−1 + ǫi,t. (15)
7j = 2....5 when mortgage loan is omitted.
8Annex 1 gives a detailed review of data sources and construction.
9Annex 8 gives a detailed a thorough calculation of equation (16).
15∆dw is the growth rate of the stock of dwelling, ∆p is the growth rate of the house
price,10 ∆dy is the growth rate of household’s real disposable income, ∆po growth rate
of population, ∆lm growth rate of mortgage loans, and ∆in is the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the
nominal interest rate.
For a long relationship to exist, ψi,11 + ψi,12 must be diﬀerent from one. Short-run
coeﬃcients and the disturbances must be independent to have consistent estimates. In
contrast, as shown by Pesaran et al. (1997) the long-run coeﬃcients of the Xi,j can be
dependent, as long as Xi,j have ﬁnite-order autoregressive representation. Consequently,
in the cointegration relation, coeﬃcients in front of endogenous variables are consistent,
but short-term coeﬃcients are not. The PMG also allows σi to diﬀer across countries
besides a ﬁxed eﬀect ui. The Mean Group (MG) provides consistent estimates of the
mean of the long-run coeﬃcients, but ineﬃcient if slope homogeneity holds (Pesaran et
al., 1997). Under long-run slope homogeneity, the pooled (PMG) estimator is consistent
and eﬃcient. Therefore, the eﬀect of the heterogeneity on the means of the coeﬃcient can
be determined by a Hausman type test applied to the diﬀerence between MG and PMG
estimates. However it is important to notice that as T is small, making inference about
the speed of adjustment is diﬃcult.
4.3 Choice of estimator
The choice of the econometric methodology is based on the following considerations. First,
the short time dimension of the available data on a country level hinders robust estimates
with classical time series econometrics. Indeed, the annual data available ranges from
1975 to 2005 (31 observations). Heterogeneous estimators are normally unstable (indi-
vidual country estimates vary within wide ranges) and unreliable, though they have the
desirable property of allowing for diﬀerences among countries. Panel econometrics allow
a substantial gain in power. In addition, panel estimators are proven to deal better with
the problem of measurement bias (see Baltagi et al., 1995). In the same stance, Baltagi &
Griﬃn (1997) show that pooled estimators have desirable properties and typically outper-
form their heterogeneous counterparts. For example, they ﬁnd that pooled models tend
to produce more plausible estimates even for panels with relatively long time series and
that they oﬀer overall superior forecast performances.
As a rule, two methods are used to estimate long-run and short-term dynamic in panel
econometrics. On the one hand, the ﬁrst supposes to estimate N separate regression (for
each country) and to calculate the coeﬃcient means. This estimator, e.g. Mean Group
(MG), is consistent but mostly ineﬃcient. On the other hand, the traditional pooled esti-
mators, such as FE, RE, IV and GMM, which assume that the slope coeﬃcients and error
variance are identical, are performed. The asymptotic properties in case of large T and
small N with traditional panel econometric procedures have proven to produce inconsistent
estimates in dynamic panel data unless the slope coeﬃcients are in fact identical. This as-
sumption of homogeneity among euro area countries is far-fetched as observed in section 2.
First, Pooled Mean Group (PMG), which assumes homogeneity of long-run coeﬃcients but
allows short-term elasticities to vary across countries (groups or cross-sections), combine
the beneﬁts of both classes of estimators. Second, as already mentioned in the previous
section, house price is a persistent process. The PMG allows autoregressive terms, and
10House price is proxied by residential property price: ∆rpp.
16so captures one striking feature of the house price process. Third, any empirical attempt
at modeling the housing market must clearly distinguish the long- from the short-run dy-
namic since I want to estimate a house price equilibrium. Finally, allowing heterogeneity
in short-run parameters averts the problem of spurious and overestimated relationship, as
explained by Haque, Pesaran & Sharma (2000).
More precisely, Pesaran, Shin & Smith (1997) propose an intermediate estimator, the
PMG estimator. This is essentially a dynamic error correction model that allows the short-
run parameters to vary across countries (groups), while restricting long-run elasticities to
be identical across countries. The problem of heterogeneity among countries highlighted
in section 2 assails the use of classical panel econometrics. Instead, the PMG estimator
allows to estimate the common long-run coeﬃcient without making less plausible assump-
tions of identical dynamics in each country. Imposing long-term homogeneous coeﬃcients
across euro area countries may be seen as tantamount to estimating the long-term rela-
tionships in the euro area. ECB policy decisions are based on euro area aggregates. The
panel parameters estimated are used on a euro area level, muting the problem caused by
the homogeneity assumption on long-term parameters. Moreover, assuming long-term ho-
mogeneity on a euro area level can be defended as countries have become more integrated
over the past two decades. The launch of the euro particularly boosted the integration of
the ﬁnancial market, i.e. the synchronization of interest rates of short and longer maturity
coined a common business cycle.
On the other hand, the mortgage market remains strongly characterized by national
features, and this market interacts with the housing market. Although long-term house
price movements across countries may be synchronized since the forces driving house
prices (such as output and interest rates) tend to move together across euro area coun-
tries, housing is quintessentially a nontradable asset. House price dynamics depends on
local elements, e.g. land price and availability, urbanization policy, mortgage ﬁnancing
tradition, supply channel etc. Indeed, the stylized facts in section 2 highlighted strong
idiosyncrasies across countries. The PMG estimator allows not only country-speciﬁc short-
term coeﬃcients to diﬀer but also to estimate country-speciﬁc long-term coeﬃcients (at
least for a sub-set). This possibility is very welcome with respect to the matter of the
empirical estimation. According to the empirical results and diagnostic tests, I will decide
whether to impose full homogeneity in the long-run or only partially. Thus, the PMG
estimator is a suited estimator regarding the purpose of the empirical study.
Based on these statements, this paper will employ Pesaran, Shin & Smith (1997) esti-
mator in order to gauge the periods when disequilibrium have arisen and the nature of the
disequilibrium (under-supply versus under-demand). The actual house price is compared
to the long-run price equilibrium. Actual house price is theoretically underpinned by the
general equilibrium model in section 3. The long-term house price equilibrium can be
easily derived from the same general equilibrium model. Equilibrium price is tantamount
to the steady state house price and is calculated by assuming ˜ Zt = ˜ Zt−1 = ˜ Zt−2. The
misalignment of actual house price with respect to the long-run house price equilibrium
cannot be assimilated to a bubble as deﬁned by Stiglitz (1990).11 On the contrary, the
11In Stiglitz deﬁnition, the non fundamental part of a price increase is a bubble. A bubble in turn is
based on expectations: the level of prices has been raised beyond what is consistent with the underlying
fundamentals of the asset pricing evaluation and buyers of the asset do so with the expectation of future
price increase.
17cycle is a salient feature of house price due to the functioning of the house market.
4.4 Endogeneity
Equation (16) includes three endogenous variables: lm, dw and p. First, the volume of
mortgage loan is endogenous to the house price via the lending collateral (see Ott, 2006b).
Banks are only willing to lend if the borrower owns a collateral. As this collateral is the
house itself, an increase of house prices will induce an increase of mortgage loans. Thus,
causality is hard to pin down, as rising mortgage debt may be the result of high prices, not
the cause, while any co-movement could reﬂect a common response to a third factor such
as interest rates and expected incomes. Second, the stock of dwelling is simultaneously
determined by the demand and supply. On the one hand a positive demand shock puts
house prices under inﬂationary pressure, on the other hand the increased house prices
will trigger a positive reaction (albeit sluggish) of the supply mitigating the pressure.
Third, in opposite to housing wealth, house prices are not included in the calculation of
the disposable income,12 consequently the disposable income is considered exogenous. The
endogeneity of the interest rate is even less plausible, but possible through the simultaneous
equation of the demand and supply of mortgage loans. However, monetary policy interest
rate strongly determines the mortgage loan interest rate, the short-term and even the
long-term interest rate. And I suppose that the monetary policy does not react13 to house
price variations.
In case of endogenous variables, the PMG estimator remains consistent for long-run
coeﬃcients but not for short-run coeﬃcients. As a result, two short-term lag structures
will be investigated. The ﬁrst lag structure is chosen to omit short-run eﬀects of stock of
dwelling and mortgage loan; let us call it the restricted ARDL(2,0,x,x,x,x,0). Nevertheless
this leads to another problem: the omitted variable bias. The other alternative is to choose
a lag structure based on the information criteria by allowing short-term eﬀect of mortgage
loan and housing stock variation; I call it the unrestricted ARDL. To conclude, there is
clearly a trade-oﬀ between omitted variable bias and inconsistency due to endogeneity.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Panel unit root tests
The major caveat of classical time series unit root tests (e.g. ADF or KPSS tests) applied
individually to each country (group or section) is the lack of power. Indeed, the relatively
short time span (T=31) gives too few observations. However the time span is long enough
to be concerned by the stationary proprieties of the series. As a consequence, to gain
power, panel unit root tests are used. The ﬁrst generation of panel unit root tests do
not take into account possible cross-sectional correlations. The ﬁrst test was developed
by Levin, Lin & Chu (1993). Beside omitting the problem of cross sectional correlation,
this test only allows for heterogeneity across sections (countries) by a ﬁxed eﬀect. The
12Renting revenues are included in disposable income. However, housing rents are not correlated with
house price via arbitrage (Ott, 2006a, 2006b). Thus, it is not far-fetched to suppose that disposable income
is exogeneous.
13Although the FED as well as the ECB have shown concern about house prices, it is however realistic
to suppose that house price movements are not included in the reaction function of the Central Bank.
Monetary policy interest rates are mainly driven by output gap and CPI inﬂation movements.
18problem of heterogeneity is better taken into account by Im, Pesaran & Shin (1997)
and Maddala & Wu (1999) tests. These tests suppose under H1 not only heterogeneous
autoregressive coeﬃcients among sections, but also divergent cases among sections in view
of stationarity. Im, Pesaran & Shin propose an average ADF test over the sections, and
under H0 all sections have a unit root without ﬁxed eﬀect.
A new generation of panel unit root tests14 was developed, taking into account the
problem of cross-sectional correlation: Bai & Ng (2001), Moon & Perron (2003), Choi
(2002) and Pesaran (2003). Monetary union and the convergence process imply a very
strong cross-sectional correlation among the series. This is particularly true for the interest
rates. All four tests perform a unit root test only on the idiosyncratic component. The
Bai & Ng test supposes to know the number of common factors in a total factor model.
On the other hand, Moon & Perron, but also Choi, eliminate the common components of
the series, and so perform a unit root test on the transformed series. These last two tests
are certainly the most relevant ones with regard to their asymptotic properties. Finally,
Pesaran’s test (augmented Dickey-Fuller) does not transform the data. Instead the test is
performed on the raw data.
First generation panel unit root tests, (1) Levin, Lin & Chu, (2) Breitung, (3) Im,
Pesaran & Shin, (4) ADF Fisher (Fisher Chi-square, Choi Z-stat), (5) Phillips Perron
test (Fisher Chi-square, Choi Z-stat), but also second generation: (1) Bai & Ng, (2) Moon
& Perron, (3) Choi (4) Pesaran’s test have been performed. All tests were performed
with a maximum lag order of 4. The number of lags were chosen automatically section
by section based on the SIC (Schwartz Information Criteria). The null hypothesis for all
tests is unit root. All variables are in log level, except the interest rate.
As can be seen in Annex 9, according to the second generation of panel unit root
tests, all variables in level are found to have a unit root. However, the log of residential
property price is found to be trend-stationary according to all three old generation tests
(see Annex 10). The log of dwelling is also found to be trend stationary according to the
Levin, Lin & Chu and Breitung’s tests. On the other hand, Choi and Moon & Perron
tests conclude to a unit root process for both series. I rather trust the new generation of
panel unit roots, as there might be strong cross-sectional correlations. For these two series,
however, as this contradiction casts some doubts, I also performed a country speciﬁc ADF
tests (see Annex 11). Once again, the lag order chosen is based on SIC. According to the
ADF test with or without trend, unit root processes cannot be rejected at 5 %. In ﬁrst
diﬀerence, the unit root is clearly rejected for all these series. Finally, the ratio stock of
dwelling over population, as well as real interest rates proved to be I(0). For these reasons,
the population was parted from stock of dwelling in section 3, and the nominal instead of
the real interest rate was investigated.
5.2 Panel cointegration tests
The use of cointegration techniques to test for the presence of long-run relationships among
integrated variables has enjoyed growing popularity in the empirical literature. Once again,
the inherently low power of these tests when applied to sections leads me to use panel
14The new generation of unit root tests were performed thanks to the matlab codes developed by
Christophe Hurlin.
19cointegration tests.15 Pedroni (1999) proposes 7 statistics to test under the null hypothesis
no-cointegration in dynamic panels with multiple regressors (heterogenous slopes among
cross-sections). About the 7 statistics, as time dimension equals T=31 and the section
dimension equals N=8, only the panel-t and the group-t statistics oﬀer good asymptotic
properties (see Pedroni, 2004). Consequently, the investigation on long-run cointegration
among series will be based on these two statistics only. It is also more relevant to use
parametric statistics, since I have only 248 observations. Under the Ho hypothesis of no-
cointegration, the statistics have to be compared with the critical values of the standard
normal distribution N(0,1).
The results in the Table of Annex 12 fail to prove that all six variables in equation
(15) cointegrate. However, Pedroni’s tests reject the null of no-cointegration when the
mortgage loan is omitted from the equation (15). Thus, I assume that residential property
price, stock of dwelling, disposable income, interest rate and population cointegrate. To
summarize, according to Pedroni’s cointegration test, these series cointegrate, i.e. a long-
term relationship is assumed. When the real mortgage loan is added, the fact that the six
series cointegrate is less obvious according to Pedroni’s test. Consequently, to address this
issue, I estimate two diﬀerent speciﬁcations by omitting or not mortgage loan. It is worth
mentioning however that the results of Pedroni’s test are only indicative for two reasons.
First, Pedroni’s tests do not deal the problem of cross-country correlation (Banerjee, 1999).
Second, under Pedroni (1999, 2004) null hypotheses, heterogeneous slope is assumed while
I only assume for some speciﬁcations heterogeneous slopes for mortgage loan. Indeed,
the long-term relationship in the PMG is considered common among all countries. Being
aware that the null hypotheses under the Pedroni’s panel cointegration test does not match
exactly the PMG assumptions, the residuals of the cointegration relationship is also tested.
Pesaran et al. (1997) suggest to test whether the residuals are I(0) with the Im, Pesaran
& Shin (1997)16 test17, and so to conclude whether the series cointegrate. This has been
done in section 5.3.3.
5.3 Pooled Mean Group estimates
The PMG assumes three hypotheses. First, the disturbances in the ARDL model are
independently distributed across the section and time, with zero means, and ﬁnite fourth-
order moment; error variances σi can diﬀer across countries. Besides, the independence of
the disturbances and the regressors is needed for the consistent estimation of the short-run
coeﬃcient. As shown by Pesaran et al. (1997) it is relatively straight forward to allow
dependence of the regressors on the error term with the long-run coeﬃcients, as long as
the regressors have ﬁnite-order autoregressive representation. Second, the ARDL process
must be stationary. Third, the long-run coeﬃcients of all regressors are the same across
countries -with the possible extension to constrain only a subset.
Following Pesaran et al. (1997),18 I estimate the dynamic heterogeneous panel equa-
tion (16) by using the maximum likelihood estimator. The estimates are computed with
the Newton-Raphson algorithm, which uses both the ﬁrst and the second derivatives of
15The cointegration tests were performed thanks to the Rats program provided by Pedroni (1999).
16The test itself was developed in 1997, however the publication year is 2003, see under Reference.
17A test which, under Ho, supposes an homogeneous slopes and country speciﬁc autocorrelation.
18The Gauss program was developed by Shin (1997) and is available on Pesaran’s web site:
www.econ.cam.ac.uk/faculty/pesaran/.
20the likelihood function. I ﬁrst estimate with standard PMG, i.e. with short-run dynamic
heterogeneity but restrict all or a subset of the long-run coeﬃcients to be the same across
groups (countries). The variables are: real house price, stock of dwelling, real dispos-
able income per capita, nominal short-term interest rate, population aged from 15-64 and
detrended outstanding mortgage loans.19
Annex 13 reports the result among diﬀerent speciﬁcation concerning restricted/unrestricted
and with homogeneity/heterogeneity mortgage loan slope. First, the diﬀerence in the in-
come coeﬃcient estimates between the homogeneous mortgage loan slope and the spec-
iﬁcation omitting mortgage loan is substantial. However, among models with imposed
lag structure, the diﬀerence in coeﬃcients between the model without mortgage loan and
the one with heterogeneous slope is quite tiny since below 15%. In contrast, interest rate
coeﬃcient diﬀerences ranges from 30 to 50%. This large diﬀerence can be explained by the
interaction between interest rate and mortgage loan. The interest rate coeﬃcient of the
speciﬁcation where the mortgage loan is omitted is much larger because it captures, not
only the interest rate eﬀect but also the credit rationing due to the problem of asymmetric
information. This proves that households are typically dependent on ﬁnancial institutions.
Even though the mortgage loan is not proved to cointegrate by Pedroni’s test,20 I refrain
from excluding it on the ground of asymmetric information theory. Indeed, the omission
of mortgage loan as suggested in a neoclassical view might lead to an omitted variable
bias. As a result, the mortgage loan is included in future speciﬁcations. A better proxy
of credit rationing would have been the spread between government bonds and mortgage
interest. Unfortunately, due to missing data, this alternative cannot be investigated.
5.3.1 Lag structure - endogeneity
The short-term dynamic will be speciﬁed according to an automatic lag selection or an
imposed (restricted) one. First, the automatic lag selection speciﬁcation based on the
Akaike (AIC), Schwartz (SBC) or the Hannan and Quinn criteria (H&Q) is one of the most
current option. Pesaran et al. (1997) propose a lag selection strategy in PMG estimations.
Annex 14 reports the results from panel regression with unrestricted lag section criteria
AIC and H&Q21 with homogeneous or heterogeneous long-term mortgage loan slope. As
can be established from Annex 14, the coeﬃcient estimates between the diﬀerent lag section
criteria are very benign. However they once again diﬀer when imposing or not long-term
homogeneity on the mortgage loan coeﬃcient. Second, I suggest to impose a given lag
structure to eschew endogeneity problems (restricted ARDL). The strong persistence of
house price growth is one striking feature highlighted in the literature and proved in
this survey. Table 2 reports the short-term house price auto-regressive coeﬃcients of the
preferred models, all systematically signiﬁcant at 95%, except in Germany. Consequently,
the ARDL in level must be characterized by a lag order of 2 in its ﬁrst rank. The lag
order of the regressors is however more open to debate. In case of endogeneity, short-
term coeﬃcients are inconsistent. One solution is to suppose that the growth rate of the
endogenous variables does not inﬂuence house price growth. Thus, I suppose that the
stock of dwelling and real mortgage loans do not enter the short-term equation but only
the long-term. The restricted ARDL speciﬁcation is then of the form ARDL(2,0,x,x,x,0).
19All variables are expressed in logarithm, except the interest rate.
20As already explained, Pedroni’s test is only indicative any way.
21The coeﬃcients estimated based on the Schwartz criteria were very similar, and so omitted.
21The PMG technique already implies high numbers of estimation parameters especially
in heterogeneous mortgage loan estimates. Thus, I suggest to choose ARDL (2,0,1,1,1,0)
instead of ARDL (2,0,2,2,2,0) due to the limited degrees of freedom. Moreover, estimates
from the former yields better results in terms of stability than the latter. In addition, the
long-term coeﬃcient estimates between restricted and the unrestricted ARDL are benign.
After the thorough investigation and the try of a number of alternative speciﬁcations, I
select the four models reported in Table 1 under the two columns headed "homogeneous"
and "heterogeneous mortgage loan" respectively. It reports the long-term PMG coeﬃcient
estimates and the error correction term by country. The results are quite satisfactory, both
from the viewpoint of the explanatory power of the regressions, and from the viewpoint of
the sign and level of signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients. In particular, all common long-term
coeﬃcient estimates are statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels in any speciﬁcation,
restricted, as well as unrestricted, and signed in line with the theory. In the columns headed
lm in Table 1, the heterogenous mortgage loan coeﬃcients are all right-signed except
Belgium. However, the coeﬃcients are not all signiﬁcant, in the restricted 5 countries over
8 and in the unrestricted half of the countries. The importance of each factor will be
investigated in the next section.
In Table 1, diﬀerences between the restricted and unrestricted model are very minor.
The diﬀerences in stock of dwelling and population do not account. Indeed, the coeﬃ-
cient ratio stock of dwelling over population is roughly the same between restricted and
unrestricted model. Annex 19 depicts for the euro area the ﬁtted values of the restricted
and unrestricted model with a common mortgage slope, and both display the same price
history in level. The same holds with heterogeneous slopes in mortgage in Chart group
9. These results conﬁrm, ﬁrst, the stability and robustness of long-term coeﬃcients irre-
spective not only of the lag restricted versus unrestricted structure, but also irrespective
of mortgage loan slope homogeneity versus heterogeneity. Second, they also conﬁrm the
consistency of long-term parameter estimates across the models (Table 1), which are not
aﬀected by endogeneity problems. The problem however remains in the short-term spec-
iﬁcation. I am aware that excluding endogenous variables in the short-term speciﬁcation
may lead to another problem: the omitted variable bias. There is clearly a trade oﬀ be-
tween inconsistency due to endogeneity and the omitted variable bias. For this reason,
both type of models, a restricted and unrestricted will be estimated. Even though the
long-term picture between both speciﬁcation is alike, the short-term dynamic is diﬀerent,
as proved later.
22Table 1: PMG estimates restricted - unrestricted ARDL
Elasticities Homogeneous mort. loan Heterogeneous mort. loan
long-term ARDL(2,0,1,1,1,0) H&Q ARDL(2,0,1,1,1,0) H&Q
st. dwelling dw -4.55 -1.42 -2.54 -1.73
(−3.99) (−2.50) (−6.30) (−3.87)
real income dy 3.03 1.18 2.06 1.90
(4.78) (3.12) (7.77) (6.96)
int. short. in -6.91 -2.97 -2.68 -2.60
(−5.34) (−5.42) (−5.14) (−5.10)
population po 3.22 3.01 2.68 1.83
(3.16) (5.40) (4.25) (4.24)
mort. loan lm 0.06 0.30
(0.45) (3.51)
ECT coeﬀ. η η η lm η lm
DE -0.03 -0.00 -0.01 0.36 -0.01 -13.7
(−1.53) (−0.01) (−0.57) (0.07) (−0.20.) (−0.20)
FR -0.09 -0.16 -0.33 1.36 -0.34 1.59
(−3.49) (−3.45) (−6.00) (6.55) (−6.19) (7.54)
IT -0.10 -0.31 -0.17 0.50 -0.34 0.37
(−1.72) (−3.96) (−2.22) (1.47) (−4.75) (2.47)
ES -0.07 -0.24 -0.10 0.17 -0.13 -0.36
(−1.21) (−3.70) (−1.33) (0.22) (−1.74) (−0.46)
NL -0.14 -0.11 -0.24 0.69 -0.22 0.92
(−2.97) (−2.16) (−3.00) (3.02) (−3.34) (4.17)
BE -0.15 -0.12 -0.12 -0.54 -0.17 -0.06
(−5.77) (−3.15) (−4.29) (−2.37) (−4.87) (−0.47)
FI -0.24 -0.61 -0.62 0.44 -0.60 0.03
(−3.99) (−6.32) (−6.42) (3.19) (−5.65) (0.16)
IE -0.14 -0.19 -0.29 0.62 -0.27 0.68
(−3.61) (−4.53) (−4.87) (4.50) (−5.99) (5.03)
In the second half section of Table 1, I also report the ECT (Error Correction Term)
coeﬃcients for each country under the column headed η. The long-run relationship is
statistically signiﬁcant in almost every country and across all 4 models, except in Germany
and Spain for the homogeneous models. The hypothesis of no long-run relationship (Ho:
η=0) is rejected in 7 out of 8 cross-sections in the less restrictive model (leftest column).
The coeﬃcients are all negative, implying that current house prices tend to return back to
equilibrium following a shock. It is comforting that the long-run relationship does exist.
More problematic is the large variance among countries and especially across models.
The error-correction coeﬃcient is a measure of how quickly each of the country should
return to its long-run equilibrium following a shock. These speeds of adjustment vary
quite considerably across models and countries. While countries can be very diﬀerent, the
large diﬀerence across countries proves an instability in the short-term coeﬃcients. Italy
and France have a speed of adjustment of approximately 11 years in the most restrictive
model (rightest column) but only 3 years in the less restrictive model (leftest column)!
In the same stance, for Finland (respectively Ireland) it varies from 4 years (respectively
7 years) to one and half year (respectively three and half) in the less restrictive model.
23The variation of the speeds of adjustment may in part reﬂect the volatility in the sample
under consideration as well as some degree of small sample bias. Interestingly, the less
restrictive models have the highest speed of adjustment, while the most restrictive ones
have the lowest.
Table 2 reports ﬁrst, the short-term autoregressive house price coeﬃcients of the mod-
els of Table 1 ; second, the mean group estimates under the column headed MG. As the
econometric theory suggests, imposing homogeneity causes an upward bias in the coeﬃ-
cient of the lagged dependent variable. For almost all countries, the PMG estimates allow
to come to more realistic persistence coeﬃcient than for country speciﬁc estimates, this
is especially true for Germany and Italy. These results conﬁrm that the PMG estimator
perform better than the more consistent MG estimator.
Table 2: Coeﬃcient autoregressive term: ∆pt−1
PMG hom PMG het MG
Country rest unres rest unres rest unres
DE 0.43 0.42 -0.04
(3.08) (3.00) (−0.20)
FR 0.92 0.80 0.56 0.36 0.43 0.31
(7.46) (6.86) (4.04) (2.89) (2.41) (2.80)
IT 0.29 0.12 0.23 0.03 -0.27 -0.36
(1.79) (0.73) (1.43) (0.16) (−2.02) (−2.62)
ES 0.59 0.79 0.59 0.81 0.78 0.78
(3.74) (7.67) (3.70) (6.60) (5.20) (7.17)
NL 0.67 0.37 0.78 0.45 0.40 0.37
(6.09) (2.96) (7.12) (3.89) (2.11) (2.87)
BE 0.60 0.99 0.85 0.94 0.63 0.47
(8.23) (8.46) (14.37) (9.86) (5.18) (2.00)
FI 0.66 0.69 0.74 0.66 0.75 0.59
(4.59) (5.20) (6.46) (4.57) (4.42) (3.68)
IE 0.34 0.53 0.32 0.38 0.35 0.34
(2.50) (4.62) (2.71) (3.56) (2.38) (2.31)
5.3.2 Long-term slope homogeneity and error variance
The error variance (or SE: standard error of the regression) diﬀers strongly among countries
as shown in Table 3. Equality of error variance across countries as assumed in dynamic
panel estimators are not an appropriate assumption, leading to inconsistent coeﬃcient
estimates. Regarding this problem, PMG and MG perform much better. For obvious
reasons as PMG is more restrictive, the SE of the PMG are systematically larger than
the country speciﬁc sigma (MG) irrespective of restrictive, unrestricted, heterogeneous,
homogeneous. Across the PMG models, the unrestricted heterogeneous model has the
lowest SE on average (precisely: 0.040), whereas the restricted homogeneous model has
the largest (precisely 0.048). Finally, the restricted heterogeneous model has almost the
same as the unrestricted homogeneous one (0.043). These results corroborate the theory.
24Table 3: Error variance across models by country
SIGMA restricted ARDL SIGMA unrestricted ARDL
Country PMG hom PMG het MG PMG hom PMG het MG
DE 0.020 0.021 0.011 0.020 0.019 0.006
FR 0.026 0.018 0.014 0.028 0.020 0.012
IT 0.072 0.070 0.034 0.065 0.060 0.032
ES 0.071 0.071 0.050 0.062 0.071 0.047
NL 0.057 0.056 0.042 0.048 0.043 0.029
BE 0.019 0.021 0.017 0.022 0.018 0.015
FI 0.072 0.056 0.054 0.052 0.056 0.046
IE 0.045 0.040 0.034 0.045 0.038 0.034
PMG imposes homogeneity of the long-run slope, this hypothesis can be tested using
a likelihood ratio test, since PMG is a restricted version of the set of individual country
equation. The log-likelihood ratio statistic (LR) is distributed as a χ2 variate with kN
degrees of freedom, where k is the dimension of the parameters and N is the number
of countries (groups or sections). Although it is common practice to use pooled estima-
tors without testing the implied restrictions, in cross-country studies, the likelihood ratio
tests normally reject equality of error variances and slope coeﬃcients at conventional sig-
niﬁcance levels. This is clearly the case in our models as reported in Table 4, even in
the heterogeneous mortgage loan slope case. One possible explanation is that the group-
speciﬁc estimates may be biased because of omitted variables or measurement errors that
are correlated with the regressors. If the bias is non-systematic and averages to zero over
groups, pooled estimation would still be appropriate despite the homogeneity assumption
being rejected.
Table 4: LR statistic for equal long-term parameters
deg. freed. LR stat. prob-lim
restricted ARDL(2,0,1,1,1,0) PMG hom 35 195.75 0.00
PMG het 28 157.20 0.00
unrestricted ARDL H&Q PMG hom 35 249.54 0.00
PMG het 28 211.22 0.00
Another type of test can help testing parameter homogeneity: the Hausman (1978)
test. Consistent estimates of the mean of the long-run coeﬃcients can easily be obtained
from the MG estimator. These, however, will be ineﬃcient if slope homogeneity holds.
Under slope homogeneity, the pooled estimator is consistent and eﬃcient. Therefore, the
eﬀect of heterogeneity on the means of the parameters can be determined by a Hausman-
type test between the MG and PMG estimates. As can been seen in Table 5 and 6, the
null hypothesis22 of long-term slope homogeneity is rejected at any common level, even in
the unrestricted mortgage loan speciﬁcation. Thus, it is proven that strong heterogeneity
among country exists. This is a further reason to allow heterogeneous slopes at least in
mortgage loans. It is however important to stress that, due to the low time span, the
Hausman test might lack statistical power.
22Under the null of the Hausman test, there is no diﬀerence between the MG and PMG estimates.
25Table 5: Long-run coeﬃcients PMG and MG & Hausman test
restricted ARDL(2,0,1,1,1,0)
Coeﬃcients Hausman test
PMG hom PMG het MG h-test p-lim
st. dwelling dw -4.55 -2.54 2.73 2.12 0.15
(−3.99) (−6.30) (0.75)
real income dy 3.03 2.06 1.60 0.73 0.39
(4.78) (7.77) (2.67)
int. short in -6.90 -2.70 -1.00 5.46 0.02
(−5.34) (−4.37) (−1.06)
population po 3.22 2.68 -7.03 1.97 0.16
(3.16) (7.03) (−1.02)
mort. loan lm 0.06 0.45 0.47
(0.45) (2.38) (2.08)
Joint Hausman Test: 14.86 0.00
Table 6: Long-run coeﬃcients PMG and MG & Hausman test
unrestricted ARDL H&Q
Coeﬃcients Hausman test
PMG hom PMG het MG h-test p-lim
st. dwelling dw -1.42 -1.73 4.71 2.08 0.15
(−2.5) (−3.87) (1.05)
real income dy 1.18 1.88 1.02 0.76 0.38
(3.12) (6.96) (1.00)
int. rate in -3.0 -2.60 -0.60 12.25 0.00
(−5.42) (−5.16) (−0.76)
population po 3.01 1.83 -9.88 2.23 0.13
(5.40) (4.24) (−1.26)
mort. loan lm 0.31 0.4623 0.48
(3.51) (1.78) (1.77)
Joint Hausman Test: 15.50 0.00
In conclusion to this section, I propose to restrict the analysis to the restricted and
unrestricted models with heterogeneous mortgage slopes for three reasons. First, as high-
lighted in this section, homogeneous slope assumption may cause inconsistent estimates.
The homogeneity assumption is too strong for the detrended mortgage loan series. Sec-
ond, the ECT coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant and right signed for Spain. Finally and mostly,
short-term dynamic estimates are less sensible in the homogeneous case. Consequently, I
will restrict the analysis to the two heterogeneous models hereinafter.
5.3.3 Residuals
Importantly, residuals of the two models considered -restricted and unrestricted with het-
erogeneous mortgage loan slope- must be stationary. Annex 15 and 16 display the residuals
which seem to show mean reversion. To conﬁrm the intuition, the IPS (Im, Pesaran &
23The German mortgage loan coeﬃcient has been omitted.
26Shin, 1997) unit roots test in heterogeneous panels was performed.24 This test allows
for individual eﬀects, time trends, and common time eﬀects. Based on the mean of the
individual Dickey-Fuller t-statistics of each unit in the panel, the IPS test assumes that all
series are non-stationary under the null hypothesis. Lags of the dependent variable may
be introduced to allow for serial correlation in the errors. The exact critical values of the
t-bar statistics are given in Table 7 below. Under the null hypothesis of non-stationarity,
the p-value rejects at any common level unit-root for any sensible lag. To conclude, both
models track actual house prices fairly well in most countries, but still diagnostic tests
must be performed.
Table 7: Im, Pesaran & Shin unit root test
Residuals lag t-bar W-bar p-value
restricted 0 -3.18 -8.72 0.00
2 -3.13 -8.19 0.00
unrestricted 0 -2.50 -5.21 0.00
2 -6.02 -21.22 0.00
Table 8 and 9 reports the diagnostic tests on the error correction models, including
estimates of goodness of ﬁt. These tests are designed to empirically examine whether the
underlying statistical assumptions of the model hold. First, corrected R-squared ﬁgures
vary by country, but overall they suggest that the explanatory variables explain more than
60 % (restricted) and almost 66% (unrestricted) model the ﬂuctuations in the countries
in average. In 5 to 8 countries considered, the models explain over 60% of the change
in real residential property price growth rate, and in all but 2 countries (Germany and
Italy) the corrected R-squared is higher than almost 50%. The overall explanatory power
of the models is satisfactory. Second, most country regressions in the panel are robust to
standard diagnoses. The following exceptions must be stressed. At the 5% signiﬁcance
level, both models’ error terms show problems of serial correlation for Italy. Moreover,
functional form misspeciﬁcation is a problem in Germany (restricted model) but also in the
Netherlands and Ireland (unrestricted model). However, whether violation of functional
form for these 2 countries will signiﬁcantly alter our 8-country panel estimates is highly
doubtful. The assumption of normally distributed errors is also violated in the case of
Italy in a restricted model. However, in large samples, strict normality is not required
as long as errors have the same variances. The test of error variances is reported in the
column headed "Ch-HE" and indicates that none of the countries are signiﬁcantly aﬀected
in the restricted model. In the unrestricted, however, the Netherlands show abnormal
variance, but this heteroscedasticity may not be troublesome as all residuals are normally
distributed.
24The IPS test was performed on STATA thanks to the codes developed by Christopher Baum and
Fabian Bornhorst.
27Table 8: Diagnostic tests restricted ARDL(2,0,1,1,1,0)
Country ¯ R2 Ch-SC25 Ch-FF26 Ch-NO27 Ch-HE28 LL29
DE 0.38 0.18 7.57 0.72 2.25 77.81
FR 0.87 1.33 0.03 0.08 1.79 81.59
IT 0.17 61.2 0.34 19.87 0.02 42.95
ES 0.47 0.05 0.43 1.40 0.57 42.48
NL 0.62 3.43 0.36 1.19 1.48 49.35
BE 0.87 0.60 14.6 0.81 1.28 77.61
FI 0.69 0.04 0.19 1.45 0.63 49.50
IE 0.74 0.01 3.40 1.16 3.31 59.30
Table 9: Diagnostic tests unrestricted ARDL H&Q
Country ¯ R2 Ch-SC Ch-FF Ch-NO Ch-HE LL
DE 0.46 5.67 0.64 0.36 3.22 81.71
FR 0.85 2.48 0.55 0.17 2.28 79.58
IT 0.38 9.04 1.12 0.54 0.70 47.14
ES 0.46 3.39 1.67 0.84 1.25 42.32
NL 0.77 1.41 6.12 0.44 9.12 60.37
BE 0.90 3.29 3.13 0.85 3.22 84.65
FI 0.68 0.95 0.09 0.96 0.44 49.23
IE 0.76 0.77 4.31 1.38 2.76 59.05
6 Determinants of the euro area house price
6.1 Parameter aggregation
Deriving country speciﬁc conclusions based on panel parameter estimates might be risky.
Instead, and it is the purpose of the paper, I suggest to infer insights on a euro area level,
which in turn avert homogeneity problems. Basically, two aggregation methods as regards
the PMG estimates might be used. The ﬁrst supposes to derive the ﬁtted values on a
country level, and then to aggregate the ﬁtted values to ﬁnd the ﬁtted euro area. The
second, instead, suggests to derive euro area parameters and to calculate the ﬁtted euro
area house price with euro area series. The former might be the less controversial. The
latter, is however more adapted to simulate euro area shocks or convergence to steady
and analyze the consequence on the euro area house prices. For this reason, I choose the
second aggregation method.
The long-term common coeﬃcients of the error correction model can be taken in their
raw form. However, short-run parameters and error correction coeﬃcients are country-
speciﬁc and so need to be aggregated into euro area coeﬃcients. Also, the heterogeneous
long-run mortgage loan coeﬃcient must be aggregated. I propose to follow the aggregation
rule used for the euro area series.30 Consequently, the mortgage loan weighting is applied
to the long-term heterogeneous mortgage loan coeﬃcients for both models. The short-term
25Chi-square test of residual serial correlation
26Chi-square test of functional form misspeciﬁcation
27Chi-square test of normality of residuals
28Chi-square test of heteroscedasticity
29Maximised Log-likelihood
30The explanation as regards the aggregation of national series to euro area level is given in Annex 2.
28parameters estimates and the error correction coeﬃcients were aggregated with diﬀerent
weightings. The corresponding weighting was applied with respect to the series, that is,
residential property price weighting to the error correction coeﬃcients and respectively to
the lagged house price growth coeﬃcient. The HICP weighting was used for the interest
rate. The three other weightings (population, stock of dwelling, income) were calculated
for the purpose of the parameter aggregation by means of the data set. Consequently, the
second Table in Annex 2 gives the averages over the entire sample, as they are indeed-time
varying, albeit at a very low range.
This aggregation yields sensible results as clearly stated not only in Annex 19 (homoge-
neous models) but also Chart group 9 and 10 (heterogeneous models). All four price levels
deliver the same euro area house price history. Importantly, artiﬁcial euro area residuals
have been constructed. The artiﬁcial residuals in Annex 17 prove that the unrestricted
model tracks better current house price in the end of the sample period than the restricted
model. Overall, both models track actual house price fairly well. I call it artiﬁcial as in-
ference and diagnostic tests are not based on these residuals, but on the panel residuals
shown by country in Annex 15 and 16. Indeed, the euro area models only exist through
artiﬁcial aggregation. The artiﬁcial residuals in Annex 17 give insight on how well the two
models perform with regard to the euro area house price forecast.
6.2 Long-term factors
According to the estimated coeﬃcients shown in Table 1, the euro area real house price
equilibrium over time was calculated (ﬁtted value) for each speciﬁcation. Annex 19 (ho-
mogeneous slope) and Chart graph 9 and 10 ﬁrst graph (heterogeneous slope) depict the
euro area long-term equilibrium price relative to the actual real euro area house price, the
series are expressed in log index. Interestingly, ﬁtted house prices in level (price equilib-
rium) have the same historical pattern across the four models, conﬁrming the robustness
of long-run coeﬃcients. Misalignments can be interpreted as the diﬀerence between the
actual (or current) and predicted euro area house price equilibrium. As can be observed,
the actual house price overshoots the equilibrium price during three periods. The ﬁrst
begins with the second oil price shock in 1979 and ﬁnishes in the mid 80’s (1985 exactly).
The second starts in the late 80’s and ends in 1997. Since 2000, the current house price
is above the house price equilibrium and this misalignment has not shown reversion yet.
The ﬁtted euro area house price equilibrium captures well the house bubble of the 90’s
highlighted by the literature on housing. These results also prove that the current house
price is over-valued with respect to long-term equilibrium. To examine the factors behind
the model’s equilibrium price, the growth rate of the equilibrium price is decomposed into
the contribution factors, as can be seen in Chart group 8 for the restricted and unrestricted
model, respectively.
The equilibrium price decreased sharply during the period 1979-1985. This dramatic
equilibrium price decrease is not only due to the recession which occurred following the
second oil price shock but also to the tightening of the monetary policy at the beginning
of the 80’s (which in turn exacerbated the recession) to purge the endemic consumer price
inﬂation. Indeed, the Bundesbank led a harsh monetary policy to contain inﬂationary
pressures, followed by the French authorities after the socialist experience in 1983 -the so
called "politique du Franc fort". The deﬂationary eﬀects of the monetary policy on the
house price equilibrium can be seen in terms of price (interest rate) and quantity (mortgage
29loan31). The fact that the equilibrium price was below the actual house price during
this period is not due to expectation behaviors on the house market price characterizing
bubbles, but rather by the sudden decrease of the equilibrium price. Indeed, the interest
rate and the disposable income explain essentially house price movements during this
period. The actual house price followed the equilibrium price in a staggered way because
of the inertia which is a typical feature of the house market.
Chart group 8: factors contributing to house price equilibrium growth
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From the mid 80’s to the mid 90’s, the actual house price caught up the equilibrium
price for three years and thereafter overshot it. The monetary policy succeeded in damp-
31Mortgage loan is a counterpart of money aggregate M3.
30ening consumer price inﬂation quickly in the beginning of the 80’s.32 Consequently, the
monetary authorities focused again more on fostering economic activity. The expansion-
ary monetary policy starting in the mid 80s preceded and helped the economic recovery
gain pace. Indeed, the two monetary policy stance indicators in our euro area model,
i.e. interest rate and mortgage loan prove an expansionary monetary policy starting al-
ready in 1982. The former coupled with the latter positively impinged on the equilibrium
price. The strong households’ disposable income growth -commensurate with the business
cycle- drove mainly equilibrium house price increase. Nevertheless, after 1988 the actual
house price increased even more. Two factors explain the increasing gap between equi-
librium house price and actual house after 1988. First, the Bundesbank until 1992 kept
raising interest rates due to inﬂationary pressures exacerbated thereafter by the German
reuniﬁcation. Second, the structural reforms on the ﬁnancial market -deregulation on the
ﬁnancial and credit market- allowed banks to overlend (see Annex 18, the growth rate of
mortgage loan). The former eﬀect impinged negatively on the equilibrium house price,
while the latter fuelled the actual house price. The deregulation in the ﬁnancial market
provoked a bubble which burst in the ﬁrst half of the 90’s with the slowdown of the eco-
nomic activity. In the end of the period under consideration, it is important to note that
monetary policy stance indicators prove a tightening despite the slowdown of the euro
area economy.33 Some countries like France maintained the currency peg within the EMS
(European Monetary System) against the tide in 1993 and 1995, at odds with the optimal
"leaning against the wind" rule and thus even harming more economic activity. This also
explains the weak growth of the equilibrium house price.
From 1996 to 2000, actual house prices tracked equilibrium house prices; thereafter,
the latter has grown at a slower pace than the former causing an increasing disequilibrium
gap with no reversion yet. From 1997 onwards, the convergence process towards the
EMU and eventually the launch of the euro have allowed a substantial fall in the nominal
interest rate due to a credibility gain for numerous member countries. Moreover the
vigorous recovery and long-lasting growth of the economy in a low inﬂationary environment
-associated with an accommodative monetary policy- improved twice the aﬀordability
power of households. First, the costs born to ﬁnance mortgage loans assuaged and, second,
disposable income strengthened households’ purchasing power. Manifold households took
opportunity to materialize their dream provoking a current house price increase in line
with the house price equilibrium. This environment characterized by strong fundamentals
lead to a second round eﬀect. As usual, banks thereafter relaxed their standard based
on expected house price increase and income. Since pledging collateral is one way of
alleviating the consequences of asymmetric information, housing prices may in turn also
inﬂuence credit availability. The self-perpetuating process of increasing real estate increase
and credit upsurge might explain the soaring house price increase overshooting house price
equilibrium. The misalignment of house price equilibrium with respect to actual house
price has been exacerbated by the recession in 2001. While the world economy, including
the euro area, was already teetering on the brink of a recession, the terrorist attack on the
11th of September pushed it over the edge. The two leading factors driving house price
equilibrium are interests and disposable incomes. The slowdown of the former impinged
on the equilibrium house price moderately as it was compensated by a loosening of the
32Thereafter, the oil price drop in 1986 helped policy makers to keep the lid on inﬂation until 1988.
33The German economy was an outlier due to the reuniﬁcation. This country-speciﬁc shock put the
EMS under pressure.
31ECB -leaning against the wind- policy. Altogether house price equilibrium has grown at
a lower pace, exacerbating the gap between house price equilibrium and actual price.
The excess demand was derived by summing the eﬀects of population and stock of
dwelling on house price growth equilibrium. First, despite adding the housing depreciation
eﬀect, excess demand impinged negatively on house price over the sample, except in the
last four years. As can be observed in Annex 18, stock of dwelling and population exhibit
both a downward trend. Nevertheless, the growth rate of population is well below the
stock of dwelling. Stock of dwelling do not take into account quality improvement in
housing. Perhaps a new series stock of dwelling corrected by quality improvement and
housing depreciation would exactly oﬀset the growth of the number of households in the
long-turn, at least this is what theory would suggest. Due to missing data on quality, this
hypothesis cannot be tested. Second, in a PECM, there is no possibility to identify several
cointegration relationships (cointegration rank) within a single model. One alternative
would have been to estimate a demand and a supply separately, but this option is ﬂawed
by poor supply side data. Instead, a reduced model (very close to a demand equation)
was estimated with the drawback of not being able to identify what belongs to demand
versus supply. Thus, conclusions based on excess demand should be taken with caution.
According to Chart group 8, however, supply did not react quickly enough at the end of
the period under consideration, and thus provoking a positive excess demand which had
a positive impact on the house price equilibrium.
6.3 Short-term factors
As discussed earlier, heterogeneous mortgage loan slopes34 have been chosen because the
short-term parameters are more sensible than in the homogeneous pairwise models. Chart
group 9 depicts the results of the restricted model while Chart group 10 depicts the unre-
stricted ones. The ﬁrst graph shows the current house price in level beside the estimated
euro area house price equilibrium. The chart in the middle shows the short-term dynamics
of the current house price beside the ﬁtted values of the error correction model. Finally,
the bottom graph indicates the factors driving the house price dynamics according to the
model estimates.
The restricted model captures well the current house price dynamic until 2001. After-
wards, the model predicts a substantial drop in the growth rate bottoming at 2%, while
actual house price kept growing eventually exceeding 6% per year the last two years. This
proves that the model fails in predicting accurately house price at the end of the sam-
ple. At least one important factor is missing. The unrestricted model performs better
in-sample forecasts over the entire sample. Despite some huge residuals, the unrestricted
model explaining mostly the history of the euro are house price dynamics. Annex 17
illustrates the artiﬁcial residuals of both models.
Both models indicate that persistence and disposable income drive mainly current
house price dynamics. This salient feature of house price dynamics highlighted in the
literature is also in line with the theory developed in section 3. First, house price stickiness
is underpinned by staggered supply not only due to the investment function and law of
34Models where the long-run coeﬃcients of mortgage loan are not required to be the same across coun-
tries.
32motion of housing stock, but also to house price expectations based on past prices. Second,
current income and expected income enable households to aﬀord real estate purchase and
to meet the bank’s standard to agree to a mortgage loan. These two points are consistent
with the main theoretical literature and earlier empirical ﬁndings. Surprisingly, the interest
rate eﬀect on house price dynamics is quite nil, while it counts in the long-term house price
equilibrium. The same result was found in Ott, 2005b, albeit to a diﬀerent form: ﬁrst
diﬀerence interest rate was not signiﬁcant but real interest rate in level was. In a PECM
estimation procedure, it is not possible to specify in both equations: long- and short-term
the same variable twice in level. Interestingly, in the long-term speciﬁcation, interest rate
is strongly signiﬁcant. As a result, in Ott 2006b, the interest rate in level might capture
a long-term eﬀect.
The lackluster performance in forecasting the last four years proves that the restricted
model fails to pick up at least one important factor. This lies in the speciﬁcation of the re-
stricted model itself, as it omits short-term variation of stock of dwelling and mortgage loan
dynamics. Indeed, in the unrestricted model variation of stock of dwelling and especially
mortgage loan dynamic explains almost half of house price dynamics after 2001. The still
growing house price -despite the slowdown of the economy after 2001- might be due to the
supply responding with delay, but also to the role of banks on the mortgage market. The
inertia of housing supply has already been explained in the previous paragraph. However,
mortgage loan development story must be deepened. A growing house price is tantamount
to higher collateral values. This enables households to attract more mortgage credit since
the problem of asymmetric information becomes less critical to banks. The former feeds
the latter and vice versa leading to a self-perpetuating process (Ott, 2006b). To conclude,
these two eﬀects together explain mostly the house price dynamic after 2001. Since the
restricted model does not capture these two mechanisms in the short-term speciﬁcation,
the predicted disequilibrium between current and price equilibrium of the restricted model
stops building up and instead dies out at 16.4% per year, according to the euro area error
correction term.
Overall, in the unrestricted model, it is worth mentioning that mortgage loan only
inﬂuences sporadically house price dynamics. It only has a signiﬁcant impact in the
end of the period under consideration. Reviewing some past episodes, this raises some
questions. Thus, the sharp increase of real house price in the mid-80’s was sustained by
fundamentals like strong disposable income growth. Thereafter, house price kept growing
beyond the fundamentals ending up in a bubble. I would have expected a surge in housing
credit coupled with the ongoing house price increase in the end of the 80’s and beginning
of the 90’s. As can be seen in Chart group 10, mortgage loans as factor contribution
do not explain anything for this period. Reviewing the country data, Germany, Spain,
Finland and Belgium were concerned by an upsurge in housing credit. Annex 18 states
clearly that a boom-bust housing credit occurred from the mid-80’s to the beginning of the
90’s. However, thereafter, the upsurge in credit boom is much more impressive, reaching
an unprecedented 10% peak in 1999. The literature documents well the Nordic countries
and the UK experience (Ortalo-Magné & Rady, 1999) for massive shifts due to ﬁnancial
liberalization. However, Finland does not account much in euro area weighting and the
UK is not even a member state. The ﬁnancial liberalization occurred in euro area countries
successively and not at the same time according to the country policy pace. On a euro
area level, this smooths the impact of ﬁnancial liberalization while on a country scale, the
eﬀect is much more abrupt.
33Chart group 9: Imposed lag structure (restricted) ARDL(2,0,1,1,1,0) heterogeneous
mortgage loan slope
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34Chart group 10: H&Q lag structure (unrestricted) ARDL heterogeneous mortgage loan
slope
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35The purpose now is not to forecast euro area house prices for the next few years but
rather to simulate an adjustment process back to equilibrium. The investigation is the
following, supposing that the tide starts to turn in 2006, how will euro area house prices
go back to its equilibrium level. I made following assumptions as regards the steady state
values of the explanatory variables. I took the mean growth rate over the entire sample of:
disposable income per capita, stock of dwelling and population. Interest rate equilibrium
and mortgage loan growth rate are set to 2% and 0% respectively. The accuracy of
the forecast within the 95% conﬁdence interval lies in the arbitrary assumption that the
turning point is actually 2006. The disequilibrium may keep building up for a couple of
years. However a trigger event can impinge on the house price negatively, and a lower
house price will again bring to the fore the problem of asymmetric information, forcing
banks to focus on the expected repayment capacity of their client in a subdued house price.
A squeeze of mortgage supply follows and this can start a vicious circle in line with the
ﬁnancial accelerator (Bernanke & Gertler, 1995). This trigger event may be an increase of
the interest rate, as it worsens household indebtedness and repayment capability on the
outstanding mortgage loans. Today the euro area economy is gathering pace and to avert
any inﬂation pressure, the ECB is raising its reﬁnancing rates. It is far-fetched to suppose
an abrupt real estate price fall. Contrary to stock prices which tumble down overnight,
house prices are sticky. However, interest rate increase might trigger a reversal to a more
subdued house market and to a soft landing of house price. Thus, supposing that the
turning point happens in 2006, might not be an unrealistic assumption.
Between both models, the picture of the adjustment process is broadly similar except
for the adjustment speed. Indeed, the error correction term is -0.164 and -0.20 for the
restricted and unrestricted model, respectively. As a result, it takes 6 years in the restricted
model but only 5 years in the unrestricted model to go back to equilibrium. The sharp
of the forecasted house price growth may not be unusual with regard to past experiences.
This does not mean that it will happen again, however. The euro area house price landing
might be softer and smoother than predicted. The sharp drop in the beginning of the
80’s occurred in a high inﬂationary environment associated with harsh monetary policy
which in turn decided to put a lid on inﬂation -regime switch of high to low inﬂation.
The substantial house price fall in the mid 90’s also happened in a diﬀerent context. In
France for instance, the macro-economic environment was characterized by low inﬂation,
economic activity slowdown and high interest rates. The non-optimal monetary policy
was the price to pay to maintain the currency peg with the Deutsche mark. The current
macro-environment is diﬀerent to that of the 80’s and 90’s. A single currency with an
independent Central Bank might eschew high inﬂationary pressure and/or non-optimal
monetary policy with regard to the business cycle. Thus, the peak year can be postponed
a couple of years, and the present ongoing cycle will be even larger. Despite the existence
of a cycle in house prices, a sinusoidal regularity is far-fetched due to idiosyncratic macro-
events. Once again, the purpose is not to forecast accurately future house price movements,
and the results should be taken with caution. Nevertheless, the models are informative
and allow to simulate the adjustment dynamics from current price to price equilibrium.
367 Conclusion
This study investigates the empirical relationship between real euro area house price and
a set of macroeconomic variables. A general equilibrium model -where a representative
household maximizes its utility and ﬁrm its proﬁt- underpins the choice of macro variables.
The choice of the estimator is based on four aspects. First, the theoretical part indicates
that house prices might be an autoregressive process, thereafter corroborated empirically.
Second, the time span is short and does not allow robust estimates in a classical time
series framework. Third, one purpose of the paper is to disentangle long-term from short-
term eﬀects in order to derive a house price equilibrium. Fourth and last challenge,
the house market depends on local speciﬁc factors and the mortgage market across euro
area countries bears the stamp of strong national features; as a result, heterogeneity is
of concern. A sensible choice of estimator is the PMG, which posits a dynamic PECM
that allows short-run and a sub-set of long-run parameters to vary across countries, while
restricting long-run coeﬃcients to be identical across the sections. The speciﬁcation tests
performed on the data corroborates the choice of the PMG estimator since it performs
better than MG or restricted estimators.
The models provide good results as regards the sign, signiﬁcance of coeﬃcients and
the explanatory power of the regressions. The residuals do not show signiﬁcant abnormal
pattern as proved by the diagnostic tests. The empirical results suggest a strong long-term
empirical relationship between house price and not only fundamentals such as disposable
income, interest rate, stock of dwelling and population but also mortgage loan. The
estimates concerning the short-term dynamic however do not fulﬁll the expectations. To
ﬁnd sensible results, long-term heterogeneous mortgage loan slopes are introduced, which
improves signiﬁcantly the short-term estimates. The short-term quantitative estimates
as regards the importance of each factor on house price dynamics are similar to previous
ﬁndings in Ott (2006b), even for interest rate. Indeed, the ﬁrst diﬀerence of interest rate
was not signiﬁcant either but in level (Ott, 2006b). Finally, I use the estimated models
to generate euro area ﬁtted values instead of deriving country speciﬁc conclusion. This
assuages the criticism as regards homogeneity assumption of long-term coeﬃcients. From
2002 to 2005, the ﬁtted values underestimate actual house price growth, exactly as in Ott
(2006b) even in the most speciﬁed second model. To conclude, I compare the ﬁtted values
with the actual real house prices to derive three types of conclusions. First, are the actual
real house prices above the equilibrium price level? Second, which factors drive not only
long-term house price equilibrium but also actual euro area house price dynamics? Third,
if there is a disequilibrium, how would house prices convergence back to their equilibrium
level?
The model estimates of euro area house price equilibrium depict three positive mis-
alignment with respect to actual house prices. The ﬁrst starting during the second oil price
shock until the mid 80’s. The second was beginning in the late 80’s and ending in the
mid 90’s. The third and last house price overshooting begins in 2001 and is still ongoing.
The gap between actual and house price equilibrium has widened since 2001 and has not
shown reversion yet. According to the results, house price equilibrium is essentially driven
by disposable incomes and interest rates. Surprisingly, in the short-term house price dy-
namics interest rates do not account for much, but income and the autoregressive term are
both the most important factors. The last house price cycle begins in 1995/1996 and was
mainly driven by households’ disposable income coupled with declining interest rates due
37to the EMU process. Since 2001, the economic slowdown should have dampened house
price growth, but expectations of further price increase and staggered supply fueled fur-
ther house price increase. Low short-term interest rates and expectations of future price
increase allowed households to capture housing credits with apparent strong collateral.
Thus, demand is still overshooting supply and the disequilibrium has not started to revert
yet. Supposing the tide starts to turn in 2006, current house prices would smoothly catch
up equilibrium price in 5 to 6 years according to the models. In the simulation of current
house prices adjustment to equilibrium level, I suppose that all explanatory variables equal
simultaneously their steady value in 2006 and onwards. By consequence, the adjustment
to equilibrium might be even softer and smoother than what is depicted in the simulation.
The gap between house price equilibrium and current price cannot be assimilated to a
bubble as deﬁned by Stiglitz (1990). Indeed, the misalignment of current prices to long-
term equilibrium price is a natural feature of the functioning of the house market. On
the contrary, the unexplained part (residuals) and, generously one half of mortgage loan
development and persistence may be due to a self-fulﬁlling and/or speculative behavior
in house prices. This very generous calculation in favour of a bubble represents roughly
3% in the second model of house price growth in 2005. This bubble estimate is well
below "the biggest bubble in history" documented by The Economist (2005) and Baker
(2002). It is realistic to suppose that the tide will start to turn in 2006 as supply starts
reacting and interest rates increase. However, contrary to them, the estimates would
rather suggest a soft and smooth landing, very typical of sticky and persistent house
prices. The Economist (2005) instead conjectures that house prices will tumble down
and harm heavily real economic activity through the wealth eﬀect by comparing western
house prices with Japanese house prices in the last 25 years. The present study does
not ﬁt into this scenario. The burst of the Japanese bubble in the beginning of the 90’s
had disastrous outcomes essentially for two reasons. First, two bubbles occurred together
with cross-linkages, one in the stock market, the other in the house market. In addition
both bubbles had risen to very high levels. Second, banks risk exposure was excessively
high. As a result, when the bubble burst, indebted households were not able to serve their
mortgage payments, which in turn worsened banks balance sheets. The crisis propagated
into the fragile banking sector provoking massive bank failures. The disruption of the credit
supply channel caused a credit squeeze (credit crunch). The banking crisis propagated on
the entire ﬁnancial system and economy (systemic failure). In contrast, as the banking
sector remains strong in Europe, i.e. banks balance sheets do not worsen in both sides
together (asset and liability), a deﬂation scenario is far-fetched.
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41ANNEX 1: Data
Annual data from 1975 to 2005 are used covering the longest available common period
restricted to 8 EMU countries: Germany (DE), France (FR), Italy (IT), Spain (ES), the
Netherlands (NL), Belgium (BE), Finland (FI) and Ireland (IE). As Residential Property
Price is not available for the period under consideration, Luxembourg, Portugal, Greece
and Austria were excluded. As a result, the sample consists of 31 observations in the time
dimension and 8 cross-sections. The panel series are: residential property price, consumer
price index, interest rate short-term, long-term, stock of dwelling, household disposable
income, population aged from 15-64, outstanding mortgage loan volume, credit to house-
holds, housing depreciation rate, housing rents and stock index price. Real series were
constructed by deﬂating the nominal series by the corresponding domestic CPI indices,
except household real disposable income, which is GDP deﬂated.
The ECB provided the residential property price, which was calculated from the na-
tional central banks and private agencies like the BulwienGesa AG in Germany and the
European Mortgage Federation, for instance. The database of Claudio Borio from the
Bank of International Settlement helped completing the ECB database. The collection is
a weighted average of series for new dwellings and existing dwellings. Note that data be-
fore 1995 include only West-Germany. Concerning the year 2005, I completed the dataset
on residential property price thanks to Livia Figà-Talamanca of the European Mortgage
Federation (2006).
The CPI is the yearly average of the monthly HICP (Harmonized Index Consumer
Price) from 1980 to 2005. ECB database uses Eurostat data and national CPI with a
ﬁxed euro conversion rate. The database was ﬁlled by the cost of living index for all
households, all items, provided by the BIS. The source of the Irish CPI however is the
national central bank of Ireland as the BIS cost of living index is not available.
For all countries including Germany, the ECB Desis database was used for the nominal
short- and long-term interest rate which is the 5 year government bond yield and the 3
month interbank oﬀered rate, respectively. Once again, the data set was ﬁlled by the
European commission DG-ECFIN AMECO database for data prior to 1990 except for
Germany, where I used the International Financial Statistics of the IMF for the long-term
interest rate and the OECD Main Economic Indicator for the short-term interest rate.
The sectorial Housing CPI was chosen as proxy for rents, except for Finland prior to
1995, where a rent index provided by the Finish National Statistic Oﬃce (Veli Kettunen)
was used. The ECB database on rents was also ﬁlled for Spain, from 1976 to 1984,
for Ireland from 1975 to 2004. These data were provided by respectively the Instituto
Niacional de Estadística (Web site) and the Irish Central Bank (McQuinn Kieran). As
1975 was missing for Germany, Spain and the Netherlands, I projected the missing value
by linear extrapolation over approximately the last 10 years (depending on the pattern of
the series).
The housing depreciation rate (δt) was calculated according to following formula: δt =
GFCFt−(NCSt−NCSt−1)
NCSt−1
GFCF and NCS stand for Gross Fixed Capital Formation and Net Capital Stock in
housing sector, respectively. National sources but also the European Mortgage Federation
database were used.
42Three diﬀerent demographic indicators were investigated: the number of households,
the population aged from 15 to 65, and the total population. Data scarcity on the number
of households obliged me to deal only with the other two variables. The source of the data
is Eurostat (European Labour Force Survey) but completed by the OECD. The German
database required some arrangements. The reuniﬁcation causes a structural break, i.e. the
OECD database jumps roughly from 60 millions to 80 millions around 1990. From 1990 to
2005, the new database provided by Eurostat was taken. Prior to 1990, the West-German
population growth rate was applied to the new Eurostat database.
The consumption of non durables and services and ﬁnancial wealth was not available for
many countries and GDP is too broad an aggregate to proxy household aﬀordability and
purchasing power. As a result, households’ real disposable income provided by the OECD,
the current issue was used. To settle the German reuniﬁcation data break, I took the raw
data from 1991 to 2005 and then calculated until 1975 by assuming the West-German
growth rate. Two sources were used: from 1975 to 1989, OECD database, and prior to
1990, ECB internal database (Forecasting section) except for Spain, Belgium and Ireland
where only nominal data were available. The OECD database does not provide data
for Ireland before 1977. Consequently, the database was ﬁlled by deﬂating the nominal
disposable income (source: Central Bank of Ireland) with the GDP deﬂator from the IFS
database (IMF).
Two proxies for housing credit were chosen: loans for house purchasing over 1 and
up to 5 years maturity and total loans to households. The former is the mortgage loan
and is the most accurate variable which theoretically impact the house price, while the
latter encompasses credits including non housing purchases like consumption credits. Un-
fortunately, the ECB by using data from National Central Banks provides mortgage loan
data only from 1995 to 2005. Consequently, I calculated the series backward by using the
growth rate of housing loans which stems from the BIS. The source of the second credit
series: loans to households, is also published by the BIS. Unfortunately these series do not
cover the entire sample either. Consequently, the total loans to households was calculated,
backward and sometimes forward when necessary by the credit to private sector growth
rate also provided by the BIS. Counterpart of the credit to private sector includes house-
holds but also individual enterprises. Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Finland are
concerned by this arrangement. The series for Italy in 1989, Spain in 2002 but especially
Belgium in 1994 (more than 140% credit mortgage increase) used to show measurement
errors. Consequently they were corrected by assuming the growth rate of the next closest
and broader credit series. In the empirical study of this paper, only mortgage loan series
were used.
The sectorial Housing CPI (source: ECB) was chosen as proxy for housing rents,
except for Finland prior to 1995, where a housing rent index provided by the Finish
National Statistic Oﬃce (Veli Kettunen) was used. The series housing rent were ﬁlled
for Spain, from 1976 to 1984, for Ireland from 1975 to 2005. These data were provided
by respectively the Instituto Niacional de Estadística (Web site) and the Irish Central
Bank (McQuinn Kieran). As 1975 was missing for Germany, Spain and the Netherlands,
I projected the missing value by linear extrapolation over approximately the last 10 years
(depending on the pattern of the series).
Stock price indices stem from both, International Financial Statistics (IMF) and the
43Main Economic Indicator (OECD), which are almost identical. Both sources were used as,
for example, the OECD index has a longer sample span for Germany but smaller for Italy,
Spain, Finland and the Netherlands relative to the IFS stock price index. The longest
stock price index available for Belgium is provided by the BIS which starts in 1980 while
IFS stock index is not available and the Main economic Indicators only starts in 1986.
Frans Buelens (University of Antwerp) and Stijn Nieuverburgh (University of New York)
provided the missing data (source: National Bank of Belgium).
ANNEX 2: Euro area aggregation
Currently 12 EU countries have joined the EMU, the member states are: Belgium (BE),
Germany (DE), Greece, Spain (ES), France (FR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Luxembourg,
the Netherlands (NL), Austria, Portugal and Finland (FI). However, in this empirical
study, the euro area was restricted to 8 countries due essentially to the lack of data for
the remaining countries. The weightings were recalculated for the eight countries (see
Table A2.1), following the ECB methodology (see ECB, 2005b) as regards the Residential
Property Price (RPP) and the Harmonized Consumer Price Index (HICP).35 National
series of interest rates and consumer price index, respectively residential property price
index were aggregated to euro area series by applying HICP weighting, respectively RPP
weighting. First, the HICP for the euro area is published by Eurostat. However, as the
study only uses the national data set of 8 countries, for congruence reasons an artiﬁcial
euro area CPI was constructed according to the European consumer basket for the entire
sample. Second, contrary to the CPI, the national RPPs are not harmonized. Despite
the possible error margins, price trends and movements are correctly reﬂected (see BIS,
2005). The GDP weighted index applied to aggregate the national RPPs (Table A2.1) is
an acceptable solution given the available data. Overall, the reliability of the euro area
RPP is strong. Finally, the euro area depreciation rate was calculated with respect to the
formula given in Annex 1. For this purpose national Gross Fixed Capital Formation and
Net Capital Stock in housing sector were added up to euro area series.
Table A2.1: Weighting euro area series (%)
Country % in HICP % in RPP % in LM
DE 32.46 31.61 46.65
FR 22.26 23.13 24.12
IT 20.85 19.32 5.41
ES 11.84 11.06 9.33
NL 5.86 6.75 8.59
BE 3.58 4.00 3.32
FI 1.74 2.13 1.59
IE 1.41 2.00 1.00
35see "Compendium of HICP reference documents (2/2001/B/5)" under http://forum.europa.eu.int
44First, national series were aggregated to euro area series in three diﬀerent ways depend-
ing on the series. The stock of dwelling, the population and the real loans were added by
countries. Two diﬀerent euro area real disposable income were calculated by aggregating
the national series. The former was divided by total population, the latter by population
aged from 15-64. In contrast, the other variables are indices, consequently a weighting
was applied (see Table A2.1 above) as already explained. The euro area HICP and the
nominal RPP were constructed. The real euro area RPP is the ratio nominal index over
HICP. The HICP weighting was applied to the interest rate. The euro area series can
been seen in Annex 18. Second, since population, stock of dwelling, disposable income
and mortgage loan have no weighting, I calculated a weighting with respect to the data
set in order to be able to generate euro area parameters. In the empirical investigation
disposable income per capita aged from 15-64 years old yields better results, thus Table
A2.2 only reports this proxy. These weightings are actually time-varying, albeit at a very
low scale. Table A2.2 and the last column of Table A2.1 only reports the average over the
sample. As a result, country speciﬁc parameters were aggregated to euro area parameters
by using the weightings given in Table A2.1 and A2.2.
Table A2.2: Weighting parameter estimates (%)
Country % in PO % in DW % in DY
DE 30.30 25.52 16.19
FR 20.40 23.31 15.27
IT 21.90 20.93 12.45
ES 14.57 15.21 8.20
NL 5.77 4.87 10.94
BE 3.82 3.35 14.87
FI 1.93 1.90 10.88
IE 1.30 0.91 11.20
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46Annex 4: Real disposable income and real residential property price growth rate (in
%)
47Annex 5: CLTV detrended and residential property price growth rate
48ANNEX 6: Utility maximization representative household





under the intertemporal budget constraint given by:




mt−1 = yt +
1 + it
1 + πt
bt + pt(1 − δ)ht−1 + mt
and the borrowing constraint,
mt = κptht.





bt+1 + ct + ptht +
1+iM
t
1+πt κpt−1ht−1 − yt
− 1+it










1+πt+1bt+1 − pt+1(1 − δ)ht − κpt+1ht+1
 
.
I maximize the Lagrangian with respect to ct, ht, bt+1 and λt, this gives the following
derivatives:
1) with respect to ct:
λt = βtUct (A6.1)
2) with respect to ht:





κpt − (1 − δ)Et(pt+1)
 
(A6.2)







Substituting A6.3) into A6.2) eliminates λt+1 and thereafter substitute (A6.1) into this
new equation yields:







κpt − (1 − δ)Et(pt+1)
 
= 0,
which gives the MRS, equation (4).
49To fulﬁll the dynamic optimization problem, the representative household must meet
the following two last conditions, i.e. 4) and 5):
4) Transversality condition: limt→∞ λtbt+1 = 0 , for the sake of clariﬁcation of equation
(6), I suppose bt+1 = 0,
5) intertemporal budget constraint.
ANNEX 7: House price dynamics and long-term pattern
50ANNEX 8: Algebra details ARDL (2,2,2,2,2,2) error correction model
Recalling the ARDL process of equation (14):





ψi,jkXi,j,t−k + ui + ǫi,t, (14)
I rewrite equation (14) by inserting steady state values (upper bar) for each variable
and ¯ ǫi = 0. This gives:
















ψi,jk ¯ Xi,j + ui

. (A.1)
At time t, I suppose the long-term relationship (steady state equilibrium). By adding
a time subscript to equation (A1), I ﬁnd equation (15):
pi,t =
1









 + ηt. (15)
and ηt stands for the short-term deviation with respect to the long-run equilibrium
house price value.
Starting again from the ARDL process of equation (14), and subtracting both sides of
the equation by pi,t−1 yields:





ψi,jkXi,j,t−k + ui + ǫi,t.
After the diﬀerentiation of pi,t , the other variables like pi,t−1 and all Xi,j,t, Xi,j,t−1
(for j = 2,3..,6) are diﬀerentiated as well by the same way. This gives:













ψi,jkXi,j,t−2 + ui + ǫi,t. (A2)
After some arrangements (A2) becomes:








ψi,jk∆Xi,j,t−1 + ǫi,t +
















Substituting this last equation into equation (15) rewritten at time t-2, gives equation
(16).
ANNEX 9: Moon & Perron (2003), Choi (2002), panel unit root tests
Var Test Deterministic terms Statistics Z(Choi), tb (M&P) p-limit
rpp Choi c,t 1.90 0.97
c -0.12 0.45
M&P c,t -0.45 0.32
c -2.25 0.01
dw Choi c,t -0.91 0.18
c 4.29 1.00
M&P c,t 0.02 0.51
c -3.34 0.42
dy Choi c,t 1.10 0.86
c 2.97 1.00
M&P c,t -0.14 0.44
c -3.63 0.14
po Choi c,t -2.51 0.00
c 6.12 1.00
M&P c,t -0.20 0.42
c -3.94 0.41
in Choi c 0.81 0.79
M&P c 3.65 0.13
lm Choi c,t 1.53 0.92
c 5.28 1.00
M&P c,t 0.15 0.41
c -2.18 0.02
52ANNEX 10: Levin, Lin & Chu (1992), Im, Pesaran & Shin (1997), panel unit root
tests
Var Test Deterministic terms Statistics, t*(LLC), W(IPS) p-limit
rpp LLC c,t -1.68 0.05
c 1.10 0.87
IPS c,t -3.21 0.00
c -0.83 0.80
dw LLC c,t -2.07 0.02
c 0.45 0.70
IPS c,t 2.02 0.98
c 1.79 0.96
dy LLC c,t -0.79 0.21
c -0.64 0.26
IPS c,t -0.15 0.44
c 2.37 0.99
po LLC c,t 1.11 0.87
c 0.63 0.74
IPS c,t -0.96 0.17
c 6.10 1.00
in LLC c 1.30 0.90
IPS c 2.64 1.00
lm LLC c,t 0.92 0.75
c 3.13 1.00
IPS c,t 0.24 0.31
c 6.81 1.00
53ANNEX 11: Time series ADF Tests
Var Count Lags Deterministic terms Statistics ADF 5% critical value
rpp DE 1 c,t -2.72 -3.58
1 c -2.25 -2.97
FR 1 c,t -3.62 -3.58
1 c 0.03 -2.97
IT 4 c,t -5.98 -3.60
1 c -1.47 -2.97
ES 0 c,t -7.01 -3.57
1 c -0.52 -2.97
NL 1 c,t -2.33 -3.58
1 c -1.26 -2.97
BE 2 c,t -2.12 -3.59
2 c -0.32 -2.98
FI 2 c,t -3.18 -3.59
1 c -2.80 -2.97
IE 2 c,t -2.92 -3.59
1 c -0.28 -2.97
Var Count Lags Deterministic terms Statistics ADF 5% critical value
dw DE 1 c,t -2.53 -3.58
3 c -1.63 -2.98
FR 1 c,t -2.83 -3.58
1 c 2.08 -2.97
IT 1 c,t -1.04 -3.58
1 c -2.55 -2.97
ES 1 c,t -2.15 -3.58
1 c 1.38 -2.97
NL 1 c,t -1.44 -3.58
1 c -3.44 -2.97
BE 1 c,t -1.45 -3.58
1 c -1.03 -2.97
FI 4 c,t -0.13 -3.60
4 c -1.96 -2.99
IE 1 c,t -1.77 -3.58
1 c 3.10 -2.97
54ANNEX 12: Pedroni’s cointegration test (the statistics refer to a standard normal
distribution)
rpp dw dy in po lm (1) (2)
x x -3.13 -3.77
x x -1.46 -1.63
x x -1.74 -1.51
x x -3.18 -3.83
x x -3.06 -3.73
x 1.82 2.28
x x x -0.03 -1.14
x x x -0.66 -0.59
x x x x -0.67 -0.50
x x x x x -1.31 -2.19
x x x x x x -1.19 -1.17
(1) Parametric panel ADF-statistic
(2) Parametric group ADF-statistic
55ANNEX 13: PMG estimates - with/without mortgage loan
Pooled Mean Group estimates long-term coeﬃcients
Elasticities Omission mort. loan Hom. mort. loan Het. mort. loan
long-term H&Q ARDL(2,2,2,2,2) ARDL(2,0,2,2,2,0) ARDL(2,0,2,2,2,0)
st. dwelling dw -2.64 -2.70 -2.25 -2.83
(−3.74) (−3.84) (−5.72) (−7.34)
real income dy 2.37 2.27 1.59 2.27
(6.22) (−5.54) (6.31) (−9.07)
int. rate in -3.50 -4.87 -2.80 -2.70
(−5.76) (−5.90) (−5.30) (−4.35)
population po 1.60 2.05 2.86 2.77
(2.29) (2.74) (7.00) (7.10)
mort. loan 1m 0.66
(8.27)
ECT coeﬀ. η η η η 1m
DE -0.02 -0.08 -0.00 -0.00 3.49
(−0.53) (−1.01) (0.18) (−0.05) (0.05)
FR -0.12 -0.18 -0.33 -0.42 1.39
(−3.45) (0.88) (−6.07) (−7.38) (8.19)
IT -0.28 -0.23 -0.25 -0.31 0.50
(−4.39) (−2.89) (−3.02) (−4.07) (3.04)
ES -0.07 -0.17 -0.17 -0.15 -0.04
(−1.03) (−2.64) (−2.36) (−1.91) (−0.07)
NL -0.14 -0.29 -0.24 -0.30 0.68
(−3.23) (−3.75) (−3.17) (−3.32) (−0.07)
BE -0.21 -0.18 0.01 -0.12 -0.54
(−8.03) (−5.71) (−0.40) (−3.18) (3.83)
FI -0.53 -0.48 -0.61 -0.60 0.41
(−5.76) (−4.90) (−5.32) (−5.57) (2.74)
IE -0.18 -0.19 -0.28 0.23 0.75
(−4.50) (−3.10) (−4.30) (−3.52) (3.42)
56ANNEX 14: PMG estimates - homogeneous/ heterogeneous mortgage slopes
Pooled Mean Group estimates long-term coeﬃcients
Elasticities Hom. mort. loan Het. mort. loan
long-term AIC H&Q AIC H&Q
st. dwelling dw -1.42 -1.42 -1.72 -1.73
(−2.69) (−2.50) (−3.88) (−3.87)
real income dy 1.20 1.18 1.88 1.88
(3.39) (3.12) (6.99) (6.96)
int. rate in -2.86 -2.97 -2.57 -2.60
(−5.36) (−5.42) (−5.14) (−5.10)
population po 2.71 3.01 1.82 1.83
(5.39) (5.40) (4.25) (4.24)
mort. loan 1m 0.37 0.30
(4.32) (3.51)
EC coeﬀ. η η η 1m η 1m
DE -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -13.7 -0.00 -13.7
(−0.63) (0.74) (−0.20) (−0.20) (−0.20.) (−0.20)
FR -0.18 -0.16 -0.34 1.59 -0.34 1.59
(−3.75) (−3.45) (−6.20) (7.55) (−6.19) (7.54)
IT -0.32 -0.31 -0.34 0.38 -0.34 0.37
(−3.96) (−3.96) (−4.76) (2.49) (−4.75) (2.47)
ES -0.21 -0.24 -0.14 -0.24 -0.13 -0.36
(−3.13) (−3.70) (−1.98) (−0.36) (−1.74) (−0.46)
NL -0.12 -0.11 -0.22 0.92 -0.22 0.92
(−2.24) (−2.16) (3.35) (4.19) (−3.34) (4.17)
BE -0.11 -0.12 -0.17 -0.06 -0.17 -0.06
(−2.72) (−3.15) (−4.87) (−0.48) (−4.87) (−0.47)
FI -0.63 -0.61 -0.66 0.02 -0.60 0.03
(−6.37) (−6.32) (−5.66) (0.14) (−5.65) (0.16)
IE -0.22 -0.19 -0.27 0.68 -0.27 0.68
(−4.99) (−4.56) (−6.00) (5.05) (−5.99) (5.03)
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59ANNEX 17: Residuals - constructed euro area models - restricted/unrestricted
heterogeneous mortgage loan slopes
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61ANNEX 19: Euro area house price equilibrium homogeneous mortgage loan
1) imposed lag structure - restricted ARDL
Euro area house price, current and long term price equilibrium restricted ARDL(2,0,1,1,1,0) 
















2) H&Q lag structure - unrestricted ARDL
Euro area house price, current and long term price equilibrium unrestricted ARDL H&Q 
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